Pedro Escudero retweeted
Warren Buffett: "Creating shareholder value doesn't mean doing something to get the stock up tomorrow.
Shareholder value means building the most value over a 5-10 year period that you can do with the resources at your command today.
That does not mean trying, every day, to have the stock go up."
Pedro Escudero retweeted
Milton Friedman: “Keep your eye on one thing and one thing only: how much government is spending, because that’s the true tax. If you’re not paying for it in the form of explicit taxes, you’re paying for it indirectly in the form of inflation or borrowing.”
Pedro Escudero retweeted
If S&P earnings are growing 33%, why Is the index falling: GS Ben Snider
Well, Ben, because the market is telling you that earnings won't grow 33%, especially since most of the "growth" comes directly from debt where the new issuance pipeline is already clogged up
Pedro Escudero retweeted
Stanley Druckenmiller:
“The greatest investors make large concentrated bets where they have a lot of conviction. They’re not buying 35 or 40 names...”
Pedro Escudero retweeted
Warren Buffett: “90% of the people that buy stocks don't think of them the right way. They think about them as something they hope goes up next week.”
“I think about what the company is going to be worth 10–20 years from now.”
Pedro Escudero retweeted
Railroads were once 63% of the entire US stock market.
Not 63% of transport stocks. 63% of everything listed.
The history of concentration, in order:
– Tulips, 1637. A single bulb traded for the price of an Amsterdam canal house.
– South Sea Company, 1720. Shares went from about £128 in January to above £1,000 by summer, then back near £150 by December.
– US railroads, 1840s. 63% of US market cap.
– Utilities, telecom and industrials, 1929. 36%.
– Nifty Fifty, 1972. 40%.
– Japan, 1989. 44% of global equity.
– Dot com, 2000. 41%.
– AI Big 10, today. About 40%.
- AI related 49%, today.
Every one of them was built on something real. Railroads did compress a continent. The internet did rewire commerce. Being right about the technology was never the thing that protected you.
The tulip story is also less clean than the legend. Modern research found the economic damage was modest and the ruin was mostly literary.
The bubble was never in the idea. It was in how many people decided to own the same idea at the same time.
Pedro Escudero retweeted
Charlie Munger: “Mis acciones de Berkshire han caído un 50% en tres ocasiones, y no me molesta demasiado. Lo considero la consecuencia natural de una vida adulta bien vivida.”
“Hay que dejarse llevar. A veces la cosa va a tu favor y a veces en tu contra. Todo forma parte del mismo juego.”
Pedro Escudero retweeted
The historical relationship between the S&P 500 forward P/E ratio and subsequent 10-year annualized returns suggests investors should expect a 4% CAGR on the S&P 500 over the coming decade.
Torsten at Apollo
Pedro Escudero retweeted
"Patience and aggressive opportunism is what you need. It's an odd combination, but it's what works best."
— Charlie Munger
Pedro Escudero retweeted
“People make bad choices all the time, usually because of fundamental inability to operate over longer time frames.”
— Charlie Munger
Pedro Escudero retweeted
Time becomes a competitive advantage when you have the patience to let it work in your favor.
Pedro Escudero retweeted
“Opportunities come infrequently. When it rains gold, put out the bucket, not the thimble.” — Warren Buffett
#ValueInvesting #Investing
Pedro Escudero retweeted
Charlie Munger: “The mistakes that have been most extreme in Berkshire's history are mistakes of omission.”
Mistakes are invaluable because they tend to offer the best lessons. The bad investments are glaringly obvious...
But the ideas you understood, could afford, & still failed to act on leave no trail in your portfolio. Only the return you could've earned.
Howard Marks did the math out loud on why the next ten years of your stock returns are already mostly decided. It is not the economy. It is not earnings. It is not the news. It is one number you paid on the day you bought.
He co-founded Oaktree, manages around 190 billion dollars, and called the 2000 tech crash and the 2008 collapse before either one arrived.
His warning has nothing to do with the headlines. It is not about a recession, an election, or a war. It is about the price on the sticker the day you buy in.
Buy the S&P 500 at 23 times earnings, and history gives one answer. Your return over the next ten years lands near zero, somewhere between plus two and minus two percent a year, almost every time it has been this expensive.
Price is not what you get. It is what caps what you can get. A great company bought at a rich price is still a poor investment, because the good news was already paid for.
That is the part nobody wants to hear at the top. The number feels boring while the crowd feels rich. And feeling rich is what makes people pay any price right before the decade of nothing.
Most people do not lose because they picked the wrong stock. They lose because they paid too much for the right one.
The market today sits near 25 times. Marks did not call a crash. He just read the sticker, and the sticker already gave the answer.
The clip is 90 seconds, free, from a man who saw the last two crashes coming. Almost nobody wants to hear it at the top, and fewer still act on it.



















