Comments such as these are instructive. If you have some belief about frontier labs, but frontier lab employees act inconsistently with this belief, what is the correct Bayesian update?

I'm actually fairly bearish on frontier lab valuations. I've never seen the reasons articulated to my satisfaction, so before I go to sleep, I wanted to quickly jot down my thinking here. The basic issue is that the labs are highly unprofitable. This may seem like a simple point, but private market valuations can be relatively irrational; however, like with $SPCX, post-IPO pricing will likely be much more punishing, especially as the standard 6-month lockup period expires and selling pressure intensifies. Many people claim that the labs have high margins. Yet even with high margins, a valuation of $1T would be justified only if the labs were doing nothing aside from serving inference (thus reducing costs only to those relevant to inference) and posting annual revenue numbers in the $100-200 billion range assuming ~80% gross margin and a 20x earnings multiple. This assumption is obviously not true, because the frontier labs have to continually spend money training the next generation of models. This is because of market competition from runner-up firms. For example, if OpenAI had paused model development last year, there would no longer be any point in paying GPT-5 API prices when you can just use Qwen or Kimi instead for much cheaper. Thus, the labs are forced to invest ever-increasing amounts of money in model training, in a way such that at any given point of time, the amount you're forced to invest in the next model is dramatically higher than the amount of money you're actually making, because even if your revenue goes up with higher model capabilities, so do your future training costs. This is a profoundly punishing dynamic which severely penalizes frontrunners. (There is also a related subpoint where frontier labs claim they can distill their leading models to win out at lower intelligence levels as well. This makes no sense because the revenue numbers involved are far too low when taking into consideration the rather low margin of such inference.) Frontier lab valuations appear largely to be based on the assumption that as you scale up, the capabilities which emerge will be sufficiently general and profound that we'll see explosive growth (epoch.ai/publications/explos…) from things akin to AI agents starting and autonomously managing entire companies of subagents. But it's not clear to me that this is the case; indeed, as I mentioned in my previous post (xitter.cf/andrewho03/status/2082…), I believe that capabilities growth will be slower, spikier, and more data-limited than people currently assume. It may be the case that eventually we will see explosive growth of this nature with full automation of the economy, but at the very least my viewpoint implies much longer (multi-decade) timelines until we reach this point. It is not clear to me that the frontier labs will be able to operate unprofitably for so long, although I suppose maybe this foreshadows some sort of inevitable nationalization. I also want to make a broader point about technological diffusion. The reason why technological diffusion is slow isn't just because, e.g., old people take a long time to learn how to use technology (although this is of course a contributing factor to some degree). In my view, it's because when a new, revolutionary technology comes along, the ways to incorporate that technology into subsequent developments are not always obvious, and in fact they cannot necessarily be arrived at through the application of pure reason. If they could be, then perhaps frontier models, at a certain point, would have a perfect understanding of how the LLM application layer should be developed, and they would then autonomously code, deploy, and sell such a layer. But it seems more plausible to me that this diffusion is limited moreso by the hard problem of economic calculation--that is to say, the Hayekian notion through which the price system gradually promotes efficient allocation of resources and which cannot be simulated through central planning--and that even if we froze current capability levels at today's levels, it would take well over two decades to fully integrate in LLMs into our lives. Such a view is consequently rather bearish for the continued profitability of labs as it reduces their prospects for finding, say, something else comparable in profitability to coding agents, which seems to have been a somewhat lucky discovery by Anthropic to begin with. That is to say, even if you spam FDEs you aren't necessarily going to be able to just figure out the "correct" product shapes fast enough. Overall, I don't think that people have clearly reasoned through their mental models for why lab equity should be worth as much as it currently is, and that if you actually bother to write down such a model, you may not arrive at the conclusion that you want to arrive at. This isn't to say that I don't expect AI to experience a huge (industry-wide) boom in the coming decades, but just that I'm not entirely sure I would buy OpenAI or Anthropic stock at latest valuations if I were given the opportunity to do so. Of course, as an ex-lab employee, arguably this is talking against my own book; I should really be giving people more reasons to be bullish. But in the end, my influence is so small that it doesn't make a difference, so why not have some fun?