Well, look at that @I_Am_JohnCullen we have the entire gang together. Fouchier, Kawaoka, Garcia-Sastre, and my good friend Webby doing gain of function experiments on H7N9. All we need is Jeffery Taubenberger and Worobey and we can have a party. 😏 Feds announce extra review for H7N9 studies- (2013) In a related development today, US government officials announced a new review process for certain GOF experiments with the H7N9 virus, such as the ones proposed in the letter by the CEIRS researchers. In the same issues of Science and Nature the federal officials wrote that studies funded by the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that could generate H7N9 viruses with increased airborne transmissibility in mammals will get an additional level of review. The announcement would apply to NIH-funded research projects, including those conducted by CEIRS researchers. Officials wrote that the review would weigh potential benefits, along with biosafety and biosecurity risks, and would flag any additional safety steps that are needed. They also noted that the review will be done by standing expert panels using an approach similar to the assessment of lab-modified H5N1 studies. Signers are part of NIH-funded network Ron Fouchier, PhD, a virologist at Erasmus University in the Netherlands, told CIDRAP News that all of the scientists who signed the letter are part of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH)–funded Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance (CEIRS). The program, based at seven sites throughout the United States, is a National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) research network that is designed to help the government and its global health partners prepare for and respond to epidemic and pandemic influenza threats. He said the idea of the letter came up during the weekly teleconference sessions that involved CEIRS investigators during the first months of the H7N9 outbreak. Scientists discussed communications issues in depth at a 2-day NIH conference in Washington, DC, and the topic came up again at a meeting on general dual-use research issues in February at World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva. In their letter today, the researchers wrote that the H7N9 outbreak requires focused fundamental and applied research by responsible investigators working in appropriate facilities with key risk-mitigation plans in place. They outlined five areas of H7N9 study that are the most urgent and may warrant GOF experiments: immunogenicity, adaptation, drug resistance, transmission, and pathogenicity. The proposed experiments are already subject to review by institutional biosafety committees and would be conducted with risk-mitigation plans that have already been developed for investigators who work with other potentially dangerous influenza viruses, such as the 1918 pandemic virus and H5N1. They said more review layers may be required by funding agencies, and they pointed to a newly announced review process for H7N9 GOF studies. Osterholm says he has full confidence in the biosafety steps used at labs such as Fouchier's and Kawaoka's, but he and others are still concerned that details about the experiments in scientific publications might enable labs in other parts of the world that don't have the same standards and oversight to replicate the work, which could pose a risk of an accidental release or allow dangerous viruses to be acquired for bioterror uses. experts.umn.edu/en/publicati… cidrap.umn.edu/dual-use-rese…