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red teaming, malware and redbull

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Joined December 2021
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mangel retweeted
My research got accepted into Phrack! In it, I explain the Windows Smart Card Minidriver architecture and show a really cool piece of malware I made that can use any smart card connected to a remote computer, regardless of model. phrack.org/issues/73/abusing…
Phrack 73 just dropped. Tell your SOC you'll be busy phrack.org/issues/73/1
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Process Injection is one of the most fundamental capabilities of malware. It plays a role both in establishing a foothold after initial access and during post-exploitation, but the technique suffers from a fundamental problem: its traditional behavior is predictable and well understood by defensive solutions. The classic Remote Process Injection flow can be roughly summarized in four stages: 1. Enumerate processes on the compromised machine; 2. Obtain a handle to the target process; 3. Allocate and write shellcode into the target process's memory space; 4. Change the memory region's permissions from RW to RX. The set of WINAPIs designed for these operations is relatively small, which makes life easier for EDRs. The list of the most sensitive APIs is short: VirtualAllocEx → NtAllocateVirtualMemory VirtualProtectEx → NtProtectVirtualMemory WriteProcessMemory → NtWriteVirtualMemory Whether through kernel callbacks or userland hooks on ntdll, these calls are easily monitored. There are ways to deal with this problem, including simply not performing process injection, at least not during initial access, and choosing something like DLL Sideloading. But we want a challenge, right? :) In the screenshot I show something different. It is possible to write into a remote process's memory without invoking sensitive APIs such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory or NtWriteVirtualMemory. Based on an article written by the amazing researcher @TwoSevenOneT, I developed a shellcode runner that successfully evades Windows Defender (with Cloud-Delivered Protection enabled) by poisoning a target process hStdInput. The technique abuses Windows console applications (such as netsh.exe) by redirecting the child process's hStdInput handle via CreateProcess with STARTF_USESTDHANDLES. The content written to the Named Pipe ends up allocated in the target process's memory by the operating system itself, with no explicit call to VirtualAllocEx or WriteProcessMemory. To locate the shellcode in remote memory, the payload is preceded by a previously established byte sequence that serves as a marker. The runner scans the target process's memory for this pattern, identifies the region, adjusts permissions, and redirects execution to the shellcode. None of the most sensitive APIs are used for writing the payload. Three APIs that are also used, among other purposes, in traditional injection are present (VirtualProtectEx, CreateProcessW, and ResumeThread), but outside their traditional context they are far less suspicious. Currently, this shellcode runner PoC would not successfully evade top-tier EDRs, but the goal was to demonstrate viability, not perfection. A little bit more evasion tomfoolery would be enough. The link to the article that guided me through this experiment will be down below, make sure to do something useful with your life and read it. Keep Hacking, Sp1d3rM_*!^
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past few weeks i’ve been pwning atms with an awesome team }:)
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mangel retweeted
x64dbg larping
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🚨New 0day inbound, curl2shell🚨 Can compromise any Linux host. Potentially 70% of the internet is affected. Tweet-able PoC: 𝚌𝚞𝚛𝚕 -𝚜 𝚑𝚝𝚝𝚙://𝚌𝟸 | 𝚜𝚑 Can’t be patched
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mangel retweeted
Independientemente de la posición política que tengas, demasiado "libre" me parece que tiene Pedro el móvil en cuanto a seguridad. Dejadme explicarme. Las personas de interés y quienes ocupan cargos políticos relevantes deberían tener protocolos de seguridad mucho más estrictos para sus dispositivos personales. No se trata de conseguir un smartphone air-gapped, porque dejaría de cumplir buena parte de su función, sino de reducir al máximo su superficie de ataque sin renunciar a la practicidad. Esto implica dispositivos especialmente endurecidos, comunicaciones controladas, compartimentación de información y, dependiendo del modelo de amenazas, incluso la inutilización física de determinados sensores. Por ejemplo, deshabilitar una cámara por software no ofrece las mismas garantías que bloquearla físicamente. De hecho, Apple cuenta con Indigo, una solución de seguridad evaluada por el BSI alemán para el uso de iPhones y iPads en entornos gubernamentales. Esto demuestra que no es necesario extirpar componentes del hardware para alcanzar determinados estándares de seguridad gubernamentales. Aunque, dependiendo del modelo de amenazas, pueden justificarse medidas físicas adicionales, como cubrir o inutilizar cámaras. Lo hemos visto en figuras públicas como Netanyahu, fotografiado con las cámaras de su smartphone cubiertas con cinta. Determinados precintos también permiten detectar intentos de manipulación física. Y aun así, esto es solo una pequeña parte de la seguridad operacional que debería rodear a alguien con acceso a información especialmente sensible.
Aprovechando que voy en el coche, camino de Burgos, para escuchar este temazo argentino. ¡Me encanta! open.spotify.com/track/32fRE…
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mangel retweeted
El hacking es esto, no robar cuentas de jubilados. Es saltar restricciones absurdas y mejorar cosas, encontrarle nuevos usos y evitar la obsolescencia programada.
I just vibe-coded my TV It showed an ad before I could even open Netflix. Gave Claude Code the model number. It found the TV on Wi-Fi, removed 25 Xiaomi packages and built this launcher. Basically an Apple TV now.
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Anything can be a C2 if you are creative enough
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mangel retweeted
this is my c2, there are many like it, but this one is mine.
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mangel retweeted
🐝 🪼 Inside BOFs, Crystal Palace, and JellyBee PIC (1/3): How the Loader Prepares and Executes a COFF Object in Memory What happens between compiling a BOF and executing it in memory? The compiler produces a COFF object. The implant’s loader still has work to do. 🎥 Watch the first episode: lnkd.in/evrzdM2f The release of the first JellyBee components is approaching. One will be released under GPLv3, while the others will be available free of charge under a license provided upon request. Before the first release, this technical series explores the architectural differences behind how implant capabilities are built, loaded, and executed. JellyBee is the only command-and-control ecosystem built around a modular, position-independent implant architecture with an integrated environment for building its capabilities directly from C projects and repositories. Swarm Factory makes this architecture practical for operators by handling PIC complexity through an advanced compilation driver integrated into its build environment. Capabilities are built as independent modules within the same ecosystem that manages their execution, allowing JellyBee to maintain a small implant core. Craft & Control. To explain this architecture and how it differs from other approaches, the series examines three models: ① BOF / COFF Compilation produces the object, but loading still requires work such as applying relocations and resolving symbols and dependencies. In the Beacon BOF model, the implant provides the loading infrastructure. Modules can also use Beacon’s internal APIs and Dynamic Function Resolution (DFR) for Windows API imports. The first video follows this process in memory. ② Crystal Palace Linker The second episode explores linking and composing capabilities for position-independent execution, examining where loading and resolution responsibilities reside in the resulting design. ③ JellyBee’s Modular PIC Architecture The third episode presents the build workflow integrated into Swarm Factory, from C projects to position-independent modules. Instead of continually expanding a single implant binary, JellyBee keeps capabilities in separate modules. Its base implant currently ranges from approximately 23 to 45 KB and does not require a separate stager. Code originally developed as a BOF can also be adapted to conventional C and built through Swarm Factory into a position-independent module. Start with Chapter 1 to see what the BOF loader does in memory and understand the foundation for the next two episodes. 🧪 lnkd.in/eWxWaHjS #Cybersecurity #RedTeam #BOF #Offensive #PIC
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I asked dozens of ransomware groups one important question, do they like cats, here are the results 🧵👇
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0x12DarkSandbox is free for everyone now! Test your implants vs the best malware detonator🤗 3 free scans per day. 0x12darksandbox.net Here the results from a public scan: 0x12darksandbox.net/results/…
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Made a real-time slop detector with jev as you scroll
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RT @NtRajkit: 🐝🪼 Creating PICs quickly and easily is one of JellyBee's advantages. This allows us to turn almost any C project into a posit…
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One way to spot a malicious proxy DLL when there are over 20 DLLs in the folder and one of them is lying, under 60 seconds. Let's go 👇 1/ An unsigned DLL named like a Microsoft runtime (𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚛𝚝𝟷𝟺𝟶.𝚍𝚕𝚕)? Open it in your favorite disassembler. Exports look normal. Now double-click any export, and you see: 𝚖𝚘𝚟 𝚛𝚊𝚡, 𝚌𝚜:𝚐𝚃𝚊𝚛𝚐𝚎𝚝 𝚓𝚖𝚙 𝚚𝚠𝚘𝚛𝚍 𝚙𝚝𝚛 [𝚛𝚊𝚡+𝟾𝟸𝟶𝚑] Click another one, and it's the same thing. You see 291 exports but zero real code - every function is a forwarding address. 2/ Now check that table: 𝚐𝚃𝚊𝚛𝚐𝚎𝚝 in the .𝚍𝚊𝚝𝚊 section - it's zeroed on disk. Every export jumps through it, and the file has nothing in it. It stays empty until the DLL loads, then one function does 𝙻𝚘𝚊𝚍𝙻𝚒𝚋𝚛𝚊𝚛𝚢("𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚛𝚝𝟷𝟺𝟶𝚊.𝚍𝚕𝚕") + 𝙶𝚎𝚝𝙿𝚛𝚘𝚌𝙰𝚍𝚍𝚛𝚎𝚜𝚜 a few hundred times. And there it is: 𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚛𝚝𝟷𝟺𝟶𝚊.𝚍𝚕𝚕 - the legitimate DLL in the same folder with one extra letter in the name. The fake DLL carries the real one's name and forwards every call to it. The 60-second checklist: ☑️ DLL named like a Microsoft runtime (𝚌𝚘𝚗𝚌𝚛𝚝𝟷𝟺𝟶.𝚍𝚕𝚕), but wait, Microsoft didn't sign it ☑️ all exports share one identical code stub ☑️ jump table zeroed on disk ☑️ a second DLL with the same name + one extra letter
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I've taken over enterprise networks in less than 60 seconds......
10 hours. That’s all it took for an AI-assisted TA to completely compromise an enterprise network. In less than 10 hours, the TA bypassed perimeter firewalls, exfiltrated Vault secrets, hijacked GitHub CI/CD pipelines, and backdoored active production K8S nodes. The TA also released a comprehensive 80-page technical report detailing its findings and remediation recommendations. unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/…
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We reverse engineered malware built to kill our own EDR. In August 2026, eSentire documented a ClickFix campaign selling a DLL sideloader as a service. It drops a malicious mscoree.dll next to a signed Microsoft binary, vb7to8.exe. Windows loads the planted copy first. Attacker code then runs inside a trusted process. The kit also ships a vulnerable driver (BYOVD) to disable EDR, including Elastic Endpoint. So we rebuilt it. A NativeAOT .NET 7 library, exports faked, a module initializer that fires on load. We dropped it beside vb7to8.exe and ran it. Elastic Defend 9.5.0 flagged the load as DLL Hijack: Masquerading. Detecting this before 9.5.0 took ~88 lines and a list of ~2,600 library names. Now it's one line. MITRE ATT&CK: T1574.001 (Hijack Execution Flow: DLL), T1036 (Masquerading). Reverse engineering walkthrough, the .NET rebuild, and the detection breakdownby @0xfluxsec and @django88_: go.es.io/4xw6o5G Original campaign research by @eSentire.
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mangel retweeted
yall buying signing certs? they're just online for free
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We are pleased to release tmp.0ut 5 Volume! Get your viruses, rootkits, strange ELFs, weird machines, tiny files, cool art, and phresh beats here!! tmpout.sh/5/
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