reverse engineer | arm64 :) | macOS/iOS @Volexity | YouTube: https://xitter.cf/t.co/VdHNCl0Qfl

NC
Joined October 2017
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My new site for learning macOS malware reverse engineering: l0psec.github.io/Malware_RE_… I got my start in RE by using @patrickwardle's awesome blog. I would download samples and follow along. So I created this to complement that with dives into specific code from recent samples.
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L0Psec retweeted
.@Volexity has published the third and final installment of its Mind the (Patch) Gap series. Parts 1 and 2 detailed Volexity’s discovery of multiple Chinese threat actors chaining zero-day exploits in Google Chrome and Microsoft Windows to deploy malware. This post takes a closer look at Volexity Volcano, one of the most advanced tools behind those findings. The blog post also showcases Volcano’s new MCP server for AI-assisted incident response, threat hunting, and digital forensics. Volexity analysts used it to triage a compromised system, automatically annotate related artifacts, create new IOCs for future detection, and schedule targeted collections across endpoints. Read the full post here: volexity.com/blog/2026/10/16… #dfir #threatintel #memoryanalysis #memoryforensics
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Attempts to disable notifications to either create a launch time or launchAgent. RAT behavior exposes certain functionality observed in 0x100008268, which is focused on getting other scripts delivered for execution (forked), pings, uploads, clipboard, etc.
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The upload functionality (0x10001aa80) is interesting, because there are several fallback targets including: temp\.sh/upload, litterbox.catbox\.moe, x0\.at, tmpfiles\.org, filebin\.net, easysend\.co via curl APIs. Ok that is enough for this thread, too long...
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9b0efba16de053c58e1d79d0b51c7331b74da729bd7913b9c9dfa95381398fb8 5086aaf6d234f6022430ffa2b3cedf966f24e68c4e69b84c7c4280c3679568b3 a23ae5735ca185c5d8ce5fe650cb07f7fce6d3ebc9dd46352c04c6aca572a416 9a30421a755d23c6df57dd0d4af6d3526fc6dbb9f34638f82cd1bfeefefa296c
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Interestingly, the stage2 Swift file has several "Sonoma" string references. "SONOMA_DISPLAY_NAME", /tmp/.sonoma_probe, SONOMA_REGRAB_PASSWORD, SONOMA_SKIP_DECOY. Maybe Sonoma Stealer??
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We also have a call to pam_verify_login() after the password is captured to verify the password using PAM APIs. There's been a lot of this recently. Also this has references to Tox (tox_client) and is related to an NSTask setup with several possible args. (in screenshot)
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Ok onto the last one, this is taking a while. This is the app called Finder (trying to act like a legit app). Which behaves like a RAT. After password captured by other app, this one is the longer lived binary (launch item/agent) in ~/Library/Application Support/System/Finder.app
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So the rust mach-O has obfuscated strings, but not super complicated (yet). BUT this gets pretty long with multiple steps (as with most modern macOS malware) so will try to keep it short. This is the main loader. First we have some anti analysis with ptrace() and sysctlbyname()
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Ok onto the downloads, it first grabs the password capture swift app from mypinata\.cloud (which I didn't even know about before) https://copper-impossible-flea-8.mypinata\.cloud/ipfs/QmYR7tJfviMMqSUVNVEPQMp5Hg9ko7zyLX4pksBBTjzDGR This is completed in the sn_http_get() function.
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The third file is downloaded using the same domain but a different ID: QmS5T1bt7p5c2kSBzWtGcp7yZuqSYxAQ9X7GLTsKnSUbFC Both downloads are tar files. 2nd stage Swift app = DocSendInstaller\.app 3rd stage c++ app = Finder\.app
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Here's an interesting one shared by @malwrhunterteam: 9b0efba16de053c58e1d79d0b51c7331b74da729bd7913b9c9dfa95381398fb8 - DocSendInstaller-Installer (DMG, funny name) with currently 1 VT detection. This one is pretty long due to some added complexity..🧵
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The Rust mach-O in the app bundle is named update09cc and left Rust panic strings and build paths intact (which is nice). "/Users/rentamac" lol which is great.
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Appreciate @jstrosch for the invite on the podcast! macOS malware is at an interesting place. Also, getting to talk about how reverse engineering workflows are changing with AI was fun/therapeutic. I wasn’t crying I promise. 😂
New episode of Behind the Binary is live! 🎙️Joined by @L0Psec to break down macOS security, ClickFix social engineering, InfoStealers (AMOS/MacSync), DPRK developer targeting, and the evolution of obfuscation. Plus, we talk about how AI is shifting reverse engineering and the inevitable future state... 🎧 podcasts.apple.com/us/podcas…
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L0Psec retweeted
.@Volexity has discovered in-the-wild exploitation of a #zeroday exploit chain targeting Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances (CVE-2026-104935). Beginning October 3, a previously unknown threat actor, UTA0576, chained three vulnerabilities to gain unauthenticated root-level code execution on a fully patched device. Notably, UTA0576 deployed no malware or web shell. Instead, the threat actor re-exploited the device for every command it ran and tampered with logs to cover its tracks, evading Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool. Using its #Volcano memory analysis platform, Volexity analyzed the compromised device’s memory to uncover the full exploit chain and the attacker’s post-exploitation activity, which focused on credential theft, Active Directory reconnaissance, and data exfiltration. Volexity reported these findings to Ivanti through coordinated disclosure. Read the full analysis, including detection guidance and IOCs, in our blog post here: volexity.com/blog/2026/10/13… #DFIR #threatintel #memoryforensics
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Quick Friday macOS malware. Shared by @malwrhunterteam: 29fc5399903e47f7aa13f932ed88ea8770456e2ec860898f2b207d53db075355 - st_helper611b_arm64. Talks to element.proxy08\.com (seen a couple files referring proxy8\.com recently) Found related Element DMG 🧵
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VT has a summary for this behavior and some of these commands it runs can be seen on VT as well. Alright that is enough, it's getting late on Friday.
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79433c988f7cbb90b5356b53719a3d4601a35819e9fd0e00ede15591d8152d29 29fc5399903e47f7aa13f932ed88ea8770456e2ec860898f2b207d53db075355 proxy08\.com bd093cce8b2c7afb507b8452dc51098ab91e65be549470f293d0bd0a3d9786ee
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