Kurdish DNA

Faqih Ahmad of Darashmana, progenitor of the Sakri tribe (17th century AD), born in a village near Qaladze, is one of the most important figures of recent Kurdish history in genealogical terms, as his descendants contributed towards one of the most extensive linguistic expansions of the Sorani tongue. Not only does the 5th Dynasty of Baban descend from him, but so do the other important dynasties/figures shown in the image. Sorani is of course a modern term, and interestingly its speakers seemingly originally identified under a Kurmanj umbrella and referred to their language as Kurmanji. This is known through European traveller accounts of conversations with the Baban Kurds, who also mentioned that the Gllali (گلاڵی) and Shinki are related to them. The Gllali are notable in their own right, having been recorded by al-Umari as a major confederation in the Kermanshah area, with branches extending into Garmiyan and south of Lake Urmia. The question of how the Sakri came to be associated with Sorani requires engagement with the Rojaki confederation of Bedlis, though the connection between the Rojaki and the Sakri dynasties that later ruled Baban must be treated with caution, as it remains uncertain. The Rojaki was composed of two tribal confederations, the Belbasi and the Qawalsi, and the Belbasi had Sakris among them. Sharafkhan Bidlisi records two competing accounts of the Rojaki's origins: one naming them after two clans of the Baban tribe, and another attributing their name to two villages in Hakkari. The coexistence of these accounts points to a southern connection, and notably Sharafkhan elsewhere records that the Mukri tribe either derived from a group of the same name living in Sharazur, itself Baban-controlled territory at a later date, or that they was Babans outright. These overlapping affiliations between the Baban, Bilbas, and Mukri suggest a tribal network with deep roots in the same zone. Sharafkhan's mention of Balakayati, the present homeland of the Balaks in southern Kurdistan, in the same context as the Balak among the Rojaki Bilbas further reinforces the interconnectedness of these tribal clusters and their ultimately southern orientation. Two questions complicate the picture. The first concerns which Sakris are actually ancestral to the later dynasties. Separate Ottoman records from the 16th century attest to a Belbasi presence near Lake Urmia, geographically distinct from the Rojaki Belbasis of Bedlis, and the Sakris within them would therefore also be distinct. It is therefore unclear whether the Sakris who came to rule Baban descended from the Bedlis branch of the Rojaki, or from a branch that was already present in the Urmia and Pizhder area independently. The second question concerns the age of the Rojaki confederation itself. If Sharafkhan is correct that the Rojaki existed since high medieval times, then the confederation is considerably older than the period in which he was writing, which would open the possibility that all Belbasis, and by extension all Sakris, were at some point part of it before dispersing across different regions. Two interpretations can be advanced. The first is that the Sakris of the later Baban dynasties descended directly from the Rojaki Belbasis of Bedlis, migrating southward at some point and eventually settling in the Pizhder area, from which the lineage of Faqih Ahmad emerged. Under this reading, their adoption of Sorani upon settling near Soran territory would represent either a return to earlier linguistic roots or an assimilation into a locally dominant vernacular. The second interpretation holds that the Sakris of Baban were never part of the Bedlis Rojaki at all, but rather a separate Belbasi-affiliated group already present in the Urmia and Zagros region from an earlier period, with the Bedlis and Urmia branches representing two independent offshoots of a common Belbasi origin. Under this reading, their southern genealogy still holds, but the Rojaki connection becomes a parallel rather than a direct line of descent. Of the two, the first interpretation carries slightly more circumstantial weight, given the convergence of the genealogical record pointing to a southern Kurdish orbit, the Rojaki's own reported Baban connections, and the pattern of southward migration that the British sources describe for the Baban-Sakri group descending from Pizhder. Nevertheless, the independent attestation of Belbasis near Lake Urmia in the 16th century means the second interpretation cannot be dismissed, and certainty is not available on the current evidence. Prior to the Sakri consolidation of power over Baban in the 18th and 19th centuries, Sorani had a very limited documentary footprint, with the scarce early attestations coming almost exclusively from the Emirate of Soran. The majority of the population across Garmiyan, Ardalan, and Sharazur spoke Gorani or languages of Lak and Kalhor affiliation, and non-tribal populations in these regions were similarly Gorani-speaking. Sorani's rise to dominance was therefore not an ancient condition but a relatively recent development driven by deliberate policy. Upon ascending to the throne of Baban, the Sakri actively promoted Sorani, referred to at the time as "Kurmanji," a term applied equally to Northern Kurdish in that period, to the detriment of Gorani, which had functioned as the lingua franca of their Ardalani rivals. This was part of a broader political project of differentiation from the Ardalan emirate and its Gorani-speaking elite, and the results were transformative: Sorani displaced Gorani across large stretches of territory between the 17th and 20th centuries. The dialectological evidence corroborates this history. The northern dialects of Sorani, spoken across the former territories of the Soran emirate through Mukriyan and the intervening regions, show markedly less Goranic influence than those spoken further south and east, with some localities appearing to lack it altogether. The southern and eastern dialects, by contrast, bear heavy Goranic imprints and in some cases Southern Kurdish influence as well. This gradient maps closely onto the historical sequence of expansion and strongly suggests that the Soran-Mukriyan-northern Baban corridor was the original zone from which Sorani spread. When tribes of Goran or Southern Kurdish affiliation are set aside, the tribal substrate of this core zone consists of groups autochthonous to the area, such as the former Rawandi of Rawanduz, alongside tribes connected to three historically significant confederations: the early Baban, the Mukri, and the Bilbas. It is within this triangle that the conditions for Sorani's emergence and early consolidation must be sought. Theoretically, all these branches should belong to Y-haplogroup E-V13 > BY3880, given that Faqih Ahmad of Darashmana is the progenitor. The result is based on the dynastic descendants of the 5th dynasty of Baban. Many thanks to @ZarbianHerki for pointing out this major connection between all these branches, that had previously gone unnoticed.

For those who are struggling to understand why the Barzani Q lineage does not originate from the Caucasus, Jews, or Turks: Q-NGQ1 formed around 8000 BCE. It is the parent of Q-M378, which is the parent of Q-L245. Q-NGQ1 has multiple pre-Iron Age ancient samples, including Habahe 22B (2500 BCE, Xinjiang), Ayituohan 22B (2800 BCE, Xinjiang), and Nileke 3N (3000 BCE, Xinjiang). Q-M378, one of the descendants of Q-NGQ1, formed around 4000 BCE. Its only notable pre-antiquity ancient samples are Abusanteer 7 and Wutulan 12, dated to approximately 800–200 BCE. Both of these samples are associated with the ethnic Tian Shan Saka Iranians. Q-M378 has two primary branches: Q-L245 and Q-FGC4620. Q-FGC4620 is a major lineage among populations associated with the Inner Asian Mountain Corridor (IAMC), including Indians and Tajiks. The most divergent branch outside both Q-L245 and Q-FGC4620 is also found in India. All of this strongly points to Q-L245 having an ancestral origin in Central Asia. Q-L245 formed around 2000 BCE, yet today it is distributed among various West Asian populations. Which population migrated from Central Asia into West Asia around this period? The most likely answer is Iranian peoples. Kurds did not acquire this lineage from Turks. The Q-L245 > YP1229 lineage among Kurds displays a highly diverse mutational structure across numerous tribes, with diversification dating back to approximately 283 CE. Turks possess other Q haplogroup lineages because they also interacted with populations carrying West Siberian Hunter-Gatherer (WSHG)-derived ancestry. Most Q lineages found among Turks are associated with later interactions involving Iranian groups such as the Scythians and Sogdians. Regardless, these lineages are genetically distant from the Kurdish Q-L245 > YP1229 lineage. Finding ancient samples from various ethnic groups after antiquity is not, by itself, a significant discovery. For example, haplogroup V88 can be found in Africa, and M47 can be found in Europe. What matters is how a haplogroup diversifies over time when considering its entire phylogenetic lineage, not focusing narrowly on a single ancient sample. With this haplogroup result, it can now be concluded that the Barzani family's paternal lineage is not consistent with a Jewish origin. Instead, it belongs to a longstanding Kurdish lineage that traces its deeper paternal ancestry to an Iranian-associated branch originating in Central Asia.

The largest genetically confirmed Bedouin Arab paternal Y-DNA lineage that exists among Kurds traces back to the Adnanite patriarch Rabi'a ibn Nizar J1-P58>Z2331>Z1884>FGC11>Y10887>FGC4453. More specifically, it is likely linked to the Banu Shayban tribal, itself a branch of Banu Bakr bin Wa'il (Banu Bakr), whose original heartland was centred in what is now Najd, Saudi Arabia. The first Rabi'ah groups to enter Northern Mesopotamia were the Taghlibi Arabs, who arrived following the Basus War in the 500s AD, making them roughly contemporary with the earliest Kurdish settlements in Mesopotamia. The legacy of Banu Bakr's descendants is still visible today: the modern Kurdish city of Diyarbakır takes its name from Diyar Bakr, meaning "The Abode of Bakr." Banu Shayban arrived later than their historic rivals and close cousins, the Taghlibis. They are perhaps best known for their role in the Islamic conquest of Sassanid Iran, most notably at the Battle of Dhi Qar, a conflict whom Kurds fought in the defence of Iran. Given their newly shared geography, tribal structures, and common faith, Kurds and Bedouin Arabs had historically alternated between shared confederation and rivalry. Periods of cooperation naturally created opportunities for assimilation in both directions. However, as Kurds rapidly consolidated their hold over Upper Mesopotamia in the post-Islamic era, the dominant vector of assimilation was into Kurdish society, though recorded accounts of the reverse also exist. No ancient genetic samples from Banu Shayban have yet been recovered, but we have samples from their close kin, the Taghlibis during their rule under the Hamdanid dynasty (890–1004 AD) in northern Mesopotamia and Syria. Despite their Bedouin paternal roots, the Hamdanids' autosomal DNA was heavily shaped by extensive intermarriage with Armenians, Kurds, and Syriacs, with Iranian/Kurdish ancestry accounting for approximately 30–50% of their genetic profile. This legacy persists today among the Baggara Arabs of Syria, who have retained a substantial proportion of Hamdanid lineage from their forebears.

In light of the repeated misuse of the word Persian by non Iranians and even members of the Iranian diaspora, I have decided to explain how the word Persian has been historically used by Iranians themselves. The persistent use of the word Persian, as it is known as an exonym, is harmful to discourse and to a proper understanding of how the past should be authentically investigated. The Greek and Arabic renditions of the term, through which most of the world has come to know it, do not accurately reflect what the term has meant within the context of Iranian society. It may come as a surprise to many, but the term Persian does not denote any sort of ethnic meaning, and it has never done so at any point in history among Iranians. This is contrary to the new major push in Iranian diaspora to reinvent their identity due to reasons relating to perception and Pahlavi era related revisionism centred around "Persianness". Often times these Iranians in diaspora don't even come from Persian speaking backgrounds, but rather from Azeri, Gilaki, etc backgrounds. Ultimately this still doesn't affect how Persian speakers within Iran itself choose to project their identity. Its neither here or there if people want to choose a new identity. It is however a major problem when people want to back project their new identity onto the entirety of history. It is therefore incorrect to call figures such as Ibn Sina, Al Razi, Al Khwarizmi, Omar Khayyam, Ferdowsi, and Rumi ethnic Persians. These were ethnic Iranians who wrote in Arabic or Persian, as those languages were the lingua franca in which science, poetry, and other forms of knowledge were expressed. Within the context of Iranian society, language has not been a major factor in how society has defined itself ethnically compared to other cultures around the world. In the ancient Iranian era, the Persians were mostly a specific tribal organization within Iranian society. Iranian confederations such as the Mards and the Medes should not be understood as ethnic units but as political ones, in which Iranians joined and left. These tribal confederations sometimes left a legacy that can be seen in the geographic names of Iran. In the case of the Persian tribes, their legacy is preserved in names such as Persis and the Persian Gulf, even though their political confederations became defunct after the ancient Iranian era. From the Middle Iranian era onward, which can be defined as beginning with the Seleucid period, the term Persian mostly referred to a language. Old Persian is a modern term for what Iranians called Ariya. Parsig, as known to Iranians, is what we now call Middle Persian. Demonyms were an important way in which Iranians distinguished themselves during the Middle Iranian era. Much like how an Iranian from Parthia could call himself Parthian, or an Iranian from Kerman could call himself Kermani, an Iranian from Persis could call himself Parsig or Persian. This is not an ethnic definition, but rather the word Persian carried gentilic meaning. In this sense, it would be correct to call the Sasanian regime Persian, but not in the way most people assume. The Sasanian regime was ethnically Iranian but gentilically from the province of Persis. This does not contradict the idea that the Sasanians may have had tribal Kurdish origins, as noted by several early Islamic era historians. However, this does not mean they were ethnically Kurdish, as Kurds did not exist as a defined ethnic unit during that period, though that is a separate issue. The main point is to understand how the meanings of words change over time, and how different societies can understand the same word differently. While foreigners have often used the words Persian and Iranian interchangeably, this is not reflected in Iranian history. These definitional assumptions become problematic when attempting to study these topics beyond a surface level. In Arabic historiography, the word Persian was sometimes used to refer to settled Iranians, and at other times to Iranians as a whole. This definition even partially influenced the Iranian world for a long time. For example even up to the early 20th century Kurds did not have a problem saying their language was Persian (as per Arabic historiographical understanding). Of course much has changed in light of nationalism. Without understanding nuance, it is not possible to properly investigate the truth. All of this is ignoring another layer of problems regarding sensitivities in how different communities feel about completely revising history and reality due to a fundamental misunderstanding.

Patrilineal lineage R1a-Z93 > CTS6 > Y37891 is shaping up to be one of the original Kurdish genetic markers. It is currently shared between three lines: the Rabatî family, as tested by Hawpa leader Sarhoz Rabaty; secondly various Kurmanjis, particularly from the Shadiyan and Shikak tribes; and lastly an Iranian from Kerman. This haplogroup is of Indo-Iranian > Iranian > CIr > Kurd origins. What is interesting here is that, unlike the Azeri who descends recently from a Kurd, the Iranian from Kerman carries a divergent mutational marker from the two Kurdish lines, suggesting this is not the result of a recent backflow population as far as we can tell. Moreover, the TMRCA split between the Kurdish lines and the Kermani individual occurs around the time when, according to linguistic evidence, the last major batch of Kurds left the region of southern Iran. It is therefore very reasonable to think that this Iranian from Kerman is descended from a Kurd who never left southern Iran. It should be noted that the Shadi tribe is one of the oldest continuously existing Kurdish tribes that survives into the modern period, so the fact that it's men overwhelmingly carry this genetic lineage as their main line is of great significance. For all of the aforementioned reasons, it is extremely unlikely that this Y haplogroup could be an Iranian lineage assimilated via later Adharic speaking Iranian populations whom we know Kurds encountered/assimilated while migrating from southwestern Iran. Rather, this Iranian lineage would be carried from the original wave of Kurds who expanded into what is now the region of Kurdistan.

Mirzā Kuchak Khān was a major revolutionary figure in early 20th-century Iran, born into a wealthy landowning Kurdish family (Kurmanji origin) in Gilan from the Rashvand/Reshwan tribe. He led the short-lived Gilan Socialist Soviet Republic (1920–1921) through his movement, Nehzat-e Jangal, which began in 1914. A friend of mine from the same Kurdish Rashvand branch in Gilan carries Y-haplogroup J2-L25>Z7700. His lineage will be upgraded to a Y-700 test soon. This is the third branch/outlier of Reshwan/Rashvand Kurds that differ from the main 2 paternal lineages of the tribe that is currently based primarily in central Anatolia (E1b-BY206101 and R1b-FT186298). As a side note, the English version of his Wikipedia page contains errors, so it should be ignored.

"Dwanzdah," meaning twelve, is one of the oldest historically attested words of Kurmanji Kurdish or the Balochi language. It was minted on the coins of the final Sassanian King Yazdegerd III (632 to 651 AD) in the province of Kerman, in southern Iran, using a pronunciation that does not fit Middle Persian dwʾcdh (/⁠dwāzdah⁠/) primarily due to the missing n. On the table on the right we made a best fit list of modern Iranian languages that best fit the bill of this attestation of the number twelve. It should be noted that Gorani has its attestation loaned from C/SK. Talysh also has some weird developments that are also atypical. These will be explored at a later date. Despite this they don't match what we are looking for phonetically. Knowing whether or not this word minted on the coins is Kurmanji or Balochi is currently difficult to decipher as both languages have variants attested that exactly fit the bill: Dwanzdah. Both Kurdish and Balochi have different developments starting from the old Iranian era, and the similarity between them is due to parallel developments living (historically) in Persian zones as NW Iranian languages, and at least partially once living somewhat near each other. The Balochi language originates among the native North western Iranian languages of Kerman, where it had major Persian contact with the local major Persian dialects of Kerman like Bashkardi, prior to its expansion into what is now modern Balochistan. Balochis are historically attested as "Balūṣ" in the province of Kerman in the early Islamic era. Although that is through an Arabic rendering. Kurmanji as a Kurdish dialect is linguistically also a North western Iranian language (separate from Balochi) that lived in a highly Persian contact zone primarily based in Persis, before migrating north west around the very start of the Islamic age. This should not be confused with other Kurdish dialects who leave the Persian contact zones a few hundred years prior to Kurmanji. Some Kurdish tribes like that of "Al-Qafs" (Arabisation of the Iranian word kofech, meaning mountain dweller) still had a big presence in the early Islamic era Kerman, on the western side of the province near the border of Persis, who can be assumed to be remnant Kurdish tribes of the pre Islamic era. One of the Middle Persian accounts in the Zand i Wahman also recounts Kurdish soldiers being brought to Padashkhvargar, who are called "both Kurd and Kerman". At least one of the major etymological solutions to the very word "Kurmanj" may involve the very province Kerman. That remains to be solved, and I will discuss that at a later date. Therefore Kurmanji and Balochi are both historically and linguistically fitting the bill of this form embedded into these aforementioned mints of Yazdegerd III. I will make a post about other potential pre-Islamic Kurdish attestations in the future. Thanks to @ZarbianHerki who I worked with on this post.

How was Sasanian Iranian society structured? It is common for people to back-project early Islamic historiography onto the pre-Islamic period, especially the notion of a nomadic Iranian Kurd versus the settled Iranian “Persian”. When examined closely, this framework quickly collapses, as it is usually based on poorly translated or misinterpreted Arabic works. For example, when Hamza al-Isfahani recounts that Daylamites are likened to Kurds, some deliberately mistranslate it as “Daylamites are Kurds” in order to suggest that the word Kurd has no strong designation. Or when al-Dinawari writes “the progeny of Sāsān (ancestor of Ardeshir) are shamed for the herding of sheep till this day, and it is said ‘Sāsān the Kurd’ and ‘Sāsān the herder’,” this is pushed to mean that Kurd must mean herder. This is not the case, otherwise he would simply be repeating “Sāsān the Kurd” twice with no functional difference. A comparison is clearly being drawn, and the presence of “and” shows an important distinction between the two. Those who attempt to demote the meaning of Kurd typically ignore the numerous other accounts by the same early Islamic authors who give Kurds a very specific description, in geographically defined areas, while Iranian nomadism was featured far beyond where Kurds resided. It is important to remember that early Islamic authors drew heavily from Arabian social divisions, where society was broadly stratified between the settled Arabs (Ḥaḍar) and the nomadic Arabs (A‘rāb). In these same texts, one can also see that the word Persian is sometimes used in ways no Iranian would have used natively. When these authors attempted to describe Iranian society, they often imposed the Arabic scope onto an entirely different social landscape. These designations fall apart when cross-referencing different early Islamic writers, and sometimes even within a single author’s own work, contradictions appear. Sasanian social structure itself is reasonably well understood. Although it is obvious that Kurds were characteristically nomadic (though not exclusively so), this trait is not a defining category, as we have both pre-Islamic and early Islamic accounts of nomadic Iranians who were not Kurds. The Baloch, for example, are explicitly called non-Kurd despite sharing a traditionally similar nomadic and herding lifestyle. The Mardians are a pre-Islamic Iranian tribal group who were not Kurds but had the same exact lifestyle as Kurds. While it is true that Kurds were not an ethnic group before the Islamic age, just like any other modern Iranian ethnic group, there was a tribal population bearing the name Kurd prior to Islam that later acquired ethnic character in the Islamic period. As a quick note, the Middle Persian word for shepherd is šubān, and it is linguistically incorrect to force the word Kurd into this category, as no serious linguistic academic has ever proposed such an etymology. Attempts to derive Kurd from PIE *kerdʰ, such as the suggestion sometimes repeated on Wiktionary, also fail on phonological grounds. Dr Nicholas Sims-Williams, a world-leading Iranologist, has explained in detail why the sound changes do not support this derivation. I discuss that topic in more detail in this post: xitter.cf/KurdiCompendium/status… The following chart outlines what we actually know about Sasanian society. The four main divisions were the Artēštārān, the Āsrōwān, the Dibirān, and the Wāstaryōšān. Kurds, by and large, would have belonged to the Wāstaryōšān class of Iranians, just like many other tribal Iranian herders, or even Iranians as a whole by in large. Iranian social classes were not equivalent to the Indian caste system and were not strictly hereditary. Social mobility was heavily monitored however.

The Kurdish tribe known variously as Shadi, Shadillu, Şadıllı, Shadlu, Shadiyan, and Shadhanjan is a major Kurmanji group distributed across Iran, Turkey, and Syria. In Turkey, Sunni Shadi villages generally follow the Shafiʿi school, although some communities, particularly in districts such as Karakoçan (Elazığ), adopted Hanafi practice under Turkish influence. Over time, substantial segments of the tribe also became associated with heterodox and Shiʿa communities. Many Shadi in Dersim, Sivas (Kangal and Zara), Bingöl, Maraş (Afşin and Göksun), and Adana are today Alevi Kurds. In Iran, the Shadi tribe of Khorasan underwent conversion to Twelver Shiʿa Jaʿfari Islam and is concentrated in Bojnurd, Shirvan, Esfarayen, and Quchan. In Syria, Shadi communities are found primarily in Kobanî and Girê Spî, where roughly 4,000 kinsmen were recorded. A Shadi clan is also specifically attested in the Urfa–Harran–Suruç region. During Ottoman Syria, Shadi settlement expanded further during the 19th century, with tribal leadership dominated by the Karadoğlu family. One of the last prominent chiefs there was Fayyad Khalil Agha, who led the tribe in the Kobanî–Urfa area during the final decades of Ottoman rule. Following the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and the Treaties of 1828–1829, large numbers of Shadi clans from Erivan, Kars, and Ganja fled south into the Ottoman Empire. From 1829 onward, these refugees settled widely across Erzurum, Kars, Erzincan, Tunceli (Dersim), Sivas, Gümüşhane, Elazığ, Bingöl, Maraş, Adana. A smaller branch of the tribe existed in eastern Azerbaijan province, while in the 19th and early 20th centuries a Shadi clan in the Ḵalḵāl highlands of Arasbaran adopted Azerbaijani Turkic, retaining memory of its Kurdish origin. Additional Shadi families also remained in the Caucasus, particularly in what is now the Republic of Azerbaijan, though many emigrated during the 20th century. Culture and customs Culturally, the Shadi carry forward typical Kurdish tribal customs such as strong hospitality codes, honor of lineage, and the practice of tribal oral history. Khorasani Shadi have a distinct micro culture. For example, Shadi styles of music and dance, where they perform a dance called “Shadi Halay”. In some weddings, and sing ballads about Sardar Mofakham, and other exploits of battles against Uzbeks and Turkmen. Khorosani Shadi also maintain folk Bakhshi bard traditions. Among the Alevi Shadi, cultural practices include Cem ceremonies (Alevi worship gatherings) and Dersim’s rich folklore as such some songs referencing the journey “from Kars and Erzurum to Dersim,” alluding to that 1829 migration wave in which Shadi came. The capital of the north Khorosan province, Bonjurd, was built by the Shadi tribe. Bojnurdis refer to the old rulers as “Sardar Shadlu”. As early as the 1920s, observers noted that of the four original Kurdish tribes of Khorasan (‘Amarlu, Za’faranlu, Shadillu, and Kaiwanlu), the Shadillu and Za’faranlu had become “mostly Turkish-speaking. However, in recent times major efforts have been made to revert these trends. Shadi also live in Khalkhal, Iran. Important note Some connect the Shadi to the Shaddadids due to the name of Shadhi ibn Marwan (Najm al-Din Ayyub's father) carrying a similar name, but this can not be used as evidence. Instead, the early Islamic era Shadhanjan can be securely identified with the modern Shadiyan/Shadi tribe. Linguistically, it derives from Šāðān + -gān, and later Arabised into Šāðanjān (short second a). The preservation of the interdental ð sound is interesting because it shows that it had once existed in earlier stages of Kurdish phonology but later disappeared. Genetics Much like other Kurmanji tribes, they typically score around 60% medieval Iranian/Kurdish autosomal, with the rest being largely post Islamic Armenian. Their Y-DNA is a major point of interest as their primary paternal lineage marker R1a-Z93 > CTS6 > Y37891 shows has a likely migratory implication of Proto-Indo-Iranian > Proto-Iranian > Central Iranian > “Northwest Iranian” > Kurds in south Iran > Kurds in modern Kurdistan. This aligns quite well with the strong linguistic heritage of the Kurdish language being of “NW Iranian” origin having strong linguistic contact with the Persian language in south Iran during the old and middle Iranian eras (unlike almost all other Iranian languages), during the old and middle Iranian era, and the historically attested presence of Kurds in this region. Some other haplogroups include L-PH8, R1a-YP4858, J2-Z287, J2-Z36894, J1-PF4869, J1-P58, E-Y83929, E-PF69751. Early Islamic Period and Annazid Era (10th–11th centuries) Early Islamic-era sources and Kurdish historical traditions attest that the Shadhanjan (Shadiyan / Shadi) Kurds were already politically active in the 10th–11th centuries. Al-Masʿūdī explicitly mentions them among the Kurdish tribes of Jibal. Their prominence is further confirmed by the Annazid Kurdish dynasty (c. 990–1117), which relied heavily on the Shadhanjan Kurds. The dynasty’s founder, Abū’l-Fatḥ Muḥammad b. Annāz, is described as having inherited the leadership of the Shadhanjan tribe itself. Safavid Period, Qizilbash Alignment, and the Ottoman–Safavid Wars (16th century) A major turning point in the tribe’s political and military history occurred during the Safavid period. In the early 16th century, Alevi members of the Shadi tribe became early supporters of Shah Ismail I, joining the Qizilbash military coalition that established Safavid rule in Iran. This alignment placed the Shadi directly within the Safavid power base and inevitably drew them into the prolonged Ottoman–Safavid rivalry. As part of the Qizilbash forces, Shadi tribesmen fought on the Safavid side during the Ottoman–Safavid wars, including the pivotal Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. Although Chaldiran resulted in a Safavid defeat, the conflict cemented the political alignment of Alevi Kurdish tribes such as the Shadi with the Safavid state. Under Shahs Ismail I, Tahmasp I, and Abbas I, Shadi tribesmen continued to be recruited into elite guard regiments and remained closely integrated into Safavid military structures. Relocations and Frontier Warfare in Khorasan (c. 1600–18th century) Under Shah Abbas I, the Safavid state implemented large-scale relocations of loyal Kurdish tribes to north-eastern Iran as part of a frontier-defence strategy against Turkmen and Uzbek incursions. Around 1600, substantial segments of the Shadi tribe were sent to Khorasan. The Kurds of Khorasan, including the Shadi, were deliberately placed in this region to counter persistent Uzbek and Turkmen raids, which had severely harassed Khorasanis. The relocated Shadi groups became heavily militarised frontier communities. Their new political centre emerged around Bojnurd (which they founded), later extending to Shirvan and Quchan, where a Shadi-controlled domain took shape. The Shadi emirate became one of five quasi-feudal Kurdish buffer states established in Khorasan during the 17th century. Shadi chiefs held the titles of Sardarand Ilkhani, governing with considerable autonomy in exchange for tribute and frontier defence. Throughout this period, the Shadlu of Bojnurd frequently skirmished with Turkmen and Uzbek groups over pasturelands, caravan routes, and regional control, sometimes acting independently and at other times in coordination with the Iranian state. Shadi Authority and Military Engagements under the Qajar State (18th–19th centuries) The Shadi ilkhanship of Bojnurd continued into the Qajar period, during which the tribe maintained hereditary control over its Khorasan domain. Relations with the Qajar state alternated between cooperation and open rebellion. In the mid-19th century, Shadi forces participated in both state-aligned and insurgent campaigns. In 1850–1851, during renewed Turkmen unrest, Shadi contingents supported Qajar military operations against the Yomut Turkmen around Sarakh. In this campaign, Shadi forces coordinated with Qajar troops and with Sam Khan Zafaranlu, another Kurdish ruler in Khorasan, illustrating the tribe’s continued role as a frontier-defence power. At the same time, resentment toward Qajar centralisation ran deep. This culminated in the Revolt of Hasan Khan Salar (1846–1850), one of the largest rebellions in Qajar Khorasan. Hasan Khan Salar, the son of a former governor, rose against the central government, and the Shadi Kurds, who “had long hated Qajar rule” became among his most active allies. Alongside local Turkmen groups, they provided cavalry forces and intimate knowledge of the terrain. In 1847, Salar and his Kurdish allies defeated a royal army at Mayamai, and in 1848 they played a key role in the seizure of Mashhad. However, the arrival of large Qajar reinforcements under Morad Mirza reversed the situation. Mashhad fell in 1850, and the rebellion collapsed. Jafar Qoli Khan Shadi and other tribal leaders surrendered to the Qajar authorities. Rather than destroying Shadi leadership, the Qajars again opted for co-optation. Jafar Qoli Khan was pardoned and, in 1854, appointed governor of Jajarm, Nardin, and Astarabad (Gorgan). This policy transformed former rebels into state officials and secured Shadi loyalty for the remainder of the Qajar period. Late Qajar Zenith By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Shadi leadership reached the height of its formal political power. Yar Mohammad Khan Shadi, known as Sardar Mofakham, emerged as one of the most influential tribal nobles in Iran. He and his son retained the ilkhanship of Bojnurd until the 1920s, ruling a domain that functioned as a semi-autonomous Kurdish principality under nominal Qajar sovereignty. Their status was symbolised by monumental constructions such as the Mirror House in Bojnurd and by their integration into elite Qajar society. Suppression of Tribal Autonomy under the Pahlavi State (20th century) The final dissolution of Shadi political autonomy occurred under Reza Shah Pahlavi. In line with nationwide centralisation policies, tribes were forcibly disarmed and subdued. In 1921, Sardar Muʿazziz of Bojnurd, son of Yar Mohammad Khan and the last Shadi ilkhani, still governed a virtually autonomous territory supported by Kurdish and Turkmen followers. Reza Shah’s forces intervened decisively. Muʿazziz Khan was arrested and deported, and the Shadi emirate of Bojnurd was abolished, marking the definitive end of Shadi tribal sovereignty in Iran. Prominent Figures Associated with the Tribe - Jafar Qoli Khan Shadlu (19th c.): Chief of the Shadi Kurds during the mid-1800s, he played a pivotal role in the Hasan Salar rebellion and later became a Qajar governor. He is remembered as both a rebel leader and a pragmatist who secured a place for the tribe in the Qajar power structure post-rebellion. - Yar Mohammad Khan Shadlu, Sardar Mofakham (c.1820s–1882): Perhaps the most illustrious modern figure of the tribe, Yar Mohammad Khan was the head of the Shadi and a high-ranking Qajar noble. He was granted the title “Sahm-ol-Dowleh, Sardar Mofakham”, and served as governor of Bojnurd and even briefly of Khorasan. He built the ornate Mofakham Mansion (Mirror House) in Bojnurd as his residence by the by the Kurdish architect Mirza Muhammad Khan Şaqaqi. The Mofakham mansion is now a museum and a symbol of Kurdish presence in Khorasan. - Sardar Mu’azziz Khan Shadi (early 20th c.): The son of Yar Mohammad Khan, he inherited leadership as Ilkhani of Bojnurd. He navigated the tribe through the tumultuous post-WWI era. Initially retaining de facto autonomy in Bojnurd, he had to submit to Reza Shah’s central army in the 1920s. His arrest marked the end of Shadi feudal rule, but he is remembered for staunchly defending tribal interests as long as possible. - Fayyad Khālīl Agha (late 19th–early 20th c.): A noted chief of the Shadi clan in Urfa/Kobani region, he was among the last influential Shadi leaders in “Western Kurdistan”

The Hadhbānī confederation (also rendered Hadhbāniyyaor Hadhbānid) emerges at the beginning of the 10th century as one of the most prominent Kurdish tribal groupings of the early Islamic period. Their principal heartlands lay around Mosul and Erbil, regions described in medieval sources as Dār al-Akrād (“the Home of the Kurds”), alongside other Kurdish confederations such as the Humaydī (Ḥumaydiyya) and Daseni. The origin of the name Hadhbānī remains debated. Some scholars associate it with a local toponym near Erbil, while others derive it linguistically from hoz (“tribe”) and bān(“chief”), yielding the meaning “tribal leader.” Another tradition places their ancestral homeland in the mountains south of Lake Van, in today’s Hakkâri region, around a locality known as Khezan/Hezan, which may have lent its name to the confederation. Early Autonomy and Abbasid–Hamdānid Conflict (906–920s) As Abbasid authority weakened in the early 10th century, the Hadhbānī began asserting political autonomy. A decisive turning point came in 293 AH / 906 CE, when Muḥammad ibn Bilāl al-Hadhbānīled a major Kurdish uprising, raiding the countryside of Mosul with a large tribal force. The Hamdānid emir Abu’l-Hayjāʾ ʿAbdallāh ibn Hamdānattempted to suppress the rebellion but initially suffered defeat. Only after Abbasid reinforcements arrived was the uprising contained. A negotiated settlement followed: Muḥammad ibn Bilāl withdrew northward into Azerbaijan, relinquishing Hadhbānī claims in the Mosul region. As part of the truce, former Hadhbānī lands around Mosul were reassigned to other Kurdish groups, notably the Daseni and Humaydī tribes. During this same period, Hadhbānī forces cooperated with the Dasini Kurds of Jabal Dasin, jointly engaging the Hamdānids before both groups accepted peace terms. Following the settlement, some Hadhbānī elements entered Hamdānid service as auxiliaries, establishing a recurring pattern of rebellion followed by negotiated accommodation. Expansion and Revolts in Azerbaijan (930s–960s) In the 930s–940s, Hadhbānī influence expanded significantly into Azerbaijan, where the confederation became a major regional power. Around 943, Jaʿfar ibn Shakkoya led a Hadhbānī revolt that captured Salmās. This rebellion was ultimately crushed by Arab or Dailamite forces, reflecting both resistance to Abbasid proxies and intra-Kurdish competition for dominance. At roughly the same time, Hadhbānī groups in Salmas resisted Sallarid authority and local governors before being subdued. Throughout this era, the confederation navigated pressure from multiple fronts: Hamdānids to the west, Sallarids to the east, and rival Kurdish powers across the Zagros. Relations with Other Kurdish Dynasties (10th – Early 11th Century) By the late 10th and early 11th centuries, the Hadhbānī existed within a broader Kurdish political ecosystem: · The Hasanwayhids and Annazids dominated the central Zagros (Kermanshah–Hamadan). · The Marwānids ruled Diyārbakr (990–1085). Direct warfare between these dynasties and the Hadhbānī is sparsely recorded, likely due to geographic separation. However, skirmishes with the Marwānids over influence in Diyārbakr during the 970s–980sare considered probable as Marwānid power expanded northward. Oghuz Invasions and Pan-Kurdish Solidarity (1020s–1040s) The arrival of Oghuz (Ghuzz) Turkoman nomads after 1028 posed the most serious existential threat the Hadhbānī had yet faced. In 1029, Rawwadid prince Wahsūdān of Tabriz allied with Hadhbānī Kurds near Marāgha, successfully repelling an Oghuz incursion. Ibn al-Athīr explicitly records that Wahsūdān “helped the Hadhbānī Kurds in Maragha to defeat the invading Oghuz.” The crisis intensified in the 1030s. Around 1037, an Oghuz horde massacred many Hadhbānī Kurds in Azerbaijan. This atrocity triggered an unusually broad pan-Kurdish alliance. Ibn al-Athīr writes: “They killed many of the Hadhbānī Kurds. The Kurds made common cause and fought together.” Under the leadership of Abu’l-Hayjā al-Hadhbānī, and in coordination with Wahsūdān, Kurdish forces expelled the Oghuz and captured many as slaves. This episode represents one of the clearest examples of inter-tribal Kurdish solidarity in the medieval period. Seljuk Conquest and Pragmatic Submission (1050s – Late 11th Century) Despite these successes, the Seljuk Turksultimately transformed the political order. By the 1050s, Seljuk armies under Toghrïl Beg and later Alp Arslan advanced across western Iran and Iraq. · The Rawwadid principality, representing a northern Hadhbānī branch, fell to Toghrïl in 1054. · In southern Kurdistan, Hadhbānī emirs in Erbil and Mosul gradually became Seljuk vassals, choosing accommodation over resistance. There is no evidence of a major Hadhbānī revolt against Seljuk authority, suggesting pragmatic submission in exchange for limited autonomy. By the late 11th century, most former Hadhbānī territories were governed by Seljuk princes or their atabegs. Late 11th-Century Alliances and External Threats As Seljuk authority weakened toward the end of the 11th century, new dangers arose from Byzantine, Armenian, and Georgian forces, as well as the early Crusaders. During this period, a Hadhbānī leader of Erbil, Abu’l-Hayjā, cooperated with the Shaddadid emir Faẓl ibn Manūchihr, their distant Kurdish kin in the Caucasus, to counter Georgian-Armenian incursions. Although details are limited, Kurdish chronicles emphasize the importance of this cooperation in resisting foreign threats. Zengid Conquest and the End of Political Autonomy (1130s–1140s) The final end of Hadhbānī political independence came with the rise of the Zengids. Under Imād al-Dīn Zengī, Mosul became the center of an aggressive expansionist state. Between 1131 and 1144, Zengī campaigned systematically against Kurdish-held territories, conquering the last Hadhbānī strongholds. From this point onward, the confederation ceased to exist as an autonomous polity, and its lands passed under Zengid, and later Ayyubid, suzerainty. Hadhbānī Role in the Ayyubid and Crusades Era (Late 12th Century) Although politically dissolved, the Hadhbānī military and administrative legacy endured. During the Crusades, Hadhbānī warriors served prominently in the armies of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin). At the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn (1187) and the Siege of Acre, Hadhbānī contingents were present in large numbers. Saladin’s host included troops from the Hakkari, Mihrani, and Hadhbānī tribes, whose numbers exceeded even his Turcoman cavalry. A specific Hadhbānī formation, the Zarzariyya heavy cavalry, achieved particular renown. Saladin’s secretary ʿImād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī praised these horsemen, stating they “mocked the lion, being clothed in bravery.” Administratively and religiously, Hadhbānī figures also played key roles in the Ayyubid state; notably, Qāḍī Ibn Durbās emerged as an important religious authority of the era. Fragmentation and Post-Confederation Trajectories (12th–14th Centuries) After Zengī’s conquests, the Hadhbānī confederation fragmented permanently: · The Rawādiyya branch had already evolved into the Rawwadid and Shaddadid dynasties. The Shaddadids survived in the Caucasus until the 1190s, while the Rawwadid line in Maragha persisted as the Ahmadili atabegs until the Mongol invasion of 1227. · In the Erbil–Mosul heartland, leadership passed to new dynasties. The Begtegīnids (Zengid vassals) ruled Erbil after 1144, followed by the Atabegs of Mosul and then the Ayyubids. Hadhbānī communities remained significant in Mosul; a 13th-century account suggests that Mosul’s large Kurdish population, many of Hadhbānī origin, facilitated the reception of Saladin’s family and Kurdish troops there. · Some sub tribes persisted independently. The Zarzariyyaare mentioned by al-ʿUmarī as late as the 14th century in eastern Anatolia. The Mihraniyya, after their Ayyubid service, likely merged into other Hakkari Kurdish groups. The Hakamiyya and Banū Marānfade from the record, probably assimilating into the broader Kurdish population. Long-Term Legacy and Modern Descendants By the Late Middle Ages, “Hadhbānī” no longer denoted a living political or tribal entity. Nevertheless, Kurdish historiography, most notably Sharaf al-Dīn Bidlīsī’s Sharafnāma, remembered the Hadhbānī among the ancient and powerful tribes of Kurdistan. Modern historians identify them as one of the earliest Kurdish supra-tribal confederations to produce ruling dynasties. Their most enduring legacy is through the Ayyubid state. Saladin’s empire was built and staffed by people of Hadhbānī stock, including his own Rawādī lineage and many of his generals. Later Ayyubid-associated Kurdish confederations, such as those in Hebron, composed of Hakkaris, Qaymaris, and other allied tribes, likely absorbed several Hadhbānī branches, including the Zerzaris. As a named tribe, the Hadhbānī do not survive into modern times. However, many Kurdish families in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey almost certainly carry Hadhbānī ancestry without a clear tribal label. Their former lands in Erbil, Mosul, and western Azerbaijan remain heavily Kurdish today, a lasting testament to the historical role the Hadhbānī played in shaping medieval Kurdistan. Regions Inhabited and Migration Patterns At its height, the Hadhbānī confederation spanned a vast area from the Caucasus to northern Mesopotamia. Geographer Ibn Ḥawqal (writing in the later 10th century) noted that the Jazira region (upper Mesopotamia) served as summer pasture for the Hadhbānī Kurds. He and other sources attest that by the 10th century, Hadhbānī presence extended “from Dvīn in Armenia, [along] the banks of the Caspian, to al-Jazira. The tribe was seminomadic, moving seasonally between highland and lowland zones: Ibn Ḥawqal specifically mentions the Hadhbānī using the Jazira plains in summer (while an Arab tribe, Banū Shaybān, wintered there). By the mid-10th century, Hadhbānī tribesmen (the Rawāddiya branch) established themselves in Azerbaijan and Arran; from this stem arose the Shaddadid dynasty (ruling parts of Armenia and Arran, 951–1199). Likewise, the Rawwādid emirs of Tabriz (r. 900s–1070s) were closely linked to the Hadhbānī confederation. By the 11th century, Hadhbānī presence in the Erbil–Mosul area intensified. Offshoots like the Zarzārī clan remained in the Erbil/Hakkari region but later spread as far as Rawanduz, Ushnū and even Sinjar. Zarzari Kurds were noted from the Irbil plain to Malazgirt in Anatolia. Political Structure and External Relations The historical record preserves a list of Hadhbānī rulers in the 10th–11th centuries, for example, Emir Jaʿfar ibn Šakkūya governed in the Salmas/Khoy area around 942–943, and later emirs like Abu’l-Hayjā ibn Rabīb al-Dawla al-Hadhbānī held Urmia and Barkarī fortress in the early 11th century. The confederation itself was federated into several sub-tribes or clans, each occupying different region but allied under the Hadhbānī banner. Notably, medieval sources and later scholars enumerate four major branches: · The Hakamiyya – based in Erbil and Shahrazūr (central Hadhbānī territory).//Not certain less likely they were really part of the Hadhabani confederation. · The Rawādiyya – chiefly in Adharbayjan (the branch that produced the Rawwadid/Shaddadid dynasties). · The Mihrāniyya – dwelling in the Zūzān districts (great Hakkari region - western Lake Van region); this clan later contributed a famous Kurdish cavalry corps under the Ayyubids. · The Banū Marān (Marāniyya) – located south of Mosul, in the upper Jazira. Other affiliated tribes like the Zarzāriyya (Zerzari) are believed to have been Hadhbānī offshoots as well. Notable Leaders and Figures Several prominent personalities emerged from the Hadhbānī confederation over the centuries: · Muḥammad b. Bilāl al-Hadhbānī – The Kurdish chief who led the 906 uprising against Mosul. Although ultimately forced to withdraw to Azerbaijan, he is credited with carving out the initial Hadhbānī domain and is often regarded as the de facto founder. · Jaʿfar b. Šakkūya (Jafar ibn Shakkoya) – A mid-10th-century Hadhbānī leader who ruled in the Salmās area (northwest Iran). In 943, he briefly seized control of Salmās but was confronted by other regional powers. His exploits are noted in local histories of Azerbaijan. · Abu’l-Hayjā al-Hadhbānī (ibn Rabīb al-Dawla) – An early 11th-century chief who led the Hadhbānī in Urmia and the Hakkari highlands. He is remembered for forging unity among Kurdish factions to face the invading Ghuzz (Turkmen) around 1029. By aligning with Wahsūdān of Azerbaijan, Abu’l-Hayjā protected his people from massacre – Ibn al-Athīr recounts how the Kurds “saw no solution but to unite and fight the evil [the Oghuz],” with Abu’l-Hayjā of Hadhbānī coordinating this defense. Abu’l-Hayjā al-Hadhbānī notably belongs to Y-DNA lineage Q-YP1228, a major Kurmanj and Zaza patrilineal Y-DNA mutation, of very early central Asian Iranian origins. · Shādī ibn Marwān – Not a ruler of the confederation per se, but noteworthy as the patriarch of Saladin’s family. Shādī (father of Najm al-Dīn Ayyūb) was a Rawādiyya Kurd of Hadhbānī stock who served the Shaddadid dynasty in Dvīn, Armenia. His decision to move to Tikrīt and enter service of the Zengids set the stage for his son Ayyūb and grandson Salāḥ al-Dīn (Saladin) to found the Ayyubid Sultanate. Thus, through Shādī’s line, the Hadhbānī confederation indirectly produced one of the medieval Islamic world’s greatest figures. · Husām al-Dīn Abū’l-Hayjā al-Samīn – A famous general in Saladin’s army, known as “Al-Samīn” (the Fat). He hailed from the Hadhbānī (likely the Zarzari branch) and commanded Ayyubid forces during the Siege of Acre (1189–1191). Contemporary chronicles praise Abu’l-Hayjā’s bravery; he died heroically in battle with the Crusaders. He is explicitly identified as a Hadhbānī Kurd and served as an ispaḥsālār (grand commander) for the Ayyubids. · ʿIzz al-Dīn Ibn Durbās al-Hadhbānī – A scholar-official of the late Ayyubid period, who became the Chief Judge (Qāḍī al-quḍāt) of the Ayyubid Sultanate in the early 13th century. His nisba “al-Hadhbānī” shows that even generations after the confederation’s political demise, its descendants were proud to retain the name. Ibn Durbās’s high office underlines the esteemed reputation Hadhbānī individuals attained within the Islamic establishment. Additionally, the confederation’s branches gave rise to dynastic founders. The Shaddadid dynasty of Armenia (founded by al-Faḍl ibn Shaddād) and the Rawwadid emirs of Tabriz both sprang from Hadhbānī’s Rawādiyya clan. Most famously, Saladin (Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Yūsuf) was the grandson of Shādī from the Rawādiyya-Hadhbānī lineage. Alternatively, some attribute Saladin with the Zarzariyya (another Hadhbānī branch), although this may be a mistake on the part of the authors. Thus many “notable figures” associated with Hadhbānī are either tribal chieftains of the confederation or illustrious descendants who carried Hadhbānī blood into new arenas of leadership.