SPECIAL REPORT: Ukrainian forces have defeated the 2026 Russian campaign to seize Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces intended to conduct a deep encirclement of the entire Fortress Belt from the Lyman direction in the north and the Dobropillya direction in the southwest, linking up near Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast. This wide encirclement would have largely completed the seizure of unoccupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian counteroffensive known as Operation Vivaldi in the Lyman direction has completely disrupted this Russian plan by inflicting an operational defeat on the northern Russian pincer. This Ukrainian success will force the Russian military to reconstitute and likely fundamentally rethink its approach to accomplish its goals in this area. There is therefore no basis to assess that Russian forces will be able to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast in any short period of time, as Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to claim, or even to forecast that Russian forces will ever be able to complete their seizure of this region by force.

3/ Ukraine and its partners therefore face a limited window to expand the production of low-cost interceptors, electronic warfare (EW), and layered air defenses able to handle cruise-missile-like air threats. Read more in the latest from @KatStepanenko: xitter.cf/TheStudyofWar/status/2…

NEW | SPECIAL REPORT: Russian integration of inexpensive, highly maneuverable quasi-cruise missiles marks a concerning shift toward low-cost, cruise-missile-like weapons that can strain Ukraine’s scarce air defense stocks. Russian quasi-cruise missiles pose an emerging threat that requires serious attention because these weapons bridge the gap between inexpensive and slow one-way attack drones and expensive cruise missiles, allowing Russia to impose additional pressure on Ukrainian air defenses at lower cost. Russian developers are actively expanding production, improving speed and maneuverability, and diversifying launch platforms in an effort to increasingly deploy these weapons in 2027 before Ukraine can field countermeasures at scale. Ukraine and its partners therefore face a limited window to expand the production of low-cost interceptors, electronic warfare (EW), and layered air defenses able to handle cruise-missile-like air threats.

NEW | Special Report: What a Limited Russian Incursion Into Estonia Might Look Like: A Narva Scenario A full-scale Russian invasion of a NATO state is extremely unlikely while Russia remains fully committed to war against Ukraine. But full-scale invasion is not Putin's only option to conventionally escalate against a NATO state. Russia could conduct limited ground operations leveraging drones against NATO states not to conquer them, but to break the alliance by causing it to fail to activate and act appropriately on its Article 5 commitments. This scenario is notional — it is not an assessment or forecast that the Kremlin will conduct such an operation. The purpose of studying a Narva scenario is not to suggest that the Russians will conduct this specific operation, although they have set limited conditions to do so already, but rather to explore in detail what such an attack might look like, how the Kremlin might seek to use it to advance its own domestic objectives and to break the alliance, and how the alliance should act both to deter and to defeat any such attack, whether at Narva or elsewhere. A number of NATO states will likely be very hesitant to invoke Article 5 over a limited incursion, fearing the consequences of appearing to launch the alliance into a full-scale war with Russia. NATO certainly has the ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat a Russian operation of this sort. It is not, at the moment, ready to do so at acceptable risk and cost. The US should take every measure possible to demonstrate its commitment to its alliance obligations. Strategic ambiguity invites Russian adventurism and significantly increases the odds that Putin might gamble. NATO must deter and, if necessary, defeat a limited Russian incursion at both the political and the military levels. European states can help deter scenarios like this by developing indigenous counter-drone capabilities, interceptor drones, and skilled drone units of their own that can rapidly identify and strike Russian drone operator positions.

ISW is releasing a new version of its interactive map displaying the pillars of Russia’s cognitive warfare infrastructure. Russia uses cognitive warfare to shape the decisions and will of its opponents. The Kremlin is expanding its network of global media partnerships, state-run international journalism training initiatives, and building a global media recruitment pipeline targeting young media professionals abroad. The Kremlin seeks to shape global narratives for decades to come. (1/2) The map includes Russian state media partnerships, state journalism training programs, and the Russian House cultural centers, which the Kremlin uses to project influence abroad. ISW will regularly update this interactive map.

SPECIAL REPORT: Russian sources are increasingly relying on AI-generated and AI-altered videos to assert territorial control over areas of Ukraine that Russian forces have not, in fact, seized. Russian sources are intentionally exaggerating territorial gains to portray Russian forces as advancing and having the initiative along the frontline and to falsely portray the Ukrainian line as collapsing across the theater. 🧵(1/4) Russian soldiers had been attempting to exploit OSINT mapping methodologies by having soldiers actually infiltrate areas and ostentatiously raise flags since at least September 2025. Russian sources are now evolving this information tactic by leveraging AI-altered footage to insert Russian soldiers with flags into geolocated videos to make such claims in places into which soldiers have not infiltrated.

NEW | Special Report: The Kremlin is Cultivating an AI-Trained Global Media Cadre for Lasting Influence The Kremlin is growing a global cadre of Russia-trained journalists as part of its cognitive warfare efforts. Russia uses cognitive warfare to shape the decisions and will of its opponents. The Kremlin is expanding state-run international journalism training initiatives, building a global media recruitment pipeline, and expanding training that specifically targets young media professionals abroad. Kremlin-run media is increasingly incorporating AI media training curricula, likely to scale production of content that aligns with Kremlin narratives. The United States and its partners need to monitor and disrupt Russia’s efforts to expand its media conglomerate or otherwise risk facing a growing Russian capability to spread false narratives and shape perceptions, decisions, and actions around the globe and over time.

ISW on Capitol Hill: The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the @HelsinkiComm, held a briefing on Capitol Hill to examine Moscow’s exploitation of unstable security environments and vulnerable populations across Africa amid its war in Ukraine. As part of the panel, ISW’s Russia Team Lead and Deputy Director of the Cognitive Warfare Project @KatStepanenko provided insights into Russia’s Wagner Group and Africa Corps’ recruitment of Africans to fight in Ukraine.

NEW | SPECIAL REPORT: Ukraine’s Strike Campaigns Will Likely Continue to Hurt Russia’s Economy and Military Operations in Ukraine Ukrainian forces have recently intensified their coordinated long- and intermediate-range strike campaigns against energy and logistics infrastructure in Russia and occupied Ukraine — a campaign that has been ongoing since early 2024. The intensifying gasoline shortages across Russia and occupied Ukraine are significantly impacting the lives of ordinary citizens. The Ukrainian strike campaigns are causing Russia to lose petrochemical export revenue that could have gone toward its war effort.

VIDEO: Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign has undermined logistics in Russia’s operational rear. As of May 2026, Ukraine has secured a drone advantage on the battlefield, reintroduced limited elements of mechanized maneuver, and upheld a successful strike campaign against Russia. In this video, ISW’s @KatStepanenko and @georgewbarros explain how the war is entering a new phase as Ukraine's recent successes on the battlefield and beyond are challenging the positional character of the conflict that has dictated the battlefield since 2023.

NEW: SPECIAL REPORT | Gasoline Shortages in Occupied Ukraine Show the Synergy of Ukraine’s Long-Range and Mid-Range Strike Campaigns Ongoing gasoline shortages in occupied Ukraine come only weeks after Ukraine began ramping up its mid-range strike campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the operational rear. Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Russia’s deep rear is also contributing to the gasoline shortages. The long-range strike campaign is reducing Russia’s production capacity, while the mid-range strike campaign is hurting Russia’s ability to transport the gasoline Russia is still able to produce.