Filip Jirouš 葉飛立

I can't say I like the debate about "engagement" with Chinese intelligence. My rules are (1) prepare professionally; (2) don't assist in the exploitation of others; and (3) treat the Chinese side as what they are and ask. If you don't want to do these three things, then, really, why are you meeting with them? The basic rule should be to approach any engagement with the PRC/CCP apparatus with the same professionalism with which they approach these engagements. At minimum, that means all U.S. participants should know with whom they are meeting. We often approach the Contemporary Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) as though they were not a bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS). They are, in fact, intelligence professionals. We would not use CIA-affiliated to describe a serving CIA analyst, so we shouldn't use MSS-affiliated to describe CICIR. That analyst is CIA (or, in my case, was), just as a CICIR analyst is MSS. I have heard from many participants in Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues with the Chinese that they were unaware who the Chinese participants really were. Nor were they aware of the history of the engagement, past transcripts, etc. All things that the Chinese side brings to the table. The Chinese side approaches these engagements as opportunities to shape outsiders' thinking much more than opportunities to explore ideas or potential initiatives. A second rule would be to prepare people for what should or should not be within the bounds of the conversation. This is not about classified information, but rather what gossip should off limits, what personal details to keep discrete, etc. Do not aid in the exploitation of others. There are a lot more, but I will finish with a third: if you're going to engage the MSS, PLA intelligence and political warfare, and united front organizations, then ask them about their system, what they do, why they do it, and how it works. Don't pretend like they are something other than what they are. Ask and you might be surprised by what you learn. There is more to be gained by treating Chinese intelligence interlocutors as what they are than pretending that they have special insights into high-level policymaking. If someone in DC said a GS-13/14 intelligence analyst was an amazing source of insight into U.S. foreign policymaking, then they would be laughed out of the room. Maybe this is changing as the MSS becomes more important, but, for much of the last 43 years, that has not been the case. If you are not willing to do these basic things, then you really should not be meeting with this part of the party-state and just stick to the diplomats. P.S. Make sure you know who to call at your local FBI field office or equivalent in case something bad happens, like a recruitment pitch.