There's a lot of bluster about sockpuppets and deleting comments in the issuance debate. Lets not lose sight of the actual outstanding questions about the proposal and ensure they get researched and addressed such that the community can have an informed debate about Ethereum's security. - None of the issuance analysis includes costs, when you do, this proposal is not good for solo stakers, it makes them worse off both nominally and relatively versus other types of stakers. - None of the issuance analysis accounts for the fact that ~97% of the network makes a real rate of return on the existing curve no matter the equilibrium because they are not staking only their own eth. This happens on both ends of the spectrum, the extremely large professionals, and the extremely small homestakers. Only the ~1% of solo stakers are focused on in the analysis so far (without their costs being accounted for which significantly alters the analysis). - No other large PoS chain has runaway staking. These chains all have far larger dilution, and far less penalties for PoS failures. It tracks that Ethereum's equilibrium on this curve is likely lower than them (so <60% imo). I am not aware of a reason why in Ethereum, delegators will take more risks, for less rewards, while there are also better alternative uses for their capital (including simply protecting it in a cold wallet for the lowest dilution in the ecosystem). - Ethereum does not have $100b in economic security, its likely under a million dollars per day. This proposal could drive it down 5-10x from there. There is no analysis as to whether this is likely enough of a security budget to protect Ethereum from a concerted attack. - We have no agreed upon tracking of the network's Nakamoto (nor gini), these are measures of how easy it is to take over the chain, or how disastrous a failure of a particular multi-sig, smart contract, or custody platform might be. We should first be tracking them, and secondly we should be consensus-seeking on what is a sufficient number for them. I believe a Nakamoto of 10 should be the minimum tolerable floor. (and that gini needs to go down not up as it has been) - Ethereum's security (Nakamoto) has been falling for ~2 years as the chain centralises. This isn't only due to the current curve, the delegation rate has been pushed far lower in this time, and the illiquidity penalty of native staking is forcing delegators to choose the most liquid staked eth offerings. We should be trying to improve the security posture of the chain rather than exacerbating the problems it faces by making the majority of delegation options non-viable. Correlated downtime penalties, a burn2exit feature, and boosted whistleblower rewards on key compromise, could all push the mean preference to solo stake or delegate stake to the long tail of operators, which would improve the chain's security (nakamoto) rather than hurting it. - Stake quality is more important for Ethereum's security than stake quantity. The amount of operators it takes to control the chain is what we should care about, not the viability of a finality reversion event. We should not be damaging the chain's security to push a ratio by likely less than 20%. - Without a cost model of stake, we haven't a good understanding of where equilibrium might be under the proposal (nor the existing curve). Backing into it from costs, I think 60m eth could be staked for as little as $5m per year by the biggest operators (0.002% issuance per year). If you account for MEV, non-ETH perks given to delegators to stake, and the value in controlling Ethereum, I think its very feasible for equilibrium under the new curve to be 45% or higher. An issuance that low would make all but the largest orgs non-viable. - Making Ethereum more centralised is more likely to re-value Ethereum in line with other centralised chains than it is to be rewarded with an increased valuation. Ethereum's value comes from its credible neutrality and its decentralisation. Changing issuance in the proposed manner hurts both. - We are a couple hard forks away from Real Time Proving, and a switch to Post Quantum Ethereum. The cost model for this chain is vastly different than the one we have today. Proposing blocks will take a server rack worth of expensive GPUs, and attesting with a Post Quantum signature scheme is also more costly than the existing scheme. We should be forward looking in this regard, and make sure we're making a change that allows block building to be at least modestly decentralised. Taking issuance to near zero and not making any allocation to the costs of proposing will lead to a world where as few as two entities can afford to eat the costs of producing blocks on Ethereum. We should not be re-doing the issuance model every couple years. Lets plan for the moment validation changes markedly, and lets build consensus for a change that best suits that future architecture. Forcing through a fast tracked change for a risk of dubious downside and dubious probability is not good for the network's reputation. - Cutting the security budget and losing a large amount of the operator set makes Ethereum less CROPS. Ethereum's scaling roadmap depends on having large amounts of independent operators on the network, to ensure its Data Layer remains available, and to ensure fork choice is not compromised. We have to decide should Ethereum's roadmap take decisions that favour its CROPS nature, or one that favours ETH's disinflation. I don't believe we should jeopardise the former for the latter. A maximum of 1.5% dilution is lower than almost every asset in the world, it is not so high as to cause CROPS issues imo, sub 0.3% is a bigger concern. These are not all of the concerns raised about this proposal, and some of these have been more addressed than others by proponents. The impact on DeFi and the Ethereum economy is also notable. I'm just flagging 10+ issues that are getting drowned out by infighting over the legitimacy of how we moderate this contentious debate. Lets focus on facts over feelings, and make a concerted effort to gather first-hand data and develop believable models, so that we can make informed decisions around what we think 'enough security' might look like for the chain on a multi-decade horizon. Thank you.