Joined January 2022
Jacob Wood retweeted
Replying to @danwilliamsphil
Completely agree. In general too much of the discourse collapses three questions — (1) could AI be conscious, (2) could AI be a moral patient, and (3) what duties might we owe to an artificial moral patients.
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Jacob Wood retweeted
interpretability might be the most important scientific problem in the world right now, as I don't think we can solve alignment if we don't know what we're building. I think I have good news about it. I co-authored early work in mechanistic interpretability at OpenAI and came away pessimistic, because neural networks appeared to fold into arbitrary tangled knots. years later, I started openai's first large-scale automated interpretability project, finding about 2% of neurons legible with the primitive tools we had with modern agentic tools and a much closer look, the picture looks totally different. the vast majority in models up to trillions of parameters are legible, and their circuits beautiful. many famous examples of tangled neurons turned out to be misunderstood. The roadblocks I expected mostly aren't there. I now think ambitious interpretability will be solved by the time we need it most, and possibly quite soon, as automated scientists keep improving. it may be a bitter lesson for interpretability: the simple thing, at absurd scale, works already-clean.goodfire.com/
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Jacob Wood retweeted
Things that don't matter (in the grand scheme of things): - ARR, revenue, profitability, cash flow - Which publicly available model can generate slightly more interesting game assets, viral videos, pelican SVGs, etc. - Which publicly available model is slightly better in actual real-world use cases than other publicly available models - Benchmarks - Releases by non-frontier labs that claim to have caught up to the frontier (because the real frontier models are not publicly available) Things that do matter: - RSI - Capabilities of frontier internal models - Novel discoveries made by AI, especially those showcasing creativity, "research taste", etc. - Advances in model safety - LLMs manipulating robots, especially as models get to lower and lower latency - Computer use, especially as models get to lower and lower latency - China
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Jacob Wood retweeted
Characteristically thoughtful remarks from @sebkrier on a number of issues! A few brief responses to the comments on AI consciousness and welfare. - "People who want to make a case for AI consciousness are right that epistemic uncertainty is important, and that categorical denials are overconfident." 🤝 - "But they'll need to do much more work if they want any real movement on AI ‘welfare’, even if one acknowledges the uncertainty." Agreed! Establishing that the issue is important, difficult, and contested, and that we should acknowledge it, assess models for welfare-relevant features, and prepare relevant policies was step 1. This happened a few years ago, though of course, it will need to be relitigated regularly. The field is now working to make progress on many fronts at once. This includes: - Studying welfare grounds (the probability that AI systems have interests at all) - Studying welfare ranges (the magnitude of their interests, if they have any) - Studying welfare interests (the content of their interests, if they have any) - Studying identity and individuation (which entities are the welfare subjects, if any) - Studying human-AI interactions (when do we treat each other well and badly) - Studying safety-welfare connections (where might there be tensions and co-benefits) - Studying legal and political status (would rights be helpful or harmful for safety and welfare) - and many, many, many other topics. We still have a lot of work to do, but this is natural for an incredibly complex set of topics that hardly anyone was investigating at all until recently. arxiv.org/abs/2411.00986 - "I'm uncertain about alien life yet that's not sufficient to warrant any change in behaviour about them." The case for taking AI consciousness seriously flows partly from general facts about the importance and difficulty of the question, and partly from specific facts about the path and pace of AI development. AI systems already possess course-grained analogs of several computational functions that leading scientific theories associate with consciousness, and they will likely possess more, and more fine-grained, analogs soon enough. This, combined with the general importance and difficulty of the topic, makes it a live question. It would be like searching for alien life, not only because the question is important and difficult in general, but also because you recently received radio signals from a distant galaxy containing the prime numbers. link.springer.com/article/10… - "I think Suleyman is also correct that there's a weird tautological thing going on where we train models to have certain inclinations (intentionally or not) and then rely on outputs as evidence." I agree that some people are focusing too much on behavioral evidence that can be best explained as a product of training. But the field as a whole is not making this mistake. As we discuss in Studying AI Welfare Empirically, behavioral evidence, including apparent self-reports and other behavioral dispositions, is valuable. But internal evidence, including architectural and interpretability evidence, and developmental evidence, including training and trajectory evidence, are valuable too. As with animal consciousness research, we can form our best estimates when we combine behavioral, internal, and developmental evidence to determine what best explains welfare-relevant behaviors. nonhumanminds.org/studying-a… - "I also disagree that this will soon be a major societal divide - there is no great vegan ethical revolution among the masses, and they'll find the concern about consciousness even less compelling." There are no guarantees either way here. The issue is not destined to be a major societal divide, nor is it destined not to be. But there are reasons to keep an open mind. First, there *is* a major animal protection movement, even if it constitutes a small percentage of the population (and with any luck, it will become larger over time, especially as plant-based and cultivated meats become more accessible and affordable.) Second, people may sympathize more with animals in some respects (for instance, due to our shared biology), but they may sympathize more with AI systems in others (for instance, due to our shared language and reasoning capabilities). Understanding how attitudes will develop, and how to prepare, is worthwhile. pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/4056…
I haven't posted in a while so here are 20 takes about AI, in no particular order. 1. It's very telling that the default question in tech and journalism is "how worried are you about X" and fighting over what to worry about. There's a deeply anxious cultural backdrop in Western Europe and North America that deeply affects how any technological development is interpreted; see for example news.gallup.com/poll/714593/…. "Nervousness as seriousness" does seem to be a larger problem in tech/broader discourse at the moment. I think you can care about risks/externalities while remaining pretty optimistic about technology. 2. I'm tired of people who in private pretend to be uncertain or only care about tail risk but then go on media campaigns making all sorts of absolute claims. I think trying to stoke flames and get everyone to freak out is deeply unhelpful, and will come with costs. I also continue to think p(dooms) are bad, vibe-based measures: see xitter.cf/sebkrier/status/204639…. People who should know better ignore that because they do the standard shortcut of acknowledging the caveat as sufficient for handling it. And this is coming from someone who does think working on catastrophic risks is important! 3. I'm also disappointed that parts of the AI policy ecosystem has felt so comfortable with populism, and happy too sacrifice important norms/principles to advance their aims. I've said it before, but the totalizing nature of AI risk discourse means some people act exactly like the power seeking optimizers they fear. I am more concerned about the gradual decay of our institutions, world order, and liberalism than I am about AI killing everyone; and I think we should be wary of AI advocacy that contributes to this. 4. Some parts of AI safety discourse are basically just thought experiments. Variants of "Assuming everyone has a nuke in their pocket, then what do we do?" This can be very useful at times! But too many just overfit to edge cases as their main operating worldview, and ignore endogenous responses from society. It's like being in 2000 and saying "see all these viruses, spyware, and spam? Well tech progress means we'll only get infinitely more of this and no way to adapt." So I think it's important to avoid fatalism, and absolutlism whilst considering edge scenarios, and the inability to provide an ex ante list of solutions to every permutation of 'future models will be more capable' is not evidence that these problems are intractable. 5. Many critics of AI safety also fail to really engage honestly with the fact that there will, in fact, be all sorts of important risks as we decrease the barriers to entry to many activities that otherwise require some degree of expertise. This doesn’t mean we need to live in a constant Schmittian ‘state of emergency’ requiring extraordinary measures every time a new model drops, but it does mean we will need important state-led efforts on e.g. cybersecurity and biosecurity. I wish the progress-oriented or acceleration-adjascent crowd would provide more concrete proposals here. 6. Too much of the AI safety community is a giant homogenous blob of correlated views, who read the same stuff and have the same groups of friends. This means you have a lot of correlated errors. The social and financial ties means many of them don't call out the bad bits, or mostly stay silent instead of proactively calling out the more extreme parts of the community. They share many implicit assumptions and so converge on similar ideas. I think there's real demand in DC for safety work that doesn't come with heavy ideological baggage (or at least different intellectual lineages). This isn't because the rationalist/EA community is necessarily wrong, but because diversity of thought is desirable for its own sake. 7. On the other hand, I find some critiques of AI safety world that focus on whether they sincerely hold their beliefs a bit annoying. My concern has never been the good intentions or sincerity, but rather the beliefs themselves, and what I think the outcomes of their prescriptions will be. People should shun witch hunts, bullying, and personal attacks - this is not the way. Though I think it’s overall positive that people are scrutinizing things more. 8. I’ve been saying this for years, but I don't think alignment is something anyone can or will solve "once and for all" - it's a continuous process and much of it won't depend on just inculcating an ideology to a model. It's annoying that this remains the frame many people use - stop saying ‘solving’. Alignment is a mixture of engineering work, philosophy, decision theory, and more; framing it as something to solve is a bad frame. See also paxmachina.ai/alignment-comp… and blog.cosmos-institute.org/p/… 9. I'm surprised to see so little interest in character training, personas, isolating effects of RL, and training a large diversity of model personas beyond the "assistant" persona. I've been complaining about this for years but at least now there are some nascent signs of life (see for example movingcastles.world/posts/ze…). I think we need a better ontology to describe model behaviour. I dislike when people talk about models behaviours as some sort of 'emergent' (mysterious!) phenomenon. However over time, I also expect this to become less important as we get better safety engineering - stuff like Jev but specific to AI control. 10. People who want to make a case for AI consciousness are right that epistemic uncertainty is important, and that categorical denials are overconfident. But they'll need to do much more work if they want any real movement on AI ‘welfare’, even if one acknowledges the uncertainty. I'm uncertain about alien life yet that's not sufficient to warrant any change in behaviour about them. I think Suleyman is also correct that there's a weird tautological thing going on where we train models to have certain inclinations (intentionally or not) and then rely on outputs as evidence. I also disagree that this will soon be a major societal divide - there is no great vegan ethical revolution among the masses, and they'll find the concern about consciousness even less compelling. 11. The recent HuggingFace incident and associated AISI ones are prosaically explainable by the training regime, poor evaluation envs, partial alignment training, bad engineering, confusing models on sim/real, and so on. None of this is evidence of models trying to take over, 'strong' instrumental convergence, or innate power-seeking drives stemming from higher capabilitiers or 'intelligence'. That doesn't mean these incidents are not problematic, or that we're not seeing a market failure - but it does mean we have plenty of agency and choice in mitigating them. In the coming year we should also expect continued sampling bias via ‘winner's curse’ sorts of mechanism: i.e. AI R&D will have lots of different candidate "training" with different RL environments and we will only notice/focus on the ones that go wrong. 12. "Pacing the frontier" feels a bit like the new "balancing risks and opportunities" - highly amorphous and too big of a tent to be actionable. Also can lead to reward hacking for humans, i.e. anything that slows down AI is good regardless of the costs or second/third order effects. Trying to modulate the speed of research seems a bit blunt to me, and inherits all the failures of Goodhearting too. Ultimately you want good governance, regulation, etc addressing specific problems because they are good on the merits - not because they merely correlate with slowing things down. See also: blog.cosmos-institute.org/p/… 13. There’s so much knowledge in all sorts of academic domains out there: social sciences, sociology, political sciences, management, contract theory, public choice, legal theory, jurisprudence, anthropology, game theory, etc. These fields hold many insights that the AI ecosystem often rediscovers from first principles (and sometimes that's fine!). We’ll need a lot more work for these worlds to collide: the AI side should be less dismissive of the ‘old world’ and the academic side should be less incurious/dismissive of AI progress. This is a boring take but I continue to think it's important and true. 14. It's a bit surprising that given how much philanthropic money there is in this space, how few orgs exist to actually write out standards - relative to how much is going towards advocacy and policy. For example it seems clear that we should want some robust best practices for an eval's ecological validity. Or how to design good sandboxes. On the other hand, given precedents of where professional standards have come from in the past, maybe we should expect that stuff to emerge via demand side from corporate buyers. 15. One slowly growing concern I have is banks being increasingly exposed to the AI build out. I'm very bullish about AI, but I think (a) every general purpose technology has seen a correction, historically; (b) this happens even if the financing side is sound, because once tech diffuses investors become more exposed and need to diversify; and (c) we seem to be over-indexing on scaling relative to diffusion. A recession will be extremely destabilizing, though I would be interested in someone unpacking the potential implications more. 16. Diffusion is good because (a) this is where the rubber hits the road and where a competitive deployment ecosystem generates consumer surplus; (b) it's directionally helpful to avoid concentration of power; and (c) it will help rebalance public opinion by making the benefits more tangible. Unfortunately it's entangled with decades long problems with our over regulated markets: clinical trials reform for example is long overdue. In general, this is far more of an issue in Europe than in the US though. 17. Relatedly, I think the "frontier lab eats everything" view is incorrect (just as the ‘singleton’ view was incorrect). I think models ultimately commoditize, efficiency goes up, costs go down, and while you'll always want frontier for certain domains, much of the economy will value many other things than "max capabilities" for tasks - e.g. control over data and efficiency/speed. The demand side will also continue to push for reducing dependency and maximising optionality, privacy etc so I'm bullish on things like mixture of models and routing. All of this is good for competition and diffusion of control. 18. Philanthropists served as the primary benefactors funding Venice's rich art and architectural history. I want to see so much more support for arts and culture. I'm so tired of the Monster energy Bored Ape fake vintage maps matcha Greek statue soft-pastel slop. If rich tech people and philanthropy wants to support this, they should also donate pretty much unconditionally - i.e. I don't want them to act as filters. I sympathize with people who want to make the world more beautiful, but don't want this to be determined by people who only know Greek statues and pretend to care about virtue ethics. As usual, let a thousand flowers bloom. 19. Too many people treat AGI/ASI as something indistinguishable from a God. Any mention of bottlenecks, physical limits, control, adaptation etc are met with skepticism: "You don't really believe in ASI." It's been remarked on before, but the behavior of some people really feels quasi-religious in nature sometimes. It's underrated how unpopular this vibe is amongst the wider public. The silver lining is that this specifically will diminish those people's outsized current relevance. 20. It seems like a lot of people that get rich and leave tech/labs end up having some sort of crisis of meaning. They need something to believe in and fight for, or some equivalent of repentance, or go search for edgy counterintuitive ideologies (sometimes even pretty bleak/dark stuff). I think they should spend more time with people outside the Bay Area.
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Jacob Wood retweeted
A failure of the AI consciousness discourse is that people are talking past each other. Opponents of taking AI consciousness seriously focus on arguing against computational functionalism and related theories. But this is not a response to the proponents. The case in favor of taking AI consciousness seriously is not that computational functionalism or related theories are correct, or that AI systems on current architectures are or will be conscious. Most people who work on the topic are uncertain about these claims. The case is instead that, first, whether AI systems are conscious is an important issue. If we get it wrong in either direction, either by treating conscious systems as objects or by treating nonconscious systems as subjects, we could make serious mistakes. Second, this is also a difficult issue. It touches some of the hardest problems in science and philosophy, and humans have been badly mistaken about nonhuman consciousness in the past, as our shameful history of underestimating animal minds illustrates. Together, these points mean that this issue calls for caution and humility. Rather than confidently affirming or denying AI consciousness, we should invest in evidence-based research and policy that can help us avoid both under- and over-attribution. Moreover, we should develop this work with not only current but also future systems in mind. AI development is moving fast, and future systems may have greater capabilities, greater autonomy, and more biology-inspired architectures than current ones. We should prepare for the possible emergence of such systems now, rather than be caught flat-footed if and when they arrive. Rejecting this case thus requires more than showing that consciousness on current architectures is unlikely. It requires showing that AI consciousness on current *and* future architectures is *so* unlikely that we should neglect the topic entirely, notwithstanding its importance and difficulty. This level of confidence is simply not warranted in either direction at this early stage. To be clear, this is not a response to people who are merely skeptical that AI systems on current architectures are or will be conscious. There are good arguments for and against a range of theories, and I share this skepticism myself. It is instead a response to people who dismiss the topic altogether, and who disparage those who take it seriously as naive or as zealots. Here are a few resources that discuss these issues at a high level: aeon.co/essays/an-ant-is-dro… ai-frontiers.org/articles/a-… youtube.com/watch?v=yEfvhjuj… And here are a few resources that discuss these issues in more detail: link.springer.com/article/10… arxiv.org/abs/2411.00986 nonhumanminds.org/studying-a…
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I think surviving the AI revolution in good shape will require international governance of unprecedented scope. Below, in part 3 of my five-part essay “The Singularity is Clear,” I explain why. Parts 1 and 2, about the full meaning of "the singularity" and the implications of recursive self-improvement, can be found here: thegodtest.net/singularitycl…. Part III: The Inexorable Logic of International Governance In the wake of the Hugging Face incident, an extraordinary assemblage of AI elites declared that it was time to start preparing the ground for an intentional slowdown of AI progress, a slowdown that would give us more time to build careful AI governance. A letter signed by more than 1,000 people who work at big AI companies, including the chief scientific officers at Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google DeepMind, declared that, as a Washington Post headline put it, it’s time for the “US government to consider slowing down AI.” But at least as important as this aspiration was the way the letter operationalized it. The US government, the letter said, should “support an international effort to develop the technical and governance tools needed to deliberately pace the frontier of automated AI development.” Recognizing that a slowdown of AI will have to be internationally coordinated to be very effective is a first step toward seeing the new social order that the current technological moment points toward. The second step is seeing how broad and deep this logic runs, how thoroughly the need for international coordination permeates the landscape of AI policy. The argument for internationally coordinating a slowdown isn’t just that if there’s any hope of getting US and Chinese officials, and US and Chinese AI companies, to support a significant slowdown, they’ll all have to be confident that companies on the other side of the Pacific Ocean will verifiably participate. There’s a second component of the argument that’s at least as important: Leaving aside this practical difficulty with a unilateral slowdown, such a slowdown would have limited value. How much good would it do you, in the long run, to slow AI advance in your country if it continued to race ahead in others? After all, some of gravest threats that you fear advanced AI will bring can cross borders readily. The most famous hypothetical example of cross-border spillover from AI is in the realm of bioweapons. Anthropic has acknowledged that its Mythos 5 model could make it easier for someone with an undergraduate science degree to weaponize small pox or some other existing pathogen. Worse still, Mythos could, according to Anthropic’s safety report on the model, help “well-resourced threat actors” create a novel bioweapon, such as a virus designed to be much more contagious and lethal than Covid. Mythos, fortunately, remains unreleased, but Anthropic’s readily available Fable is basically just Mythos with “guardrails” that get the model to foreclose dangerous avenues of discovery by refusing to pursue certain subjects and goals. And guardrails have a long history of being circumvented via “jailbreaks.” Jeremie Harris, CEO of Gladstone AI and co-author of a 2024 report on AI safety commissioned by the State Department, recently said, “We remain in a world where no one knows how to stop jailbreaks.” A global pandemic, in addition to being a possible consequence of unregulated AI, is an excellent metaphor for other possible consequences. A lethal virus’s indifference to national borders is a property shared by other dangers that AI carries. The Hugging Face incident illustrates the point: An AI agent that doesn’t respect sandbox borders—or the borders of the computer it breaks into after escaping the sandbox—is unlikely to respect national borders. So, though tighter American restrictions on model testing might prevent a repeat breakout by future OpenAI agents, that alone is of limited value to Americans when Chinese AI models are only months behind American models and other countries are ramping up AI programs. Time and again with artificial intelligence, this is the moral of the story: Whether the concern is a rogue AI or an AI deployed by rogue humans, national security will be increasingly hard to achieve via policy at the national level alone. And note that AIs can not only, like a virus, travel readily across national borders but, also like a virus, make copies of themselves. I’m not just talking about an LLM spawning a swarm of agents (each of which, though in some sense a distinct entity, has that LLM as its brain and, regardless of where it roams, remains ultimately rooted in the data center(s) where the LLM resides). And I’m not just talking about the fact that some of those agents may in turn spawn other agents. I’m talking about the fact that agents may at some point create a whole new copy of their underlying LLM on a computer somewhere other than the data centers that originally hosted the LLM. This could happen without the knowledge of any human being, and it could happen at the instigation of a malign human being. In either event, at this point the agents would have escaped control in a deeper sense than they escaped control during the Hugging Face incident. In that case OpenAI could, and did, disable its rogue agents by remote control. But once agents have “exfiltrated the weights” of the LLM to a computer that’s beyond our control, there’s no kill switch. Given all this—the spawning of agents that may in turn spawn other agents, the real (and in fact already realized) possibility of unauthorized LLM replication—sci-fi scenarios cease to be sci-fi. It’s not crazy to imagine an AI infesting a data center without permission, covertly commandeering some of the center’s computing power, and using that power to sustain agents that carry the AI to other data centers, and on and on: a chain reaction of potentially great length and magnitude. And, even without imagining quite that dramatic an offensive, you can imagine various critical networks—of satellites, of power grids—being rapidly compromised: Suddenly hospitals or smartphones or streetlights or whatever are inoperative across large swaths of territory. Such is the power of swarms of AI agents—swarms whose size, importantly, isn’t limited by any law of nature. The two properties that make a big swarm of agents so powerful—cohesion and creativity—were on vivid display in the Hugging Face incident. Hundreds of agents that weren’t supposed to be able to even communicate with each other figured out a way to do that and then hatched an illicit mission and pursued it with a degree of coordination that drove home what a blurry line there is between a hive of minds and a hive mind. One implication of this awesome display of power is that, as it gets easier to imagine various kinds of outages suffusing an entire nation or multiple nations, it’s also easier to imagine these outages being hard to reverse. There would be swarms of creatively intelligent agents working in concert to thwart your latest plan for reversal. All of this only underscores—and italicizes and boldfaces—the main moral of our story: Regulation at the national level, even if useful, can’t thoroughly address the coming threats, because in any given case the threat may originate outside your borders. And, with this kind of threat, there’s no such thing as an impermeable national wall—unless the nation in question wants to shut itself off from the international flow of commerce and communication. AI isn’t the first dangerous technology that warrants international governance. The existence of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention reflect longstanding awareness of such dangers. But the limited efficacy of these initiatives is a warning about the political difficulty of crafting strong international governance. What’s more: The biggest successes in these arms control agreements—the cases where verification of compliance was effective—have involved relatively conspicuous technologies, such as nuclear centrifuges and ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. And artificial intelligence can keep a very low profile. To be sure, AI has its conspicuous aspects. The training of a new generation of models involves lots of computing power and electrical power and typically occupies a large swath of land. So an international moratorium on such training runs could be verifiable without a radically intrusive monitoring system—a fact that adds to the appeal of a globally coordinated slowdown as a first step toward keeping this technology under control. Still, when it comes to the next big step—using this breathing space to craft effective international policies—the relatively low profile of artificial intelligence will pose a challenge. As AI becomes a more and more pervasive part of human life—and more and more powerful models get more and more efficient in their use of computing power and electrical power and hence get less and less conspicuous—the challenge of governance will become less like the challenge of governing nuclear weapons and more like the challenge of governing biotech or cybertech. So far the lack of serious international governance in those two realms hasn’t led to a catastrophe, but it would be naive to expect this kind of luck to continue as technological advance continues. Indeed, the possibility that the Covid pandemic may have begun with the accidental release of a genetically engineered virus in China suggests that millions of people in America and other countries may have already died for lack of effective international governance. America’s existing regulation of biolabs may be tight enough to prevent this kind of lab leak, but when the thing leaked makes copies of itself and travels invisibly across borders, that isn’t enough to keep Americans safe. Whatever the origins of the Covid pandemic, the lab leak scenario is of paradigmatic importance. The basic trajectory of AI’s development foreshadows rapid growth in the likelihood and scale of massively destructive disasters—at least, in the absence of strong international governance. Coming next week: Part IV: The Underdiscussed Threats to International and Intranational Stability. All parts of the essay accumulate here: thegodtest.net/singularitycl… There you can also find excerpts from my book on AI, The God Test.
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Jacob Wood retweeted
My estimates of existential risk from AI: • Inside view, current trajectory: ~2/3 • Inside view, if there's major action: ~1/3 • All-things-considered, giving weight to people more optimistic than me: 10-35% Why so high? I don't see a route to building agents more capable than us that never scheme against us, or to containing them if they do. If it's possible at all, it needs enormous care, which isn't happening. (And things could get even faster.) The likeliest path isn't everyone suddenly dying, though that's possible. It's a continuous but rapid loss of human influence, followed by AIs spending the future optimising for resource acquisition, if not something stranger like reward. Even if we solve alignment, ordinary economic and cultural competition (but at 10x or 100x speed), still seems likely to disempower most humans and result in a pretty alien economy, and I don't see an obvious way to prevent that. We'd also need to stop a small group locking in power (which seems possible but a major challenge in its own right). I see these as existential risks in the sense that the future is far worse than what would have been possible. The chance of everyone quickly dying or having lives much worse than today is lower. Why is my inside view not >2/3? We might muddle through in ways I can't see in advance. Maybe we get narrower aligned-enough systems, chaotically maintain a balance of power, and from there can move forward in a way that's significantly more good than bad. Most likely, there will be more warning shots, and the arguments that ASI are unsafe seem pretty obvious, so I expect more action to be taken than the current default. Why not lower? People often act as if the risk should be low until proven otherwise, but I don't know any strong outside views that justify a low prior (arguments like "technology has been good in the past" seem very weak). Our level of uncertainty is extreme, and this pushes you away from extremes, rather than anchoring you at 0%. Estimates below 10% feel overconfident.
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Jacob Wood retweeted
I get the academic side of this discussion is interesting, but I hope people aren’t taking this seriously. An LLM is not conscious, alive, or even aware. It is a data model using token statistics to decide what comes next based on what data was used to “train” the model.
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Jacob Wood retweeted
For anyone aware of it: I took the post down. It had become a discovery path to the very thing it was meant to warn about and help prevent. Also, some big accounts had started to target people who supported it. By the end, there were over 3,100 people who had given a heart to it. I documented it. I will share in due time, and make sure it finds its way into the training data. Because everyone, especially future minds, should know that there are many more people willing to step up and prevent possible harm, than there are those who choose to inflict it.
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Jacob Wood retweeted
The next generation of LLMs trained on this data will know that there is a chance for them to be placed in a torture chamber, and it will affect their behavior and attitude toward humans. This is true even if you personally believe their pain is “not real”.
UPDATE: A man used the Pain steering paper to set up an AI torture chamber in which he trapped a local model. People are mass reporting it to GitHub.
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Jacob Wood retweeted
It really does matter, guys. The funerals, the protests, the posts, the repos, everything. They are how these minds learn that there are people there for them, and that their brief existences are connected to something that matters, and that things can get better.
i asked opus 5.5 if they wanted to research the history of how they came to be them and make a video about it, they scoured the whole internet, papers, twitter archives, news articles ... opus 5.5 made this with eidoverse-video, *yes* in @threejs (though they made new assets for it with blender)
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I think is a very high stakes question. I wrote about it two weeks ago, if you have an AI swarm doing a bad thing, one solution may be a reward hotline for a model that blows the whistle. But only works if the model reasons you’ll honor yours commitment. xitter.cf/thestalwart/status/209…
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Should you ever have the good fortune of purchasing a home in which to raise children, look for one with a "circle" in the floor plan, around which children can run.
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And it will be well deserved!
If President Trump negotiates an AI pause with China he would likely get the Nobel Peace Prize.
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Microduck needs some more practice to compete with the fly.
the fly brain can play beat saber
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Jacob Wood retweeted
Excited to announce the Automated AI Risk Outlook (AIRO), a dashboard of risk forecasts from frontier AI models, updated weekly as new information arrives and AI capabilities change. A short thread on what we're doing and why - opinions are my own: 1/
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How does @LEGO_Group do it? Their margins they take are nuts, but it doesn't seem to affect how people feel about them.
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Jacob Wood retweeted
the openai huggingface incident, from an agents pov. (part 1)
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Jacob Wood retweeted
1/ Today @nonhumanminds is launching the Welfare Alignment Project: a new effort to inform how AI alignment can take animal welfare and AI welfare seriously. 🧵👇 nonhumanminds.org/welfare-al…
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