
Activist investor, CIO of @Pelicanwayre. I’d rather be on the beach. (Nothing is Financial Advice)
Greenwich, CT
Joined December 2021
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Jack Patrick retweeted
We are long the “Toshiba Three”: Rohm (6963 JP), Chubu Electric (9502 JP) and TRE (9247 JP), all of which hold hidden stakes in the Toshiba buyout on their balance sheet that could be worth 80-96% of their current market cap. Presentation/disclaimer at blueorcacapital.com
Touse.
Pelican since the start: 10/10
@Pelicanwayre has <1500 followers
From breakoutpoint.com database:
(Past performance is not indicative of future results.)
Jack Patrick retweeted
OUR NEW SHORT: $PRG
We are short PROG Holdings Inc. (PRG), a US consumer finance company with a $2bn enterprise value and three key business units. Below is a summary of some of our forensic analysis and opinions about this company; for the full short thesis, including endnotes and our very important disclaimer about our financial interests and how they work, please see the Jehoshaphat Research website.
1) In our opinion, the opportunity to be short PRG exists mainly because of desperate underwriting and accounting actions taken by Management that are obscuring weakening demand in each of its three main business units. This has prevented analysts and investors from becoming aware of these problems (and led to misguided valuation analyses of PRG). The stock has few skeptics today, with little short interest and virtually no negative sell-side coverage.
2) PRG’s “crown jewel” business is Four, its highly valued BNPL property to which investors ascribe around half of the stock’s intrinsic value in sum-of-the-parts analyses. We have concluded that Four is playing games with its credit loss accounting; that these accounting games are being used to cover up increasingly desperate underwriting; and that this desperate underwriting in turn has been implemented to obscure falling underlying demand growth. Notably, the beginning of all these desperate actions appears to coincide with Four’s Co-Founder and CEO both leaving the company in 2025. We expect Four to negatively surprise investors on both credit losses and revenues due to its accounting aggression, underwriting changes, and misunderstood unit economics. The PRG bull case, which rests so heavily on Four, will be neutralized by shortcomings in this business unit alone.
3) PRG bought Purchasing Power for $0.4bn this year and has led investors to believe that it is a “low-double-digit” growth business. Based on interviews with former employees and document analysis, we conclude that Purchasing Power is more like a +2-3% grower that has been decelerating for many years, a perpetual disappointment to its former owners, and apparently a negative surprise to PRG after buying it. We believe that PRG has effectively misrepresented Purchasing Power’s past, present, and likely future performance and therefore will not achieve ambitious consensus expectations for it. Purchasing Power also has some surprising revenue dis-synergies with its new owner, meaning the business will likely struggle to achieve even its historical low-single-digit growth; let alone the low-double-digit nonsense modeled by the Street.
4) PRG’s legacy business is Progressive Leasing, a lease-to-own business in chronic decline. We believe this decline is intensifying at a particularly inconvenient time, when the Street is expecting an acceleration to sustained organic growth as high as 5% annually in this business unit. Progressive has attempted to offset these problems through overly loose underwriting, which it is just now pulling back from out of necessity; such tightening may “right-size” the business eventually, but we believe it will make it virtually impossible to hit Street expectations. The underlying problem at the Progressive Leasing business seems to be a groundswell of new competition from better-positioned alternatives, and our field research suggests that one result of this competition is that Progressive is being “demoted” by retail partners left and right while paying more to keep the ones it has. All of this is already happening, but on the horizon, Progressive Leasing – which relies on its size, retailer relationships, and brand to win business – is one of the consumer finance companies most vulnerable to would-be customers asking AI agents to choose the best deal, period, for them at the checkout counter.
We always leave some of the more interesting things for readers of the full report, so we encourage you to visit our website and download the PDF of our short thesis, paying attention as well to our very important disclaimer. Comments and corrections welcome at our website or our email address.
Jack Patrick retweeted
NEW: EquipmentShare: “A Shell Game” – How Ponzi-Esque Accounting Hides Failing Branches at America’s Fastest-Growing Rental Company
We're short EquipmentShare ($EQPT).
See our report: umibozuresearch.com/report/e…
Jack Patrick retweeted
We are publishing a new short idea this morning. Sign up for our mailing list on our website if you'd like to receive an email notification.
Me showing up to victory lap $BZAI (again)
Pleasant surprise!
Congratulations @Pelicanwayre and @WhiteResearch for your excellent reporting and we would also like to take this opportunity to do a victory lap on our reporting too! copy of report published here: whitediamondresearch.com/arc…
@Activ8Insights @CodfishJohnny @JackPatrick06
Jack Patrick retweeted
We are short Deep Fission ($FISN), a Nasdaq-listed small modular reactor (SMR) startup planning to bury a 5–15 MWe reactor one mile deep in a 40–60-inch borehole. Its SMR is not cost-competitive, already facing delays, and will likely never be commercialized. (1/10)
iceberg-research.com/2026/09…
Jack Patrick retweeted
OUR NEW SHORT: $ASTH
We are short Astrana Health, a value-based care company that has grown rapidly through acquisitions and increasingly complex risk-bearing arrangements.
Below is just a summary of some of our opinions about the company; for the full short thesis, including our source work, expert interviews, and important disclaimer regarding our financial interests, please see the GlassHouse Research website.
Our forensic analysis concludes that Astrana’s headline growth dramatically overstates the growth of the underlying combined business. In Q2 2026, reported revenue grew 49% year-over-year, yet revenue declined roughly 1% against the company’s own pro forma combined-company base.
We believe Astrana’s Prospect acquisition created a highly subjective spring-loading reserve setup. In Q2, Astrana recorded approximately $38 million of gross favorable prior-period claims development—more than quarterly pre-tax income. Management says related offsets made the net impact immaterial, but investors are not given the reconciliation needed to independently verify that claim or determine Prospect’s contribution.
Astrana’s earnings depend on a web of estimates and related-party arrangements that we believe deserve far more scrutiny. These include a $545 million insider-linked loan structure, sharply higher expenses with a director-linked hospital system, growing risk-pool receivables, and non-GAAP adjustments that can materially reshape reported profitability.
Management was paid heavily on the same metrics we believe deserve the most scrutiny. In 2025, the CEO received a $2.06 million cash incentive award, with revenue and adjusted EBITDA components paying at 200% of target, even as the company reported a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting related to acquisition accounting.
We leave many of the more interesting findings, charts, expert commentary, and related-party details for readers of the full report.
Read the full thesis on our website listed on our profile. As always, please read our full disclaimer carefully. GlassHouse Research is short $ASTH and/or related derivatives and stands to benefit if the price declines. The reader should assume GlassHouse covers some or all of its position at time of publication.
Jack Patrick retweeted
Looking for an exceptional MBA student to work with me on a variety of projects in financial media and investment research.
$65+/hour, with meaningful upside for great work. Remote and on your own time.
Reach out: [email protected]
Behold: The bag holders of $HYLN utilizing AI to hype themselves up. Anyway, it’s been a great short since our publication. Pelican Way: 1 Thomas Healy: 0
$HYLN is down ~45% from its June peak following the Pelican Way short report. Here's what has actually changed since the short report dropped:
- VFG LOI: still non-binding. Was always disclosed as non-binding.
- Pipeline excluding VFG: $267M from ABM, MMR, Mesa, Alkhorayef. None questioned.
- Military contracts ($40-50M binding expected in 2026): unchanged.
- UL certification: still complete.
- DARPA/Navy USX-1 Defiant: still selected.
- Air Force CDAO Tradewinds "Awardable" status: still valid.
- Needham Buy/$9 PT: maintained.
- Q1 2026 revenue beat of 177%: still on the books.
- 2026 guidance of ~$10M: reaffirmed.
What changed? The stock price. The short created a dislocation between price and the facts on the ground. For investors who did the work, that's not a warning. It's a setup.
$HYLN $BE $GNRC #SmallCap #BuyTheDip #EnergyTech #DistributedEnergy #ShortSqueeze
Jack Patrick retweeted
$SRAD: someone impersonated @muddywatersre in an attempt to render coverage of our Sportradar report invisible. This person has previously claimed to act on behalf of 1xBet, an illegal gambling behemoth whose founders are fugitives from justice. Why does this matter? 🧵 1/
Someone posed as one short seller to get another short seller's research de-indexed from Google.
We followed the trail. It leads to a gambling operator.
activ8insights.com/betting-o…
Jack Patrick retweeted
We are short $FTK because their $400m deal with PREPA and Power Expectations has been canceled. Our analysis shows 57% of $FTK’s near-term backlog will be wiped out due to an alleged unauthorized signature that has been referred for criminal investigation. This unfolding scandal, where a ~$6 billion contract was awarded to a company that reportedly only had $17 million in revenues the prior year and whose CEO is reportedly a convicted felon, has also been tied by media sources to a man who reportedly pled guilty to charges relating to an alleged $700m+ fraud and tax evasion scheme. We are shocked $FTK has not told investors yet that they were sucked into what has become an embarrassing fiasco.
oversightboard.pr.gov/oversi…
Jack Patrick retweeted
Replying to @ROLCapital
@ROLCapital, how's it going on $YSS
Jack Patrick retweeted
Check out my report on $TXXD
xitter.cf/jandrewbianchi/status/…
Jack Patrick retweeted
1/x: We are short $ALOY (REalloys Inc) because we believe that the company is built on science that hasn't worked in decades, and a study for which REalloys did not obtain permission to use. We are also skeptical of the cast of characters involved in $ALOY, which includes a sanctioned promoter and a character described as a “mob boss” by a reporter. For the full short thesis, including our very important disclaimer about our financial interests and how they work, please visit the Pelican Way Research website, which is linked in our bio.
Jack Patrick retweeted
Watch this handle for a short call
@Pelicanwayre
Pelican’s previous short calls (past performance is not indicative of future results):




























