Three Years Since October 7. Three Years That Have Reshaped Israel and the Entire Middle East. Marking three years since the October 7 massacre and the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, the Institute for National Security Studies presents a special project documenting the war. Three Years of War - A Special INSS Project >>> inss.org.il/publication/octo…

Should Gaza’s reconstruction be contingent on Hamas disarming? An INSS survey asked Palestinians in the West Bank what they think. See the full survey findings >>> inss.org.il/publication/surv…

Is the Democratic Party Really Turning Against Israel? Left Progressive victories in the U.S. primaries have generated plenty of headlines - but a new INSS study reveals a more complex picture.Which factions are actually gaining ground within the party? How will the party’s different factions be represented in the next Congress - and what could that mean for Israel? Read the full analysis of our researchers Theodore Sasson, Ari Blumenthal and Avishay Ben Sasson-Gordis >>> inss.org.il/publication/demo…

Is a True Alternative to the Strait of Hormuz Attainable? Read the full article >>> inss.org.il/publication/afte…

Is the Palestinian struggle shifting away from the battlefield? This is just one of the findings from the INSS Palestinian Public Opinion Survey. Explore the full survey findings >>> inss.org.il/publication/surv…

What’s really happening in Yemen? Our interactive live map tracks the fighting, military activity, and shifting front lines >>> inss.org.il/publication/map-…

Saudi Arabia is Looking for a Way Out Senior researcher Yoel Guzansky writes: Saudi Arabia is facing mounting military and economic pressure, perhaps among the most severe it has experienced in years. To the east, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is impairing its ability to export oil; to the north, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq threaten its territory and infrastructure; the East–West Pipeline, designed to allow it to bypass Hormuz, has been damaged and shut down; and to the south, the Houthis are intensifying their attacks and threatening the Bab el-Mandeb region. What previously seemed like threats emanating from different arenas is now converging into a strategic chokehold around the Kingdom and its export arteries. Throughout the war, Mohammed bin Salman has sought to avoid direct involvement, keep channels with Tehran open, and prevent Saudi Arabia from being drawn back into the war in Yemen. Yet as the pressure mounts and outside assistance remains limited, Riyadh’s room for maneuver is narrowing. The United States has thus far failed to provide the response Riyadh is seeking; the United Arab Emirates is no longer the military partner it was during the previous campaign in Yemen; and the new security frameworks established by Saudi Arabia have yet to prove themselves in a moment of crisis. This poses a significant danger to Israel and the United States: the more isolated and vulnerable Saudi Arabia feels, the greater its incentive to reach an arrangement specifically with Iran. Riyadh does not need to trust Tehran. It needs Iran to help reopen Hormuz, exert its influence on the Houthis, and help alleviate the pressure from the militias in Iraq. In return, Tehran may demand a political price: Saudi Arabia distancing itself from the US position against Iran, opposing further military action against it, acquiescing to a stronger Houthi position in Yemen, and accepting the status quo in Hormuz. In doing so, Iran can attempt to convert military pressure into political gains that would otherwise have been difficult to achieve. From Riyadh’s perspective, this would not necessarily constitute a shift in camps or a reconciliation with Iran, but rather a cold calculation of interests. Its immediate interest is to stop the attacks, reopen its export arteries, and break free from the chokehold—even at the cost of "ugly arrangements." Israel and the United States therefore have a clear interest in ensuring that the kingdom is not left without alternatives. Assisting Saudi Arabia is not merely a matter of supporting an ally in distress; it is also a means of reducing Iran’s leverage over it. Iran does not need Saudi Arabia to like it. The pressure just has to be heavy enough to convince Riyadh that the way out runs through Tehran

Iran Has Appointed a Supreme Leader. Now They Just Have to Find Him. Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since taking office - and the longer his absence continues, the greater the efforts in Tehran to bolster his authority and explain his disappearance. What could his prolonged absence mean for the regime? Read the full article >>> inss.org.il/publication/mujt…

Jewish terrorism and nationalist crime pose a real threat to Israel’s ability to maintain control and function effectively. Our researchers warn that the consequences for national security could be catastrophic - and that immediate action is required. Read the full Strategic Alert >>> inss.org.il/publication/jewi…

The “Mecca Alliance” Faces Its Moment of Truth INSS Senior Researcher Yoel Guzansky writes: Just one month ago, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan declared a new defense alliance in Mecca: an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. Now, much sooner than expected, that pledge is being put to the test. Saudi Arabia may be facing its most severe security crisis since Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the threat then posed to the kingdom’s oil fields. From the east, the war with Iran and the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz are damaging its economic lifeline; from the north, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq are attacking Saudi territory and have even struck the East-West pipeline; and from the south, the Houthis are targeting sites in the kingdom and have established a foothold allowing them to threaten the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The United States is providing intelligence and targeting assistance, but Trump has rejected the Saudis' request to use force against the Houthis. This is precisely the moment when the "Mecca Alliance" is expected to prove it is more than just a declaration. If Turkey and Pakistan settle for mere condemnations, the clause stipulating that "an attack on one is an attack on all" will be rendered meaningless. This poses a difficult dilemma. Pakistan already declined to join the Saudi-led war in Yemen in 2015, while Turkey is in no hurry to adopt Riyadh’s enemies as its own. Behind the mutual defense declaration lies a fundamental problem: the three countries do not share the same threat perception, nor do they necessarily share the same willingness to pay a price. And this is also a test for Israel. While Washington hesitates and Riyadh's new partners deliberate, Israel should offer quiet assistance—unconditionally and without demanding immediate political payback. Aid provided in a time of distress could help build something with Riyadh that is far more difficult to achieve through declarations: trust.

This is how Israel’s story is being rewritten - one Wikipedia article at a time. Read the full article >>> inss.org.il/publication/wiki…

Why are plans to build in E1 causing such a major controversy - and what would actually change if they move forward? Explore the implications of one of the most hotly disputed construction plans in the region in the full article >>> inss.org.il/publication/e1/

Who Will Blink First? Trump and Iran’s Ticking Clock INSS Senior researchers Eldad Shavit and Sima Shine write: On September 9, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution referring the issue of Iranian non-compliance with inspection demands to the UN Security Council. The resolution, initiated by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, passed with 23 countries voting in favor, three opposed, and eight abstaining. This marks the first time in two decades that Iran has been referred to the Security Council through this mechanism, against the backdrop of its continued refusal to allow IAEA inspectors access to nuclear sites bombed during the "Rising Lion" and "Roaring Lion" wars. Iran rejected the resolution, describing it as a political move intended to intensify pressure rather than a response to any violation of its safeguards agreement. Iranian officials claim that the suspension of IAEA access resulted from attacks on sites that had been under the agency’s supervision, as well as from the ongoing war and threats against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, Kazem Gharibabadi, emphasized that the move would not compensate the West for the failure of its policies, and that even in the Security Council "they will not be able to achieve anything." Nevertheless, under current circumstances, the resolution’s practical impact is limited. In itself, it neither alters the balance of power nor imposes new sanctions or changes the situation on the ground. At this stage, its significance is primarily political and symbolic: it deepens Iran’s isolation and adds another layer to the cumulative pressure against it. In any event, the resolution comes as the conflict between the United States and Iran is once again escalating, illustrating how diplomatic pressure on Tehran is being applied alongside military, maritime, and economic pressure. This picture is reinforced by President Trump's comments on September 9, reiterating that the US has identified activity at "Pickaxe Mountain," the underground complex adjacent to Natanz. Trump warned that if Iran attempts to restore nuclear capabilities there, the United States might strike the site. As a result, the line between the issue of nuclear inspection and the military campaign itself is becoming increasingly blurred. Escalation also continues in the maritime arena. Iran announced that it attacked ten vessels after the US sank five Iranian tankers, and the IRGC has threatened to expand its maritime area of operations. Oil prices have once again crossed the $100 per barrel mark. Against this backdrop, Trump's remark that the war will end "immediately after" the midterms is particularly interesting. In his view, Iran is playing for time in an effort to influence the elections, but will be unable to hold out against economic pressure. He even added that negotiations remain possible, though not something the administration is currently seeking. Here lies the American dilemma: Trump is intensifying the pressure believing that time is working against Iran, but simultaneously setting a political deadline for ending the conflict. As the elections draw closer, and as energy prices and the public toll of the war rise, the gap widens between the desire to claim a decisive victory and the difficulty of forcing Tehran to accept Washington’s terms for ending the conflict. At this stage, Iran has not announced any concrete retaliatory measure. It is keeping its threat deliberately vague, emphasizing that inspections can only resume once appropriate security conditions are met, while relying politically on Russia and China to block further measures at the Security Council. However, if Iran responds with a defiant nuclear move or further escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, the resolution could instead become the trigger for another round of conflict, making it more difficult for Trump to adhere to the timeline he himself has set.

Riyadh’s Distress – Israel’s Opportunity INSS Senior Researcher Yoel Guzansky writes: Saudi Arabia is experiencing one of its most severe security low points in years. To the east, the ongoing war with Iran and the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz are impairing its ability to export oil; to the south, the Houthis are targeting strategic facilities in the kingdom and threatening the alternative export route via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait; in Yemen, fears are mounting over the renewal of a full-scale war; and to the north, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq are joining the circle of threat. Riyadh is thus contending with threats from almost every direction, simultaneously undermining its security and its primary source of power—energy exports. Saudi oil exports dropped to a low this month of just 3 million barrels per day. Saudi Arabia’s response is to diversify its pillars of support. Riyadh is attempting to strengthen ties with the United States, deepening its alliance with Pakistan, forming the "Mecca Alliance" together with Pakistan and Turkey, and advancing regional security frameworks to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. Yet no single framework provides a comprehensive solution. The United States remains Saudi Arabia’s central pillar; Pakistan adds military and deterrent depth; Turkey contributes military and industrial capabilities; and regional frameworks provide additional cooperation. Despite its mutual defense clause, the Mecca Alliance has yet to demonstrate how it would function in wartime, particularly given that its members do not share a common threat perception. This proliferation of alliances reflects not only power, but above all distress. As Saudi Arabia’s sense of threat intensifies, Riyadh is not choosing a single ally but assembling a range of partial partnerships to avoid dependence on any one actor. Israel, too, could become part of this network—not as a substitute for the United States or as part of a new defense alliance, but as another partial partner. Israel has much to offer in intelligence, early warning, defense against missiles and UAVs, and confronting Iran and the Houthis. However, given the political cost of openly engaging with Israel, particularly in light of the Palestinian issue, such cooperation is likely to remain selective and discreet for now. Herein lies the paradox: Saudi Arabia’s security distress may increase its need for Israel, but not necessarily the urgency of normalizing relations with it. For Israel, the right policy is not to use Saudi Arabia’s distress as leverage to pressure Riyadh into normalization, but to demonstrate its value as a security partner. Israel should offer practical cooperation through discreet channels. The more it is perceived in Riyadh as providing a vital additional layer of security without demanding exclusivity or immediate public acknowledgment, the more likely it is to gradually lay the groundwork for a broader partnership and, ultimately, normalization.

What’s happening on the Lebanon front - and what do the numbers tell us? Explore our continuously updated dashboard: launches, alerts, casualties, displaced persons, and offensive activity >>> inss.org.il/publication/leba…

How does the Gaza roadmap differ from previous plans - and what are the implications for Israel? >>> inss.org.il/publication/road…

Bullseye: Successful LORA Missile Test – An Israeli Achievement in German Waters INSS Researcher Yehoshua Kalisky writes: Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) announced in early September that the German Navy had successfully completed a dual operational test of the naval version of IAI’s LORA (Long Range Artillery) ballistic missile. The achievement illustrates Israel’s standing as a military-technological power and its contribution to European security. According to the announcement, two complex test scenarios were conducted, in which the entire weapon system—the command trailer, launcher, and missile—successfully met the test objectives. The missile was launched from an operational German Navy vessel equipped with the command trailer and launcher. In both scenarios, the missile was launched, navigated toward its target, and struck it with maximum precision. What is the LORA System? According to open sources based on IAI publications, LORA is an IAI-manufactured platform for launching high-speed, solid-fueled ballistic missiles. The missiles carry a 400–600 kg warhead and are guided by GPS and an inertial navigation system (INS), providing high precision with a circular error probable (CEP) of less than 10 meters. LORA is available in several variants: surface-to-surface, sea-to-sea, sea-to-surface, and air-to-surface (Air LORA). Its aerial variant is classified as a deep standoff weapon, enabling pilots to strike enemy targets from a considerable distance while reducing the risk to aircraft and crews. The ballistic missile is designed to strike enemy targets at short to medium ranges of up to ~500 km and can be launched from land, naval, or air platforms. Following launch, the missile travels along a high-altitude ballistic trajectory at supersonic speed. As it approaches its target, it shifts from an arcing trajectory to a vertical terminal dive, significantly increasing both its accuracy and the effectiveness of the strike. The LORA missile has been sold to several countries in Europe and Asia and was first used operationally in 2020 during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Is Iraq truly capable of disarming the pro-Iranian militias? As the deadline set by the Iraqi government approaches, divisions among the militias are deepening - and Tehran is already working to block the move. Read about the power struggle threatening to derail the Iraqi government’s ambitious plan in the full article >> inss.org.il/publication/iraq…

Replacing the United States with China? The UAE Diversifies Its Partnerships INSS researcher Yoel Guzansky writes: Falcon Shield 2026, the fourth joint air exercise conducted by the United Arab Emirates and China in four years, is another indication of the deepening and institutionalization of security ties between Abu Dhabi and Beijing. The current exercise, once again taking place in China, includes flight training, command simulations, and operational drills in integrated formations. This does not indicate that the UAE is seeking to replace its U.S. security pillar with a Chinese one. The war demonstrated how the United States remains Abu Dhabi’s primary security mainstay, particularly in the areas of air and missile defense, intelligence, and advanced military systems. However, Abu Dhabi has long pursued a strategy of hedging and diversifying its partnerships: maintaining its vital alliance with Washington while simultaneously expanding ties with other powers, chief among them China. In doing so, it seeks to reduce exclusive dependence on the United States, increase its strategic autonomy, and strengthen its bargaining power vis-à-vis Washington. The war with Iran adds another important dimension to the UAE's rapprochement with China. From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, Beijing holds potential leverage over Tehran. The Emirates therefore hope that, as their partnership with Beijing deepens, China will have a greater interest in taking their security needs into account and exerting pressure on Iran to refrain from targeting the smaller Gulf states and their critical infrastructure. So far, the war has actually illustrated the limits of this strategy: China does not provide security guarantees, and its ties with Iran limit its willingness to explicitly side with the Gulf states. Yet for the UAE, this is not necessarily a reason to distance itself from Beijing, but rather a reason to invest further in the relationship and attempt, over time, to increase the weight of Emirati interests in Chinese calculations. Falcon Shield 2026 is therefore more than a military exercise. It reflects a broader Emirati strategy: relying on the United States, but not exclusively; cultivating alternatives and sources of leverage vis-à-vis major powers; and simultaneously attempting to turn the tightening relationship with China into an indirect tool to restrain Iran. The test will be whether Beijing contents itself with exercises, procurement, and technological cooperation, or whether its deepening ties with the Gulf states will eventually lead it to invest genuine political capital in safeguarding their stability and curbing the Iranian conduct that threatens them.

In recent weeks, talks have been underway in Cairo on the formation of an expanded national list ahead of the Palestinian Legislative Council elections - The composition of such a list would effectively allow Hamas to integrate into the Palestinian political system. What are the risks, and how should Israel respond? >> inss.org.il/publication/hama…