British/global history and political economy @CamGeopolitics, @RobinsonCamb. Visiting Fellow @HooverInst PhD @CamHistory

Joined May 2022
NYT: "Maros Sefcovic, the trade commissioner of the 27-nation bloc, said that the understanding could lead to China’s halving the number of hybrid gasoline-electric cars that it sends to the European Union in the next four years." This may seem like a victory, but the problem is a systemic one, and not sectoral. Because this agreement does not in any way address either China's demand imbalance or the overall role of the EU in absorbing that imbalance, it won't have much effect on overall EU manufacturing. All that will happen is a shift in the locus of net manufacturing imports from China, so that EU producers of hybrids will be better off, but at the expense of other EU manufacturers. For historical reasons, trade discussions are usually held on a product-by-product basis, but while that may make sense in a world of broadly balanced trade, it makes no sense in a world of deep, persistent imbalances. China runs huge surpluses not because it produces too many hybrids but rather because of its deep consumption imbalance and the very low household income share of GDP. As long as that happens, the only recourse for the EU, if it does not want to accept deindustrialization, is either to reduce its own household share of GDP (which would be politically disruptive as well as bad for the global economy) or to intervene in its external accounts in such a way that it reverses the competitive impact of China's low household share of GDP. nytimes.com/2026/10/09/busin…
15
65
12
255
30,451
Hugo Bromley retweeted
Britain needs to stop 'throwing shade' at itself, the London Stock Exchange's CEO says. Julia Hoggett tells Today business presenter @WillBain31 the nation's negativity has driven companies to delist from the UK. Hear the Big Boss Interview on Sounds 🔊 bbc.co.uk/sounds/brand/p016t…
4
7
4
27
15,437
Hugo Bromley retweeted
Credit @WillBain31 for this interview. What Julia speaks to about self-confidence is no doubt correct. The interview also acknowledges that the UK is an outlier at having tax reliefs that are agnostic to the country in which the underlying company pays tax. Franked dividends in Australia are a good long-held example. Trump Accounts in the US the most contemporary example. Moving beyond mandation would endogenise the fiduciary duty issue that dogged the passage of the Pension Schemes Bill, Mansion House Accord. Ending rationing of capital would be addressed by a lot of what Julia talks about.
Britain needs to stop 'throwing shade' at itself, the London Stock Exchange's CEO says. Julia Hoggett tells Today business presenter @WillBain31 the nation's negativity has driven companies to delist from the UK. Hear the Big Boss Interview on Sounds 🔊 bbc.co.uk/sounds/brand/p016t…
2
9
53
6,380
Hugo Bromley retweeted
1/2 This is why, when examining the impact on US manufacturing of external shocks, it is important to separate the manufacturing share of output from the manufacturing share of employment. When the manufacturing share of employment declines because of a rise in manufacturing productivity, this is a good thing, and is precisely the reason why countries should want to specialize in manufacturing. Even China, whose share of global manufacturing has surged in recent years, has seen a decline in the manufacturing share of employment. This is exactly the definition of productivity growth. But when the manufacturing share of employment declines because of a decline in the manufacturing share of GDP, this is a very different thing. It means the country is reducing its ability to take advantage of rising productivity in manufacturing. This is clearly not a good thing. I am always a little shocked when American economists dismiss the importance of manufacturing to the US economy by pointing to the long-term decline in the manufacturing share of employment in the US. This is not evidence that manufacturing doesn't matter. On the contrary, it is evidence that countries that specialize in manufacturing benefit from more rapid productivity growth.
A few comments on the China shock debate, from a more "macro" point of view that sets aside the vicious debate about "identification" -- There was clearly a downturn in manufacturing output around the time of China's WTO entry (it doesn't recover til 06/07) 1/
10
23
2
129
16,185
Hugo Bromley retweeted
For my money the solution is some version of @DamianGreen's for @CPSThinkTank - state pension style system in which state guarantees a decent minimum of care, people top up via insurance/savings/housing wealth, and funding doing nationally to save councils cps.org.uk/wp-content/upload…
4
1
14
3,278
"Are we ready?" 🌍 The inaugural event of our Government & Geopolitics Programme, with: 🎙️ Prof. @JacekSiewiera (ex-National Security Adviser, Poland) 🎙️ @haynesdeborah (Sky News) 📅 Tue 20 Oct, 5–6:30pm 📍 Gonville & Caius, Cambridge ⬇️ Info&reg cfg.cam.ac.uk/events/are-we-…
2
1
885
Hugo Bromley retweeted
My book, Power and the People: A History of British Energy, is out today and is 30% off
2
17
2
55
6,358
Hugo Bromley retweeted
Very important article from the head of China's Ministry of State Security, laying out China's view of top AI risks. First is social & political risk from AI content. Second, is cyber, citing Mythos: "Second, the landscape of cyber offense and defense is undergoing a disruptive transformation. Marked by the recent release of large models such as “Mythos” (Claude Mythos) and “Cyber” (GPT-5.5-Cyber) by U.S. technology companies, AI is significantly improving the efficiency and sophistication of vulnerability discovery, malware development, and cyber weaponization. Cyber conflict is entering a new phase characterized by industrialized vulnerability exploitation, fully automated offense and defense, and AI-versus-AI confrontation. Some countries and organizations are now capable of rapidly identifying vulnerabilities at scale, automatically chaining attack paths, and completing complex hacking tasks—substantially lowering the technical barriers and costs of conducting cyberattacks, and creating serious risks for China’s critical IT infrastructure."
What are China’s biggest concerns about AI? A new article by Chen Yixin, China’s Minister of State Security, in the latest issue of China Cybersecurity Magazine offers some revealing clues. Chen identifies six major risks: 1. Regime security. Hostile forces and people with ulterior motives can use deepfakes, AI-generated text and images, and automated online accounts to cheaply and massively produce political rumors, spread harmful information, and incite social divisions—waging “public-opinion wars” and “cognitive warfare” against China and directly threatening its political, institutional, and ideological security. 2. Critical infrastructure. AI can enable countries and organizations to rapidly discover vulnerabilities, automatically chain together attack paths, and carry out sophisticated hacking operations, dramatically lowering the technical barriers and costs of cyberattacks against China’s critical information infrastructure. 3. Data leakage. Foreign intelligence agencies can use AI-powered web crawlers, data mining, and profiling to collect sensitive information, including critical national data, trade secrets, and citizens’ personal information. Chinese users who process sensitive information through foreign AI products or export data abroad could also cause large-scale data leaks. 4. Closed technological ecosystems. Countries with advantages in AI theory, model architecture, and computing power may invoke “national security” to impose technology controls, entity lists, monopolize technical standards, and build closed-source ecosystems, restricting other countries’ access to advanced technologies and fragmenting global AI supply chains. 5. Structural challenges to social governance. AI creates new uncertainties for social governance and public order. Algorithmic “black boxes” and data poisoning can amplify existing social biases; misuse of personal information can trigger crises of public trust; automated decision-making creates difficult questions of accountability; and the rapid development of AI is increasingly outpacing existing laws, ethics, and regulatory mechanisms. 6. A fundamental transformation of warfare. AI is pushing warfare into an era of “intelligentization.” Whoever can use algorithms to achieve more precise sensing, judgment, and targeting will gain the initiative on the battlefield. AI is moving from an auxiliary role to a central one in intelligence fusion, decision support, target identification, combat operations, and cognitive warfare. And what is the solution? Chen’s answer is revealing: strengthen “Party control over the internet” and “Party control over data,” and “transform the advantages of Party leadership into the effectiveness of AI governance.” In other words, from the CCP’s perspective, the central question is not simply AI versus no AI. Nor is it even fundamentally a contest between the US and China. It is a contest between the US and the CCP over who gets to control AI, data, information, and ultimately the future of society. And whoever wins that contest will decide the future of humanity. mp.weixin.qq.com/s/jsc97cKVY…
50
114
17
762
200,897
“It is unclear how close to the nuclear brink U.S. leaders may be willing to go in defending Taiwan, especially because many Americans cannot even locate the island on a map.” Bonny Lin reviews “Defending Taiwan” by Eyck Freymann: foreignaffairs.com/reviews/l…
2
3
1
6
7,082
“If the United States wants to defend Taiwan, it cannot overlook the possibility that China could use gray-zone tactics to win without fighting,” writes Bonny Lin. foreignaffairs.com/reviews/l…
10
28
5
98
19,696
Nice little retrospective on the dearly departed DSIT. uk20.substack.com/p/a-short-…
2
5
730
Economic dependencies are center stage in US-China competition—and allied governments need a way to identify truly "critical" needs in goods, services, and technologies. In Defining Ideas, @EyckFreymann, @HugoBromley, and Kazuto Suzuki provide a step-by-step way to do so. hoover.org/research/what-sho…
1
14
15
4,077
Hugo Bromley retweeted
Waiting for someone to dig up the UK statements protesting Chinese nationalizations in 1956
China's Foreign Ministry said on Saturday that it would closely monitor the United Kingdom's nationalisation of Chinese steelmaker-owned British Steel and will take appropriate measures to safeguard legitimate rights and interests if warranted. reuters.com/world/china/chin…
1
6
1
21
16,642
Hugo Bromley retweeted
1/ Some thoughts on the rumour of yet another government department reorg...
Jonny is great and would do a great job at DBT. But changes to DSIT (which I’ve been getting calls about) would be a mistake. A mega department would mean British tech competing with British steel for attention. And waste 6 months reorg-ing when time is of the essence. Not good.
4
28
4
110
39,838
Something that I heard quite a lot from soldiers while preparing this story last month is that, even if they liked the idea of the reform, they didn't trust the state to follow up on its promises. Their distrust seems vindicated as Def minister Fedorov... ft.com/content/923a4168-0b25…
3
27
2
85
16,042
5/6 I am still surprised, for example, that the Shenzhen economy "grew" even faster than China's in the first quarter of 2026, and yet retail sales grew even more slowly (and even then the growth was only positive because of shoppers from Hong Kong). xitter.cf/michaelxpettis/status/…
1/4 SCMP: "China’s top tech hub, Shenzhen, saw retail sales grow by just 0.5% year on year in the first quarter after reporting gross domestic product growth of 5.8% for the same period, casting a spotlight on its unbalanced development as... sc.mp/6c6g1?utm_source=twitt…
2
1
33
9,530
Hugo Bromley retweeted
This week Kyiv was hit by missiles & Irish politicians are STILL defending the refinery supplying Russia’s war machine. Today, another ship sailed from Ireland to Russia. For years, the government tried to cover this up. Now the truth is coming out Watch my full investigation:
451
4,257
126
13,733
356,562
Hugo Bromley retweeted
We have a new Section 232 investigation and could get additional 232 news this week. Let's unpack: 1. BIS announced a new Section 232 investigation into two types of coal primarily used in steelmaking. The US only imported about $125 million of this coal in 2025, mostly from Peru and Canada, with substantially larger domestic production. 2. Trump announced that he had reviewed Commerce's Section 232 investigation into aircraft, engines, and parts, which, unsurprisingly, found that imports threaten to impair US national security. Rather than imposing tariffs, however, Trump directed Commerce/USTR to negotiate with trade partners over import levels. A report due in early January. The US has a trade surplus in aircraft and the no-tariff approach is consistent with Trump's Section 122 and planned Section 301 tariffs (the "country tariffs"), which exclude aircraft and aircraft parts. The threat of tariffs, may, however, give Trump leverage in trade negotiations with three jurisdictions he tends to fight with--Canada, the EU, and Brazil, all of which sell large quantities of aircraft and parts. (Note possible legal issues with these tariffs, discussed below). 3. Potential 232 news, part 1-critical minerals: Back in January, Trump directed Commerce and USTR to undertake negotiations about US critical minerals imports, and a report on the negotiations is due on Monday (July 13) Of course, the report may not be made public, and/or could simply note that negotiations are progressing and will take more time. 4. Potential 232 news part 2--polysilicon & UAS: The Trump Administration is at the outer limit of the statutory clocks for the Section 232 investigations announced last July 1 into polysilicon and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAS). Given the statutory timelines, we should see an announcement of actions, which would be tariffs, other import adjustments, or negotiations with trade partners (e.g., similar to the aircraft announcement) in the coming days. 5. That said Trump may not be 100% committed to statutory timelines. For example, it appears that he may have missed deadlines on the civil aviation 232. His July 9 proclamation directing negotiations, for example, said that he had received the Section 232 report "within the past 90 days." This would mean that Commerce transmitted the report no earlier than April 10, 2026. But the 270 deadline for Commerce to complete and transmit that report lapsed in late January. If Trump does impose 232 tariffs on civil aircraft and parts under 232, missing the statutory deadline could create real litigation risk. (Of course, Trump could also impose tariffs by removing the 122 and 301 exemption from country tariffs for aircraft and aircraft parts). 6. Trump has now initiated 21 Section 232 investigations between his two terms. All other Presidents combined have initiated 26. Counting only self-initiated investigations (e.g, excluding ones at the behest of industry), the score is Trump-17, all others-10.
6
1
22
6,092
Hugo Bromley retweeted
I did the math here -- the lost revenue could easy pay for a nuclear car and an escorting sub -- or several attack subs. Every year. Over 10 years it would impact the defense balance in the Pacific 2/2 cfr.org/articles/the-luck-of…
3
10
3
62
7,234