The fight over whether Iran will "control the Strait of Hormuz" is really a fig leaf for the uncomfortable reality that Iran has demonstrated a capability to reliably penetrate regional air defenses. This is what makes it so perplexing that the idea of a service fee in the Strait of Hormuz is being rejected in such a knee-jerk fashion. If you are worried about Iran's control of chokepoints, the issue at hand isn't really Iran's ability to dominate a small stretch of water, but rather Iran's ability to disrupt or damage any systemically important structure, facility, or complex in the region with weapons systems that cannot be degraded through anything less than a full-blown invasion. Simply as a function of military capabilities and the target landscape, there are tens, if not hundreds, of chokepoints in the Gulf that Iran can hit. This is Iran's actual source of leverage. The ongoing impact on maritime trade is actually somewhat incidental. Recent attacks have focused on vessels because they are non-territorial, meaning Iran can remind parties of its underlying capability while managing escalation. Given the military realities, the fact that Iran is insisting on a mainly symbolic level of administrative "control" over the strait is actually a blessing for the American and regional negotiators. This is a modest demand when you consider how the war played out and the extent to which Iran retains leverage. So why aren't the Iranians demanding something more? Iran's leaders are aware of their own strategic vulnerabilities. They need a way out of a cycle of violence and so they are they are seeking to parlay the issue of postwar hegemony into an institutional and technical arrangement, one which could theoretically be regionalized. This is the approach of a country that knows it did not win the war, but also knows it denied victory to its aggressors. As the text of the MOU makes clear, Iran's leaders want to restore the status of Iranian sovereignty and security, including through regional arrangements. In this sense, the issue of control of the Strait of Hormuz is a test. If regional countries or Western governments cannot tolerate Iran levying a nominal fee on vessels, likely in association with the Gulf states, then surely there is no genuine path towards normalization. So far, everyone is failing the test. When it comes to institutional arrangements that help break cycles of conflict, there are many historical antecedents. In 1950, the Schuman Declaration proposed that Franco-German "production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe." The joint administration of the Strait of Hormuz can be for the eight littoral states of the Persian Gulf what the European Coal and Steel Community was for postwar Europe. It offers the opportunity to institutionalize regional cooperation over a critical shared trade in ways that can build trust and help foster greater regional cooperation. A "Hormuz fee" is a small price to pay for a chance at peace.