1/2 🎁 DeepScan Community Nominations · Round 3 | Web3 Security Hot Topics Quantum computing takes another leap. OpenAI’s math results are all over the timeline. The community is asking: Can Bitcoin hold up? Could smart contracts get rekt? CryptoBilis, a Ledger reseller, shipped tampered wallets. About $100M was stolen. Which is safer: a hardware wallet, or an offline iPhone? Binance’s .ai domain is lighting up agentic wallets. How do you use an agent wallet without getting drained? Which topic do you care about most? GoPlus will publish a security research report based on the votes. 🎟️ Giveaway: 10 eligible participants win 10 USDT each. 🗳️ How to enter: 1. Follow @GoPlusSecurity and repost. 2. Vote in the thread post “2/2”. 3. Voting closes October 26 at 23:00 UTC. Winners and the security report will be announced afterward.

🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: Two unauthenticated RCE vulnerabilities in PHP PHP’s official security advisory confirms CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619 can both lead to unauthenticated remote code execution. Patched releases are available: 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27, 8.5.12. php.net/archive/2026.php#202… ⚠️ Checks and mitigation steps 1. Know what is actually running. List each entry point, service, node/container, PHP SAPI, the executable path and PHP version used by each running worker, vendor package or image source, config overrides, and public reachability. 2. Upgrade first. Schedule public-facing mod_php first, then other internet-facing PHP services and any internal service that untrusted requests can reach. Move to the patched release for that branch, or a vendor package with a verified backport. Check compatibility and prepare backups and a rollback plan before upgrading. After the upgrade, restart all workers and verify the running PHP version on every node. 3. If you cannot upgrade now, reduce public exposure. Restrict external access. Review upload and input size limits, and request limits.

5/6 IV. Fix: crypto.getRandomValues(bytes) After the incident, Qubic shipped v4.26.4 (github.com/qubic/wallet/rele…). The updated implementation uses crypto.getRandomValues(bytes) to fill a Uint8Array with random bytes from 0 to 255, drawn from the browser CSPRNG. This fixes insufficient randomness in seed generation.

2/6 Math.random() seed strength differs sharply across JS engines. This is why the attack affected only wallets generated on Apple platforms.

1/6 ⚠️ Qubic weak-seed exploit breakdown: 1,404 wallets on Apple platforms drained, ~$1.3M From Oct 17–18, attackers exploited the @Qubic official Web wallet on Apple platforms (WebKit / JavaScriptCore). Seeds were generated with Math.random(). They enumerated all 2^32 possible PRNG seeds offline, matched the derived addresses to 1,404 funded wallets, and drained 2,939,606,531,944 QU (~$1.3M). Qubic then initiated a protective shutdown. 87.1% of the stolen funds are frozen on-chain. The remaining 12.9% was sent to MEXC, where the receiving account was frozen. Web wallet v4.26.4 is out — it switches to crypto.getRandomValues. Affected users should update. I. Who is affected 1,404 wallet addresses. Shared trait: the seed was generated by the official Qubic client in a weak-entropy environment. ▪️ Seeds generated before Oct 18, 2026, in any browser on iPhone / iPad (Safari, Chrome, Firefox — all forced onto WebKit) ▪️ Seeds generated before Oct 18, 2026, in Safari on MacBook / iMac ▪️ Seeds generated before July 2025 in the Qubic iOS App II. Root cause: insufficient entropy from Math.random() A Qubic seed is a 55-char lowercase string. Theoretical space is 26^55 (≈2^258). Actual security depends on the entropy of the PRNG’s internal state that produced it.

⚠️ Breakdown: Papertrade BBO oracle manipulation — ~$1.28M taken 8 hours after launch On Oct 10, 2026, HyperEVM perp venue @papertrade_xyz went live, with $85.3M in pre-deposits and TVL reaching $118M within 24 hours. About 8 hours after launch it was hit by an oracle manipulation attack. Loss: ~$1.28M. This was a cross-market oracle and quote-manipulation incident. The suspected attacker first opened oversized synthetic longs and shorts on Papertrade, then used real capital to buy and sell ETH on Hyperliquid, briefly displacing Hyperliquid’s BBO mid. That displaced mid was then used for execution and PnL on Papertrade. The resulting PnL was paid by the Martingaler LP. 🔍 Root cause 1. Instant BBO from one market was the oracle Opens and closes both read the Hyperliquid best-bid/ask mid directly. The official docs explicitly state there is no max-deviation cap, no TWAP, no lookback, and no independent reference price. A non-zero, non-crossed BBO could therefore be accepted even if it had been manipulated. Papertrade’s own risk docs identified “Hyperliquid BBO manipulation” as a major protocol-level risk before launch: docs.papertrade.xyz/#/how/pr… 2. 1,000x leverage turned a tiny move into a large payout On hundreds of millions in notional, pushing ETH ~10–14 bps was enough to generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in Papertrade PnL. Trading loss on the external venue was far smaller than the synthetic PnL paid by the LP. 3. The per-position cap was bypassed by splitting The per-position notional cap was ~$10M. The final $297M short was split into 30 positions of ~$9.9M each, just under the limit. Directional OI controls still left ~$1B of headroom, so existing controls did not meaningfully constrain aggregate exposure in this case. 4. LP capital did not match the exposure The Martingaler LP is the sole counterparty, and its pool is largely built from trader losses. Public data showed ~$3.14M in LP against hundreds of millions in notional, up to 1,000x. Available LP capital was severely mismatched with the potential payout. 🔗 Attack flow 1. Displace the upstream BBO The suspected manipulator executed concentrated buying and selling on Hyperliquid, moving the ETH perp’s best bid and ask. Papertrade used that mid as its execution price, so the distorted BBO mid fed directly into Papertrade’s pricing. This activity occurred on HyperCore’s order book and does not map to a single HyperEVM transaction hash. 2. Open the first high-leverage positions Once the upstream BBO had shifted, the suspected manipulator submitted signed orders to the Papertrade relayer. The relayer then called the Exchange contract to open the positions. hyperscan.com/tx/0x199de70bc… The relayer appearing in the `from` field should not, by itself, be treated as the attacker. 3. Split positions to bypass the per-position cap The per-position notional cap was ~$10M. The suspected attacker split the exposure into ~30 positions of ~$9.9M each, for total exposure far above the single-position limit. Batch that appears to include ~30 shorts: hyperscan.com/tx/0xfad868110… 4. Trade the other way and close in profit After the Papertrade positions were in place, the suspected manipulator traded in the opposite direction on Hyperliquid so the BBO moved in favor of those positions. With no TWAP, no max deviation, and no lookback, the distorted mid was used directly to close the positions and calculate PnL. 5. Position termination path About 30 related positions were subsequently terminated. This transaction appears to correspond to the batch termination or suspected liquidation path: hyperscan.com/tx/0x2a337b31c… 📌 Addresses Suspected attack / manipulation hyperevmscan.io/address/0x20… Funds receiver / suspected coordinating address hyperevmscan.io/address/0x7e… Final suspected liquidation caller hyperscan.com/address/0x0762… Papertrade trading / settlement contract hyperevmscan.io/address/0x6c… 🛡️ Security recommendations Simply blocking the suspected attacker address does not address the root cause. 1. Stop using an instant BBO as the only settlement price. 2. Use Hyperliquid’s multi-venue weighted oracle or mark price as a reference, plus TWAP, deviation limits, and freshness checks. Official oracle docs: hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyper… 3. Bind total OI, per-address OI, and max payable PnL to LP capital that is actually available. 4. Trigger circuit breakers on rapid long/short reversals by the same address, large trades on external markets, and anomalously high win rates.

📢 GoPlus Service Update #Abstract (chain ID 2741) and #Blast (chain ID 81457) are shutting down. GoPlus will end Token Security API support for both chains on October 19, 2026. Token Security API coverage on all other chains is unchanged.

🥷 Hack or insider? Security analysis of the $12.5M loss at 79thVault BNB Chain project @79thVault lost about $12.5M after a privileged admin address was used without authorization. Close to 10,000 holders are affected. A leaked operator key and insider activity are both still open. 1. Root cause — privileged function + operator key compromise (or an insider) The 79AU contract has a function restricted to `OPERATOR_ROLE` (selector `0x2a2c5923`; source unverified on BscScan). On-chain calls show it can move $79AU from a chosen address — this time the 79AU/USDT pair — to any recipient, then call `sync()` to update the pair’s recorded reserves. Effect is backdoor-like. bscscan.com/address/0xc35ef0… 2. Key leak, or insider? `OPERATOR_ROLE` was held by `0x019bD8ED017D11AF0eB24d28DCdd0f9930c85cA3`. No multisig. No timelock. In the incident window (UTC 07:25–08:19, almost an hour) that address executed 7 privileged calls and moved 2.01M $79AU (10K / 100K / 100K / 300K / 500K / 500K / 500K) to `0xc3E90f78A918594a605d584887b2775F4b80A099`. The transfers coincided with a sharp spike in the $79AU price. The role was revoked after the incident. 3. Fund flow The receiving address sold the $79AU into the pool and drained the USDT, then converted the proceeds to 16,249 BNB and consolidated them to `0x629B368c6BF1a9f190e38f21235033FEcE8A6231`. Aside from several smaller transfers of 10–15 BNB each, purpose still unclear, most of the funds now sit at `0xa9537B40b02Af7Af8f1543aea3691992B2174F89` — 14,394.92 BNB (~$11.03M). No further movement yet. 4. Points in question The contract is not open-sourced, and it contains a privileged function with backdoor-like effect. Centralized-control risk was high. The on-chain “bounty negotiation” message was sent from the same privileged address involved in the incident. Using that address to talk to an attacker would be unusual, and the message’s authenticity is still in question: bscscan.com/tx/0x09f02313958… The project’s X post only called it a vague “system upgrade.” No detailed note yet on the suspected key compromise, the role-revocation tx, or the loss breakdown. That limited disclosure leaves open whether users have been given enough information. xitter.cf/79thVault/status/21080…

🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: On Base, a vault contract that no project team has publicly claimed was hit. 1,783.067 aBaswstETH was taken out, then redeemed on Aave V3 for about 1,783 wstETH. Loss is roughly $6 million. The vault holds a position on Aave V3 Base, sized in the tens of millions. Aave’s core lending contracts and Base itself were not attacked. basescan.org/tx/0x03f0297373… 🔍 Root Cause: multisig governance and access-control failure. The exploit contract (0xcdFE9130…) was added to the vault’s borrow allowlist through a Safe multisig. The Safe flow may have been socially engineered or phished, or this was insider collusion. The team had not executed any Safe transaction for 25 days. These two were executed suddenly. Most concerning: about $31.7 million in assets is still sitting in the vault, at risk. Someone even sent the attacker an on-chain message pushing them to withdraw the rest and asking for a tip. Still zero response and zero announcement from the project team. Attacked vault: 0xD1895f2019c2152FC2b9022D57f19198c4CFCABC Attacker: 0x0B5126e1bc27C0de77e02e97945760A674EdB034 Related addresses: 0xcdFE91301356da873562EF513828a60dba1F569d 0xC73448432a05deeA5Ea18a07D3b5d9ccf6297f8D Malicious authorization (Safe execution): basescan.org/tx/0xed265fc80e… Attack transaction (first borrow, 1 aBaswstETH): basescan.org/tx/0x0ec75c3be1… Attack transaction (Aave redemption, 1,783.067 wstETH): basescan.org/tx/0x557bfd0e85…

🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: A user got drained for ~$170K in $LINK after signing a malicious #Permit2 transaction. Victim: 0x71619d71474F8D0AAa9C18a757be7617686B499b Phisher wallets: 0x0000db5c8B030ae20308ac975898E09741e70000 0x0000cdCa01087D340e8fA4339b121B69a8aE0000 0xA6809aeDEbFA10A0C2dbcF3363cB0Ff37866f73D 🛡 Security Tips: 1. Follow the #GoPlus Anti-Phishing “4 Don’ts”: 🚫 Don’t click unknown links 🚫 Don’t install unverified software 🚫 Don’t sign transactions you don’t fully understand 🚫 Don’t send funds to unverified addresses 2. Install the GoPlus Security extension to block phishing links, risky signatures, malicious approvals, and suspicious transactions in real time 👉 chromewebstore.google.com/se…