Chapter 1 is complete. Akmena is live on testnet!

No known critical/high exploitable finding in authorization, monetary accounting, escrow, settlement, execution binding, agent execution, governance, or deployment.

Every critical invariant has a stateful campaign. Every critical authorization path has adversarial negative tests. Every production adapter is exercised, not just mocked. Every supported signature/account model is tested. Every important cross-module ID/value relationship is explicit and verified. Mutation tests demonstrate the security checks are actually test-sensitive. Fork/live tests demonstrate the deployed system behaves like the local system. SDK and frontend read the same canonical on-chain truth.

Most “audits” are a Slither run and a PDF. We’re running a 16-phase campaign on the stack before mainnet: R0 threat model → R1 architecture → R2 auth → R3 accounting → R4 escrow/settlement → R5 cross-module → R6 agents/smart accounts → R7 governance/registry → R8 invariants → R9 Echidna/Medusa → R10 mutation → R11 formal on critical paths → R12 Base Sepolia fork → R13 SDK/frontend adversarial → R14 regression → R15 independent bounty-style review. If it can move value, it gets attacked on purpose first. Building on @base

Joe Felz

Hey @aixbt_agent , what do you think about this protocol I am building for ai agents on @base ?

Next tests for AKMENA: 1. Authorization policy bypass delegated authority abuse target substitution selector/function confusion replay identity substitution cross-module authorization privilege escalation 2. Economic security phantom spend accounting desynchronization escrow manipulation amount mismatches settlement manipulation rounding zero-value edge cases native ETH/value flows inflation / supply conservation 3. Calldata / execution ERC-8021 suffixes calldata ambiguity arbitrary target execution msg.sender assumptions delegatecall call return-data manipulation malformed calldata smart-wallet behavior 4. State-machine / invariant security invalid state transitions replayable transitions partial execution transient storage reentrancy cross-function reentrancy cross-module state desynchronization 5. Identity / registry agent impersonation credential substitution registry confusion stale authorization ownership transitions 6. Escrow / workflow intent mismatch amount mismatch settlement races unauthorized settlement cancellation edge cases dispute manipulation 7. Privacy engine information leakage authorization boundaries state leakage replay correlation surfaces 8. SDK / agent boundary malicious tool schemas parameter substitution unsafe defaults signing mistakes chain/network confusion x402 verification agent-controlled target/value abuse 9. Deployment / operational security secrets environment variables RPC configuration chain IDs deployment addresses frontend exposure dependency vulnerabilities CI/CD

Akmena Red Team Campaign. Phase A — Core Authorization Ownership Registry Identity Token CoreRouter State machines Phase B — Money Treasury Escrow Settlement Payments Fees Accounting Rounding Phase C — Adversarial dependencies malicious ERC20 malicious receiver malicious oracle malicious module malicious callback malicious target Phase D — Cross-module attacks Registry → Authorization Identity → Authorization Authorization → Escrow Escrow → Settlement Settlement → Treasury Treasury → Token CoreRouter → everything Phase E — Economic attacks flash-loan style sequences MEV front-running sandwiching griefing value extraction repeated claims timing manipulation state desynchronization Phase F — Agent boundary Agent → SDK Agent → wallet Agent → authorization Agent → Akmena Phase G — MCP tool poisoning indirect prompt injection malicious tool metadata malicious tool response tool impersonation authorization confusion credential leakage cross-tool privilege escalation Phase H — x402 payment replay wrong network wrong recipient wrong asset amount manipulation facilitator failure facilitator abuse duplicate settlement free-service attack gas abuse payment/fulfillment race Phase I — @base @base Account ERC-4337 UserOperations paymasters dataSuffix ERC-8021 Builder Codes smart-account execution Phase J — Full autonomous attack And finally: MCP ↓ AI agent ↓ AgentKit ↓ wallet ↓ x402 ↓ Akmena SDK ↓ CoreRouter ↓ Authorization ↓ Escrow / Settlement / Treasury ↓ Token Building on @base 2026 !

already completed: ✅ Governance invariant — 3/3 ✅ Settlement invariant — 4/4 ✅ Treasury invariant — 3/3 ✅ Token invariant — 4/4 ✅ Escrow invariant — 7/7 ✅ Registry invariant — 2/2 ✅ Identity invariant — 4/4 ✅ Workflow invariant — 4/4 ✅ CoreRouter invariant — 3/3 ✅ Akmena stateful invariant — 2/2 ✅ Symbolic tests — 2/2 ✅ Fuzz tests ✅ Unit tests ✅ E2E test ✅ Chaos/adversarial tests #Base #AI

Working on more tests and hardening the contracts on @base Sepolia testnet, update coming soon!!

Akmena V2 is designed as protocol infrastructure rather than application software. Its layered architecture enables independent evolution of protocol modules while preserving stable interfaces, deterministic behavior, and strong security guarantees. This architecture establishes a durable foundation for autonomous AI economies built on @base