
⚙️#NoCode with @DappFactory_ 🔮Layer-2 @SeerPrediction Market 🌾 DEX Aggregator @PolyDEX_ ⛩️DeFi-Yield Aggregator @YugenFinance_ 👉 https://xitter.cf/t.co/W8LLzNatXa
Joined April 2018
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Over the last 5 years, Cryption Nework has built the first gasless DEX with farming, DEX aggregator, a Cryption App, Double Chance Lotteries, and Dapp Factory Unfortunately, Cryption Network will be closing down
blog.cryption.network/conclu…
📢 Important Announcement📢
We've secured the transition to the CNT(NEW) Token.
Your assets are our priority! 📢
Read more: bit.ly/46N4iB8
#CNTNEW #CryptionNetwork
🔹 These actions will be executed as soon as possible, within a week.
🔹 This process will ensure that Cryption Governance can continue to run smoothly.
Thank you for your support. (18/18)
🔹After that, we will add liquidity again to Polygon using our treasury.
🔹 The amount of liquidity will be exactly equal to what it was before the hack.
🔹 Liquidity will be added to Balancer in an 80/20 pool. (17/18)
Next steps:
🔹 Since our treasury is safe, we want to proceed with an option that is fair/transparent for the community.
🔹 We are going to create a new Cryption Network Token on Polygon and airdrop the token to all the holders based on the snapshot taken at 6 PM IST on Fri 16/18
We value the trust and support of our community and will continue to prioritize the security and well-being of our users as we navigate this challenging event.
We appreciate your understanding and patience as we work to resolve this matter swiftly and effectively. (15/18)
Our dedicated team is working diligently to restore the affected accounts and ensure the utmost security of our platform going forward. (14/18)
We deeply apologize for any inconvenience and concern caused by this incident. We are actively investigating the matter and taking immediate steps to mitigate the impact of the breach. (13/18)
Additionally, we want to reassure everyone that our treasury has been safeguarded and remains secure. (12/18)
The attacker gained access to the Cryption Deployer private key, which allowed them to change the owner of the CNT token on Polygon from the official bridge to their own address. They then minted {100 Billion } CNTs and dumped them. (11/18)
Here is the GitHub organization and repository, NPM Link, and Security Report:
🔷 GitHub organization: npmjs.com/package/child_proc…
🔷 NPM link: npmjs.com/package/child_proc…
🔷 Security report: npmjs.com/package/child_proc… (10/18)
10. However, since Node.js can access the filesystem, the package was able to access private keys stored in the filesystem as part of various projects and environment files. (9/18)
8. As soon as the server was started, the code from this package was executed.
9. This led to multiple permission dialogues being displayed, but they were denied, preventing the package from accessing MetaMask. (8/18)
6. Based on this information, there was very little room for doubt. The ex-employee proceeded, cloned the project, and ran the server.
7. The project had one malicious dependency: "child_process": "^1.0.2"
🔷 npmjs.com/package/child_proc… (D ONT INSTALL)
🔷 github.com/npm/security-hold… 7/18
4. The hacker then sent the second task, which involved completing the API in an Express.js project.
5. The GitHub organization of the repository for this task had good development activity
Link to the GitHub organization: github.com/RaccoopackWorld/w… (6/18)
Here is a detailed account of how the attack happened:
1. One of our ex-employees was working on a freelance task on Upwork.
2. The ex-employee received a task from the hacker.
3. The ex-employee completed the first phase of the task and the hacker approved it. (5/18)
Address where funds were routed: polygonscan.com/address/0x3a…
Note: This address has been flagged multiple times before and a simple Twitter search for this address will also prove that this address belongs to professional hackers. (4/18)
It is important to note that the Cryption Network Token contract, along with all the major contracts, underwent thorough audits and meticulous development.
This exploit was not due to a vulnerability in the contract.
Address of the hacker:
polygonscan.com/address/0xd2… (3/18)
After obtaining ownership, the attacker minted ~100 Billion tokens and dumped them straight away on the QuickSwap CNT-MATIC pool, completely draining it. (2/18)
