Why would the U.S. be able to overthrow Iran’s regime if Washington brought back the people who corrected its strategy for shaping Iraq after the 2003 attack? controlthreat.org/p/why-has-…

Gadi Eisenkot rose to prominence on a wave of dissatisfaction with Netanyahu, but lacks a sufficiently distinct political agenda to win over voters who remain loyal to the Israeli prime minister. Eisenkot previously served as chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces but has limited political experience. His military reputation helped him quickly bring together former generals, officials, business leaders, and donors dissatisfied with Netanyahu to establish the Yashar party. However, Yashar's rise has been driven largely by the desire to replace Netanyahu, without offering a clearly superior political agenda. Eisenkot also shares many of Netanyahu's core national security positions, making it difficult to attract voters who remain loyal to him. The opposition is far from united. Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid jointly lead the B'Yachad alliance, while Avigdor Liberman and Yair Golan head their own parties. If Eisenkot fails to secure enough support, these political forces could turn to someone else.

Is Europe helping Putin save face after more than four years of failing to win the war in Ukraine? Finland and Norway have broken with their policy of limiting diplomatic contact with Moscow by holding phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin. The move may be intended to offer him a face saving way out, paving the way for peace talks.

Defeated Brazilian presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro still has a chance to make a comeback. Bolsonaro could claim the title of “rightfully elected president robbed of victory” to stay in the spotlight and rally his supporters ahead of the 2030 election. With nearly 60 million votes compared with Lula's 64.3 million, he still has a substantial political base. Don't forget that Lula himself was once in prison before returning to Brazil's presidency.

The Mecca Alliance is riddled with contradictions that could eventually tear it apart. Several members have competing ambitions to shape the Middle East according to their own interests. They are cooperating for short term gains, but their strategic rivalries remain unresolved. It is little more than a temporary peace treaty between rivals competing for power in the Middle East.

Why Does Serbia’s Election Winner Still Want to Maintain Ties With Russia? The Student List’s victory in the October 25 election ended 14 years of rule by the political establishment led by Aleksandar Vucic. The result raised expectations that Serbia would distance itself from Moscow and move closer to the European Union (EU). However, the Student List has declared that it will not join sanctions against Russia, continues to regard Moscow as an important traditional partner, and intends to maintain Russian gas supplies. Three major factors make a foreign policy reversal difficult. First, Kosovo. Serbia still considers Kosovo part of its territory, and the Student List maintains that position. Russia remains one of Belgrade’s most important supporters on Kosovo, particularly at the UN Security Council. Serbia is unlikely to sacrifice that support simply to satisfy Brussels. Second, energy. Russia supplies approximately 80% of the natural gas Serbia consumes, primarily through Gazprom, at preferential prices. This dependence gives Moscow substantial economic leverage. Cutting off Russian supplies would put pressure on energy prices, industrial production, and Serbia’s economy. Third, foreign policy. The Student List continues to support military neutrality, maintaining relations with Russia, and expanding economic cooperation with the EU. This position offers little indication that Serbia intends to move decisively into the Western geopolitical camp. Notably, the new government could impose tighter restrictions on arms exports than its predecessor. Under Vucic, Serbia refused to sanction Russia while selling weapons and ammunition to Western buyers, some of which ultimately reached Ukraine. The Student List has not confirmed whether it will allow these exports to continue. If the new government blocks indirect supply routes, Ukraine could lose a source of Serbian ammunition. The Student List’s victory primarily represents a domestic political transition, not yet a geopolitical turning point. There is insufficient evidence to describe it as a strategic defeat for Russia or a victory for the West.

Russia is borrowing money to sustain a war Moscow failed to end quickly in Ukraine. The situation echoes Nazi Germany, which borrowed heavily to finance rearmament but was ultimately exhausted by a prolonged war of attrition, contributing to its military defeat. Tax and oil and gas revenues are no longer sufficient to cover government spending driven higher by the war. Western sanctions continue to pressure Russia's energy revenues while restricting its access to international financing and advanced technology. To cover the shortfall, the Russian government has been drawing on its reserves and selling government bonds to domestic banks. A bond is essentially an IOU. Banks lend money to the government, which promises to repay the principal with interest. When the debt comes due, Moscow can borrow again to pay off the old debt. By August 2026, Russia's domestic government debt had doubled from early 2022 levels, reaching 32.6 trillion rubles. If banks run short of funds or demand excessively high interest rates, Russia will find it increasingly difficult to borrow. The government would then have to raise taxes, cut spending, or rely more heavily on the central bank to inject money into the financial system, risking inflation and financial instability. Russia still has a substantial defense industry, but borrowed money cannot instantly expand production or overcome technological constraints imposed by sanctions, while Ukraine continues to receive Western weapons and technology. Russia is gambling its future economic strength on a war of attrition. Putin faces mounting pressure to achieve military results before the cost of the war exceeds what the Russian economy can sustain.

Netanyahu losing could be exactly what Trump needs to escape a war of attrition with Iran. A new Israeli government taking a softer stance toward Tehran could give Trump the perfect excuse to pull the US out of the war without having to admit defeat. An ally's electoral defeat could become the American president's political escape route.

Why is Flavio Bolsonaro facing a criminal investigation just days after losing Brazil's presidential election? On October 26, just one day after the presidential election, Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes ordered restrictive measures against Bolsonaro as part of an investigation into suspected money laundering. But this could mark the beginning of a prolonged political confrontation in Brazil. Bolsonaro secured 48.21% of the vote, representing nearly 60 million voters. Despite his defeat, he still commands an enormous base of support, making him a formidable political counterweight to Lula's administration. Bolsonaro has refused to accept the election results and announced plans to challenge them through legal channels. For Lula, an opponent who won nearly half the vote and refuses to concede could pose a serious political challenge throughout his next term. The investigations could damage Bolsonaro's credibility. However, if his supporters view the judicial measures as political persecution, they could also reinforce the image he is building: A president whose electoral victory was stolen. Lula himself was once imprisoned before returning to power. Bolsonaro is only 45 and still has plenty of time to rebuild his political career. His 2026 defeat does not necessarily mark the end. He could turn the next four years into a prolonged campaign for the 2030 presidential election. Will these investigations weaken Bolsonaro, or will they inadvertently help him maintain his support and become a persistent political rival to Lula?

U.S.-Saudi relations will never be the same again. Riyadh is struggling to secure protection from multiple countries, despite the U.S. having been Saudi Arabia's most important security partner for decades. In November 2025, Washington and Riyadh signed a strategic defense agreement. But just three months later, the U.S. and Israel launched a war against Iran, triggering attacks on Saudi territory, airports, and oil facilities. When Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asked President Trump for military assistance against the Houthis, Washington refused to launch direct strikes, offering only intelligence and targeting support. Riyadh was forced to seek defensive assistance from Britain, France, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt. Saudi Arabia has also sought to repair relations with the UAE despite serious disagreements, while pursuing dialogue with Iran to reduce the risk of further escalation. A country that spends tens of billions of U.S. dollars on defense and maintains a special security relationship with Washington now finds itself seeking help from multiple countries just to protect its own territory. The U.S. still holds considerable influence in the Middle East, but Washington's position will weaken if its allies increasingly turn to other countries for protection. Turkey is already in a position to fill part of that vacuum.

Why does Saudi Arabia need Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey to help defend its territory despite spending 83.2 billion U.S. dollars on its military in 2025? These countries intend to provide defensive support without joining offensive operations against the Houthis in Yemen. Is Saudi Arabia really unable to defend itself? Riyadh possesses a modern military but is struggling against repeated missile and drone attacks. Its interceptor stockpiles are running low, while the U.S., its main arms supplier, is also facing shortages following the war with Iran. But if the problem is simply a weapons shortage, why don't its allies just transfer more weapons and let Saudi Arabia defend itself? Not every weapons system can be put into service immediately after delivery. Some new air defense systems require specially trained personnel and time for integration. Deploying combat-ready forces can therefore be faster. However, political interests also play a role. By deploying troops to Saudi Arabia, these countries directly share responsibility for Riyadh's security, something an arms deal alone cannot guarantee. In return, Egypt can strengthen its financial ties with Saudi Arabia and its influence in the Red Sea. Pakistan can reinforce relations with a key financial partner, while Turkey gains an opportunity to expand its influence in the Gulf. Limiting their missions to defense allows all three countries to avoid being drawn into a prolonged war in Yemen while strengthening ties with Riyadh. For Saudi Arabia, the presence of allied troops also strengthens deterrence. An attack that kills foreign soldiers could trigger responses from multiple countries. Riyadh is therefore seeking more than weapons. Saudi Arabia wants to build a broader security network and reduce its dependence on the U.S. after Washington failed to fully meet its security expectations.

Why has Egypt agreed to send troops to defend Saudi Arabia, even though Riyadh possesses one of the most advanced militaries in the Middle East? On October 26, Egypt's parliament approved President Sisi's request to authorize the deployment of defensive forces if Riyadh asks for assistance, amid escalating Houthi attacks. Cairo has three clear strategic interests. First, the Houthis threaten shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the gateway to the Suez Canal. Disruptions to maritime trade deprive Egypt of a vital source of foreign currency revenue. Second, Saudi Arabia is a major financial partner of Egypt, providing investments, central bank deposits, and energy supplies. Egyptian workers in Saudi Arabia also send home billions of U.S. dollars in remittances each year. Third, Turkey and Pakistan have signed the Mecca Defense Pact with Saudi Arabia. Cairo has strong reasons to maintain its influence in the region's evolving security architecture rather than remain on the sidelines. However, President Sisi has set a clear limit: Egypt will only help defend Saudi territory, not participate in offensive operations against Yemen

The U.S. has neglected Africa for years, creating an opening for Russia to recruit Africans to fight in Ukraine and for China to exploit the continent's mineral resources. Africa remains a source of natural resources and manpower for the ambitions of foreign powers. On October 28-29, Putin will welcome African leaders to Moscow for the third Russia-Africa Summit. According to Ukrainian intelligence cited by Bloomberg on October 26, Russia recruited 699 Burundians and 530 Zimbabweans in the first nine months of 2026 to serve in its war in Ukraine. Some were reportedly deceived with promises of civilian jobs.

Brazil could have two "presidents": Lula, the election winner, and Flavio Bolsonaro, the man who claims victory was "stolen" from him. Brazil's October 25 presidential election results could face annulment challenges over a controversial last minute extension of voting hours. Supreme Court Justice Cristiano Zanin, who was appointed by Lula, extended voting by two hours. However, some polling stations had already closed and could not reopen. Electoral law experts warn that these inconsistencies could provide grounds for legal challenges, potentially even annulment. Lula won 51.8% of the vote, but Flavio Bolsonaro refused to concede defeat and said he would seek to annul the election. Even if he fails to overturn the results, Bolsonaro could use the controversy to challenge Lula's legitimacy and strengthen his political standing for years. He could portray himself to supporters as the rightful president elect whose victory was stolen, maintaining that narrative until he has another opportunity to win the presidency. His October 25 defeat could become the starting point of a prolonged political campaign.

Why hasn't Trump's support been enough to help his allies win elections? In April 2026, Viktor Orban lost power after 16 years in Hungary, despite Trump's public endorsement. On October 25, Lula won reelection as Brazil's president, defeating Flavio Bolsonaro. Trump never formally endorsed Flavio, but some officials in his administration had sought to help the Bolsonaro family return to power. The Trump-aligned right is encountering limits in several countries. Verbal support from the White House alone can hardly overcome domestic voter dissatisfaction. To create a real political advantage, Washington needs to make concrete commitments that deliver tangible benefits to those countries, from economic and trade opportunities to security cooperation. Tomorrow, October 27, Benjamin Netanyahu faces Israeli voters with Trump's public backing. Will Trump's support be enough to make a difference?

When will American students become powerful enough to shake the political establishment like those in Serbia? In 2024, student led protests in Bangladesh helped force Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from power. In 2025, Nepal's Gen Z movement forced Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli to resign. On October 25, 2026, after nearly two years of protests, Serbia's student led movement ended Aleksandar Vucic's 14 year grip on power at the ballot box, with projections giving it around 140 of the 250 parliamentary seats. In France, high school and university students are leading a nationwide wave of protests. Albania is also witnessing major student-led demonstrations against the government. In Hungary, young voters played a significant role in ending Viktor Orbán's 16 years in power. From Asia to Europe, a younger generation is gaining influence over national politics.

If Machado becomes president, many officials from Maduro's former regime could face prison. Will they really allow her to take power so easily when their own futures are at stake? This could be a major challenge for Washington.

Washington can no longer ignore Machado. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's public statement on her return shows that Machado has become an unavoidable figure in Venezuela's political future. Thousands have taken to the streets to welcome her. Pressure for elections is growing. Machado's path to the Venezuelan presidency is opening up.

Did Donald Trump rise to power because of fortunate timing, or was it his own political talent that brought him to the White House? When Trump ran for president in 2016, 15 years had passed since the U.S. launched the war in Afghanistan and 13 years since the invasion of Iraq. These wars consumed enormous resources but failed to deliver many of the lasting political outcomes Washington had hoped for. Meanwhile, voter dissatisfaction with the economy, immigration, and Washington's political establishment was growing. Trump emerged with his America First slogan, opposing prolonged wars, criticizing military interventions and nation-building abroad, and demanding that U.S. allies shoulder more of the security burden. These problems existed long before Trump entered politics. He arrived at a moment when many Americans wanted to change how Washington used its resources and national power. So was Trump's success the result of his political talent, or did Washington's years of costly mistakes create the opportunity that brought him to the White House?

Why is the U.S. suddenly scaling back its global involvement after decades of expanding its influence? Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. has fought prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by military intervention in Libya in 2011. Washington committed enormous resources to reshaping the political landscape of these countries. Could these prolonged wars, costing trillions of U.S. dollars without producing commensurate results, have forced America to reconsider its strategy? While Washington was consuming resources in Afghanistan and the Middle East, China rose to become a major strategic rival, while regional powers such as Turkey continued expanding their influence. Now, the U.S. wants to reduce its direct military presence and shift more responsibility for regional security to its allies. Is this a calculated strategic adjustment, or has Washington realized that intervening around the world is draining American power and creating opportunities for its rivals to rise?

Is the U.S. sacrificing its influence to reduce military costs? The U.S. wants to shift more responsibility for regional security to its allies, reducing Washington's military burden and allowing it to focus resources on broader strategic priorities. But Turkey is exposing a risk in this approach. In Syria, Ankara is expanding its influence, seeking to weaken Kurdish forces previously backed by the U.S., and competing with Israel, Washington's leading security ally in the Middle East. In Iraq, Turkish military operations have created tensions with Baghdad, a U.S. security partner. In Libya, Ankara's maritime claims conflict with those of Greece and Egypt, two important U.S. partners. These activities may support some U.S. security objectives, but they also allow Turkey to build independent military power and regional influence, sometimes at odds with Washington's interests. The U.S. may reduce the costs of direct military intervention, but as its allies become regional powers with their own spheres of influence, Washington must also accept that they will become increasingly difficult to influence and may even end up challenging American interests.