I typically avoid long interactionson X. But this issue of debt cancellation is important, conceptually and politically. So here it goes. On something else before I answer. I am sincerely happy to hear that you will help Venezuela discuss with its creditors. At this point, the Venezuelan government has no choice than to obey instructions from the US, has no bargaining power and the US adminstration is heavily on the side of creditors. Venezuela needs a break. Now on the two issues you raise. On Greece. Thanks for bringing this up, as it allows me to state facts more clearly. My conclusion that the fiscal multipliers were larger than had been assumed by the IMF and the commission was not an error on my part, but indeed an effort to modify the position of these two institutions and get more realistic and less painful adjustment programs. It was at least partly successful. Anybody who was involved in the episode will confirm. My efforts to help Greece have been recognized by the Greeks, in particular through an honorary doctorate from the University of Athens. And, perhaps, if you think that endorsement by the elites or academics is not relevant, more importantly, by Varoufakis. On debt and the ECB. (I suspect I shall sound like a boring university professor, but trying to clarify things is what we do for a living) Proceed in two steps. Assume for the sake of argument that France still has an autonomous central bank. (The fact that we have the ECB introduces distribution issues across countries, which strengthen the argument that French debt cancellation is a non-starter, but are of a different nature. To put it simply: Germany will not accept having the ECB cancel French debt. The end.) Consider the relevant budget entity, i.e. the budget of the consolidated government, so putting the Treasury and the central bank together. (Let’s leave aside the considerations that may come from different perceptions of the two by investors. I come back to it.) Let me state two propositions. Any action which changes the claims between the Treasury and the central bank, but does not affect the claims of the investors on the consolidated government (that is the public debt held by the private sector plus the liabilities of the central bank) has no economic effect. This applies to debt cancellation of the holdings of the central bank, or whether central bank profits or losses are passed on to the Treasury (an issue raised by you and Dufrene). The argument is straightforward. If their claims are unchanged (no change in their net holdings of Treasury debt, no change in reserves at the central bank), why should private investors care? In contrast, any action which changes the claims of private investors on the consolidated government is likely to have an effect. For example, purchases of long maturity bonds by the central bank financed by zero maturity interest paying reserves, what is known as QE, has an effect on the yield curve, and can decrease long rates. To get the private investors to accept the change in the nature of the claims they hold, interest rates will have to adjust. In short, debt cancellation of the public debt of the central bank has no effect. Purchases or sales of bonds by the central bank do. Are things that simple? No, there are all kinds of footnotes, psychological effects. If for example, debt cancellation leads private investors to expect changes in central bank reserve policies or interventions, then there can be effects. There may be psychological effects, which almost surely work in the direction of make the effects of debt cancellation worse. The attempt to cancel the debt held by the bank is likely to raise issues of fiscal dominance, of monetization of the debt (purchases of bonds by the central bank financed by non-interest paying money). Going back to the ECB. If the ECB cancelled French debt, the loss associated with it would be shared by all euro members. They will not accept it, de jure or de facto. The end. Let me end this long tweet, with a remark. The debt position of France is not by itself dramatic. Our deficit however is too large. We must reduce it if we want investors to stay. Proposing false solutions, raising false hopes, is, I believe, irresponsible.