CipherTechs is a global Cyber Security service provider founded in 2001 that remains privately held with headquarters in New York City.

New York, NY
Joined May 2010
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Auth bypass affecting multiple VMware products kb.vmware.com/s/article/8909…
- "... and then he said to sign my malware.exe with faked Microsoft cert to evade AVs/EDRs. Would you believe?" ( ̄y▽ ̄)╭ Ohohoho..... Sign-Artifact.ps1 - based on @mattifestation research & implementation shamelessly borrowed here: github.com/mgeeky/Penetratio…
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zyxel.com/support/Zyxel-secu… Pedro and Darren from CipherTechs Red Team credited in Zyxel advisory
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Months of fun for pentesters - new Confluence exploitable bug cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current…
cisa.gov/known-exploited-vul… sort by date added. These are actively exploited bugs - good priority list for patching.
cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/… there's been a few of these. Along with patching, be sure to remove management interfaces from the Internet.
Replying to @dio9sys
We'd love to talk to you. Fully remote position, opportunities to work SOC, develop detections, automation, write Python, and get real-world DFIR experience
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CipherTechs, Inc. retweeted
LAPSUS$ extortion group claims to have breached @Okta. They have released 8 photos as proof. The photos we are sharing has been edited so no sensitive information or user identities are displayed. Image 1 - 4 attached below.
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CipherTechs, Inc. retweeted
Sandy Bacik, Director of Audit and Compliance at @CipherTechs, will present on PCI 4.0 next week at SecureWorld Philadelphia. See the conference agenda and register here: hubs.li/Q0168mQt0 #SWPHL22 #GRC
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Our researchers discovered a high-severity code vulnerability in the open-source monitoring platform Zabbix. Learn more about this authentication bypass in our latest publication🔥 blog.sonarsource.com/zabbix-… #appsec #cve-2022-23131 #cve-2022-23134
CipherTechs, Inc. retweeted
Can confirm! ➡️Splashtop SRUtility.exe ➡️AnyDesk AnyDesk.exe AnyDeskMSI.exe ➡️Atera AteraAgent.exe AgentPackageSTRemote.exe AgentPackageHeartbeat.exe AgentPackageWindowsUpdate.exe AgentPackageADRemote.exe Thanks for sharing @AltShiftPrtScn!
#Conti ransomware affiliates using AnyDesk, Atera, Splashtop, Remote Utilities and ScreenConnect to maintain network access. During initial stage of IR I recommend blocking ALL remote access tools via Application Control policies, allow only the ones required & monitor their use.
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Arbitrary file write on Windows domain controllers bugs.chromium.org/p/project-…. Microsoft guidance here msrc.microsoft.com/update-gu…