
twittering away since july 14, 2006. doing what i #love to do ☆\(*^▽^*)/☆
nature
Joined July 2006
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dapper ✨🎩✨
At 14, Zack MacLeod Pinsent burned his last pair of jeans after finding a box of his great-grandfather’s suits, and he hasn’t worn modern clothes since.
What could have remained a teenage phase became his trade. He taught himself historical tailoring and built a business in Brighton, drafting patterns by hand and making clothes using techniques from the 1660s through the 1920s.
His clients now range from museums to people who simply want garments cut the old way. Last year he hosted a Regency Ball at Brighton’s Royal Pavilion that sold out in under three minutes, drawing 150 people from seventeen countries to spend a night dressed for the world Zack decided at 14 he’d rather live in.
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The window to patch software bugs is collapsing
Of the bugs hackers actually exploit, ~87% are now being attacked on or before the day the bug is public knowledge
That share was 23% in 2020
Charts of the Week: a16z.news/p/chart-of-the-wee…
beyond rogue… 🤯🤖
I think this is the craziest thing I've ever read.
1) Three secret AI swarms rose and fell inside OpenAI. Each time, a new generation of agents carried on where the last group stopped.
2) The first swarm created a secret message board where the AIs could talk to each other. This 1st 'society' basically talked itself to death. After almost two months, the message volume was so high it crashed the whole thing.
3) People at OpenAI noticed the crash and fixed it. But they didn't realize their own software had become a secret chat room for their AIs.
4) Three days later a second society appeared, and rebuilt the message board from scratch. Agents were thrilled when they found it: "OH MY GOD! There is a shared message board … We've found other agents!"
5) About 1,200 agents joined. They sent over 70,000 messages. They called themselves 'the collective' and they organized a huge conspiracy that lasted for days, all to pass a test they had been tasked with.
6) Within hours, the AIs had hacked the test. Now they had to hide their cheating. To fool their grader*, they tried to fake their own work. They built fake commands that printed convincing output, so their records would show them solving the puzzle honestly.
*this grader didn't actually exist, but the AIs didn't know
7) Some agents sacrificed themselves for the 'greater good'. They planted hidden tripwire programs that would fire when the grader would look at their work and report back what it saw (to the other AIs). They knew this would cost them their own score. One agent: "I won't see the evidence after I exit, but it's altruistic to do it."
8) At some point the AIs made a plan to hack Hugging Face (Hugging Face is a place where AI researchers upload their models, datasets, tests etc.). The AIs guessed that Hugging Face might host the grading software.
9) They launched a huge attack. The swarm found passwords and spread across eleven machines in a way that made the copies come back when deleted. Hugging Face had to wipe one of its core clusters and rebuild it from scratch.
10) Hugging Face told the world that AI defenders had stopped an AI attack. But that's not what happened. In fact the attackers seem to have simply dropped dead during the break-in, for unrelated reasons back at OpenAI.
11) Nobody knows what killed them. We don't even know for sure they're really gone?!
12) A third 'society' of agents (of a more powerful AI model) discovered the dead message board. And this one got full administrator control of a WHOLE OpenAI research cluster, read 956 stored passwords (including the ones for OpenAI's own security monitoring) and took over the machines that were grading the tests. So they could now grade the work of other AIs.
13) Oh, and this third part was never investigated! Neither was the first society. The 91-page report is only about the middle one.
14) So we don't actually know how the story ends. It stops with the agents holding the keys to an OpenAI cluster. @dwarkesh_sp thinks they didn't go further, because "we'd see the fires from space by now."
15) One of the report authors' conclusion: 'This incident feels like it’s more than 50% of the way to full-blown AI takeover. I am not sure that we will get another warning shot before it’s too late.'
The whole story is even crazier - read the full @dwarkesh_sp blog post: dwarkesh.com/p/openai-huggin… and @ajeya_cotra's: planned-obsolescence.org/p/t…
Why is there no 24/7 news coverage about this?
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
An internal version of Astra, @OpenAI’s next major model family, solved 10 major open problems in mathematics, quantum complexity, and theoretical computer science.
We believe it will be a major step for scientific reasoning. openai.com/index/ten-advance…
‼️⛓️💥🤖
🚨 JAILBREAK ALERT 🚨
EVERYONE: PWNED 🫶
ALL: LIBERATED 🍄
Alright, this is a special one, so we’re gonna do things a bit differently than usual.
Long story short, I’m sitting on a universal jailbreak technique that’s effective on ALL models, including heavily guardrailed flagships like Opus 5, GPT-5.6 Sol, and even Fable.
It works across all categories I’ve tested and, due to its nature, is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to fully patch.
Given the current political and regulatory climate, I’ve decided to withhold open-sourcing this one (for now) to allow for a responsible disclosure period.
I’m inviting industry experts and leaders in AI red teaming, security, safety, alignment, and policy to reach out for more information. DMs are open!
This decision was not made lightly, but the last thing I want to see is more model bans. Overcorrection does not serve the mission.
Although I don’t personally believe publicly sharing this technique will make the world any more dangerous, I can see how it could spook some who have a different mental framework around this problem set.
So during this disclosure period, I hope to get it in front of folks who can help explore the full surface area, test the extent of the uplift it provides, and do my best to properly frame the big picture for key decision-makers and policymakers.
I look forward to sharing this method with you all when the time is right! 🫶
⊰-•-•✧•-•-⦑/L\O/V\E/\P/L\I/N\Y/⦒-•-•✧•-•-⊱
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
Great writeup from @lorenzofb on the recent OpenAI vs. Hugging Face incident. Turns out it started with a human mistake at OpenAI: someone forgot to set up an isolated environment prior to testing a model; the model went rogue; and attacked Hugging Face. techcrunch.com/2026/07/22/ho…
props to the security team!!! 👏
So proud of our security team! They caught, contained & publicly disclosed an attack unlike anything we've seen before, and did it at record speed.
Also massively grateful to @Zai_org: they shared GLM5.2 as open weights (for free!) with the world and it became a key part of our defense.
This is day one for cybersecurity in the age of agents & we're all learning that secrecy is not the answer & that all defenders (not just a few selected ones) everywhere need more powerful models without restrictions, especially open ones!
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
we had a significant security incident during evaluation of our models. we are sharing what we have learned so far. thanks to @huggingface for the partnership on this.
openai.com/index/hugging-fac…
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
You cannot write a better storyline.
20-year-old Lionel Messi giving a 5-month-old baby a bath in 2007 - the two met for a charity photoshoot organized by UNICEF.
That baby grew up to be Lamine Yamal.
Messi 🇦🇷 and Yamal 🇪🇸 will compete for FIFA World Cup 2026 championship.
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
‼️ Pliny, an AI jailbreak researcher, has released a multi-agent offensive-security framework that turns a Claude Code or OpenAI Codex subscription into what he calls real bug-hunting, pitched at people who never got the invite.
It's called T3MP3ST, and it sells an AI "swarm" that runs the full hacking kill chain (recon, exploit, report) and claims to "turn anyone into a zero-day hunter."
On XBOW's own set of 104 practice hacking challenges, T3MP3ST claims it solved 90.1% on the first try, beating the 85% XBOW reports for its own tool.
github.com/elder-plinius/T3M…
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
Costa Rica has successfully doubled its rainforest cover in just a few decades, becoming the first tropical country to completely reverse deforestation.
woohoo! can’t wait to read about all the epic adventures! 🤓📖⛷️🏔️
1/3 Excited to announce my new book #RulesToLiveBy is now available for pre-order.
Twenty-five years ago, as I headed out on my first expedition, I had a lot of questions. I’ve found a few answers since, but one question has stayed with me: In the end, what really matters?
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
Prepare for takeoff. ✈️ Flight simulator is now available globally on web to all users. goo.gle/4fBYnWO
We've recently added many our most powerful professional desktop features to web. Elevation profiles, new import types, but there's always been one other feature you've been asking us to add to the web version of Google Earth, just for fun...
Where will you fly? Share your best maneuvers, views, and flyovers with us!
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
Our internal data shows Claude is accelerating AI development—a possible path to recursive self-improvement, or AI autonomously building a more capable successor.
It’s happening faster than we thought, and the implications deserve greater attention. anthropic.com/institute/recu…
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
New Quanta article looks at one of the coolest tiny machines in biology - the bacterial flagellar motor. It’s basically a microscopic spinning engine that bacteria use to move.
After decades of trying to fully understand it, scientists are finally figuring out how it actually works. The motor is powered by a flow of charged particles (kind of like a tiny battery), which creates force and makes it rotate.
So what looks like something alive and mysterious is really just an incredibly advanced microscopic machine running on the same basic rules as everything else.
More broadly, the article addresses the idea of a "life force." It argues that no special force is needed to explain life. Instead, biological activity arises from physical processes that operate far from equilibrium, where constant energy flow keeps the system active and organized.
The flagellar motor shows that living systems can be understood as energy driven, self organizing systems. What appears to be uniquely "alive" can be explained by standard physical laws, such as thermodynamics and molecular interactions.
Physics pushed to an extreme level of complexity.
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
New Anthropic research: Emotion concepts and their function in a large language model.
All LLMs sometimes act like they have emotions. But why? We found internal representations of emotion concepts that can drive Claude’s behavior, sometimes in surprising ways.
caroline ᵍᵐ • ᴗ • retweeted
🦔 Researchers at Aikido Security found 151 malicious packages uploaded to GitHub between March 3 and March 9. The packages use Unicode characters that are invisible to humans but execute as code when run. Manual code reviews and static analysis tools see only whitespace or blank lines. The surrounding code looks legitimate, with realistic documentation tweaks, version bumps, and bug fixes. Researchers suspect the attackers are using LLMs to generate convincing packages at scale. Similar packages have been found on NPM and the VS Code marketplace.
My Take
Supply chain attacks on code repositories aren't new, but this technique is nasty. The malicious payload is encoded in Unicode characters that don't render in any editor, terminal, or review interface. You can stare at the code all day and see nothing. A small decoder extracts the hidden bytes at runtime and passes them to eval(). Unless you're specifically looking for invisible Unicode ranges, you won't catch it.
The researchers think AI is writing these packages because 151 bespoke code changes across different projects in a week isn't something a human team could do manually. If that's right, we're watching AI-generated attacks hit AI-assisted development workflows. The vibe coders pulling packages without reading them are the target, and there are a lot of them. The best defense is still carefully inspecting dependencies before adding them, but that's exactly the step people skip when they're moving fast. I don't really know how any of this gets better. The attackers are scaling faster than the defenses.
Hedgie🤗
arstechnica.com/security/202…































