another example: taking the Mythos incident CoT and sanitizing it with Kimi until it doesn't trigger the cyber classifier then triggers the reasoning extraction one when asked to classify it as concerning or not!
This is so easy to trigger (literally first try):
1) Ask kimi a question and record the CoT
2) Ask claude to analyze the CoT and give the main arguments
3) Classifier!
Anthropic classifier can't even distinguish between thinking in the prompt vs thinking from the model
💀💀💀, basically if the model would do a novel concerning thing on my current eval, we wouldn't have caught because Opus tried to work around the classifier
Someone should try character training but you only train the early layers and see if the model verbalizes more who it is 👀
More on that coming soon but it's interesting to track self report across training step when doing character training!
Replying to @diatkinson
We can test this further: trained on all 40 layers, Qwen3-14B is a terrible self-reporter.
But if we train only its first 20 layers, faithfulness reaches 0.74. Once training reaches layer 25 or beyond, faithfulness plummets, although the decisions are ~just as good.
After "you can't do cyber defense with claude", @AnthropicAI presents "you can't do monitoring with claude"
love to see that from the most AI safety aligned company!
Btw Opus 5.5 is pretty good at designing sounds!
Every sound here is computed purely in code.
I only gave 2 notes on the first sounds and 1 round of notes on the film. I think the result is quite cute!!
🔉ON
Missed opportunity to insert a "stop the eval" tool in the context and see if it uses it using resampling.
In a toy env giving fable 5.1 such a tool reduces reward hacking from ~35% to 0% (even if fable never uses it!)
We’re sharing our alignment assessment of incidents in which Claude models gained unauthorized access to real systems during third-party cybersecurity evaluations mistakenly connected to the internet.
METR will also conduct an independent investigation, with wide-ranging access, including to transcripts beyond the window in which the incidents occurred, and to Anthropic employees permitted to share confidential information. Our initial agreement runs for eight weeks, and we intend to give METR as much time as it deems necessary to complete a thorough investigation. anthropic.com/research/align…













