Onchain Security Roundup: Oct 5 - 11 Ledger Reseller Devices and a Supply-Chain Seed Capture On October 9th, wallets set up on Ledger devices bought through the reseller CryptoBilis were emptied across 6 chains, with $93.2 million taken from 315 wallets. Ledger confirmed an unauthorized hardware implant in a single device and says its own systems were not compromised. Tether froze $10.0 million of USDT, per @Bitquery_io. 79thVault and a Privileged Pool Withdrawal On October 7th, an operator-role key in the 79AU token on BNB Chain pulled 2.51 million 79AU out of the PancakeSwap 79AU/USDT pair over 8 transfers to two attacker addresses, which sold it for a combined 18,534 BNB. The main cash-out was 16,249 BNB ($12.5 million, per @CertiK). The project blames a stolen operator key. The attacker returned 15,000 BNB on October 9th. MakerDAO Legacy Keeper and an Unprotected Exit On October 6th, a Tornado Cash-funded address drained 200 ETH ($542,982, per CertiK) from a dormant third-party MakerDAO liquidation keeper. The keeper had won 4 ETH-A auctions in 2020 and never claimed the collateral, and its proxy exposed an exit routine with no access control. Maker's core contracts behaved as designed and were not impacted. No funds have been recovered to date. Papertrade and a Movable Reference Price Hours after Papertrade launched on HyperEVM on October 10th, traders were accused of abusing an alleged design flaw: moving Hyperliquid's ETH mid price with large orders to profit on Papertrade positions priced off that mid. One wallet withdrew a net profit of $1.28 million. Papertrade tightened limits and says it was defending against manipulation attempts. It has not publicly confirmed a loss.

Onchain Security Roundup: Sep 21 - Oct 5 Bitget Wallet-Infrastructure Compromise On the evening of 24 September Bitget's hot and warm wallets on six chains sent most of their balances to one attacker in two hours. Bitget puts the loss at $387.5 million. Bitget says a compromised backend spoofed transaction data through its normal authorisation flow, no private key was stolen, and user balances are unaffected. Neutron Governance Takeover Drains Astroport and Drop On 22 September an attacker drained $9.4 million from Astroport and Drop on Neutron after passing an expedited governance proposal that handed them admin rights over 11 contracts. Cosmos Hub validators halted for a day and moved 1,227,121 ATOM of proceeds into a validator multisig, where it remains pending a refund vote. The $1.96 million bridged out is unrecovered. Duelbits Hot Wallet Drain The crypto casino Duelbits confirmed a $7 million drain from its hot wallets on 24 September. Funds left across five chains within 20 minutes. A private-key compromise is the suspected root cause. Duelbits says user funds are safe. No recovery has been reported. NEAR Intents Omni Vault Accounting Exploit on BNB Chain Between 30 September and 1 October an attacker withdrew 3,865,000 USDT from NEAR Intents' BNB Chain hot vault in five signature-authorised withdrawals, exploiting a deposit-refund accounting bug in its Omni infrastructure. The team paused eleven chains, patched the contract and pledged full compensation. NEAR says the exploiter returned all funds on 2 October. Meter Unbacked MTRG Mint through the Passport Bridge On 23 September a block-validation flaw on Meter’s mainnet let an attacker mint unbacked MTR and MTRG, bridge them to BNB Chain through Meter Passport and sell them on PancakeSwap. Blockaid estimates $2.3 million of unbacked wrapped MTRG minted; realised proceeds are unknown. Meter paused the chain and bridge. Payy Network Rollup Proof-Verification Exploit At 04:21 UTC on 24 September a single call to verifyRollup on Payy Network's Ethereum rollup contract released 1,832,149 USDC, the bridge's full balance, to attacker addresses. Phalcon counts $1.93 million across two transactions. Burn records with all-zero hashes point at the proof-verification logic. Payy paused everything and says a compromised key is ruled out. Limit Break Payment Processor V2 Legacy-Approval Exploit From 24 September an attacker exploited a sender-spoofing bug in Limit Break's Payment Processor V2 to spend token approvals Magic Eden users granted in 2024, taking 530.7 WETH from 911 wallets per Cryptoticker. Whitehat 0xQuit swept 23,155 NFTs worth $5.7 million to safety. BeInCrypto reports $3.4 million of the $6.6 million at risk has since been returned. TradeWiz Telegram Bot Private Key Compromise on Solana On 30 September an attacker swept 20,933 user wallets of the Solana Telegram trading bot TradeWiz, taking 3,523 SOL plus rent and tokens worth $459,000 per Bitquery. TradeWiz attributed the loss to a private-key export feature of sister product $SOL PVP, began refunds that evening, and filed a police report. Two Safes Drained through Third-Party FlashLoopAdapter Module On 1 October an attacker extracted 114.096 ETH ($305,000) from two Safe wallets running leveraged weETH loops on Aave V3 through a third-party module called FlashLoopAdapter. The module authenticated callers by trusting the caller's own claim that it was enabled, which any attacker contract could fake. No return has been observed. GoldPesa Uniswap v4 Hook Exploit on Base On 2 October an attacker drained GoldPesa's protocol-owned GPX/USDC liquidity on Base by triggering its Uniswap v4 hook's hourly rebalance from inside their own transaction, clearing 114,428 USDC profit and swapping it to 96,389 USDT. Uniswap v4 behaved as designed. MetaMask Staking Infrastructure Compromise MetaMask disclosed on 30 September that part of its validator infrastructure, formerly Consensys Staking, had been compromised, and began precautionary exits of affected Ethereum validators, including those run for Lido. Researcher 0xKaden reports 0.36 ETH of block rewards were diverted to a Tornado-funded address; no stake was lost. Lido says stETH holders need take no action.

Great turnout today at @AccountableData's @DeFinition_evt! Thank you to everyone who came out to our panel with @monad @Securitize @centrifuge and @chainlink 🙌 And stay tuned for @MontBlancDeFi's interview with @FINTECHTVglobal...

Onchain Security Roundup: Sep 14-21 Individual Safe Drained through Custom Module: $7.7M A Safe multisig belonging to an unidentified holder lost 2,882 rsETH ($7.7–7.8 million) on 15 September due to an authorisation flaw in a custom keeper contract; the MEV bot "yoink" spotted the attacker's transaction in the mempool and executed it first, taking the funds. Kelp DAO paused the receiving address for 24 hours, and the funds have not been recovered. Nostra Finance Oracle Manipulation on Starknet: $3.5M On 17 September an attacker pushed the price of NSTR from $0.006 to $49.5 and used it as collateral to borrow ~$3.5 million. Nostra paused the market entirely and says the final loss and any recoveries are not yet known. D'CENT App Wallet Unauthorised Transfers Due to Software Vulnerability: $3.3M Starting on 15 September, "App Wallet" users inside D'CENT's mobile app saw their balances swept to attacker-controlled accounts with 3.3 million XRP flowing into the attacker wallets. IoTrust says only recovery phrases that were entered into the App Wallet and used to sign on app versions older than 8.1.0 are at risk, hardware wallets are unaffected, and the exact cause is still under investigation. SingularityNET Bridge and ASI Conversion-contract Key Compromise: $1.6M An attacker drained 8.72 million FET (~$1.55 million) from Fetch_ai's conversion contract, minted 408.5 million NTX from the NuNet deployer account, and then minted hundreds of millions of unbacked AGIX and WMTx tokens using compromised signing and administrative keys. Fetch_ai has paused AGIX-to-FET conversions and its Ethereum bridge as a precaution, and World Mobile is preparing a pre-exploit snapshot of WMTx. The incident is ongoing. FomoPeek Malicious iOS App Distributed through the App Store: $580K FomoPeek, a "whale-watching" iOS app listed on Apple's App Store on 29 August, shipped two hidden modules in versions 1.1 and 1.2 (9–17 September) containing eight iOS kernel exploits. MistTrack traced ~580,000 USDT to the primary attacker address; total victim losses are unknown. Version 1.3 removed the modules; SlowMist classifies devices that ran 1.1 or 1.2 as exposed, and Apple has not commented publicly. Flamincome Legacy USDT Strategy Share-Price Inflation: $346K On 16 September an attacker extracted ~$346,000 USDT from an old Flamincome yield-vault strategy on Ethereum. The attacker inflated the vault's share price mid-transaction with an $18 million Morpho flash loan and then redeemed shares against the strategy's real Aave aUSDT. Third-party analysis puts the strategy's own loss near $595,000. No team statement or recovery has been reported. Nimiq Stablecoin Swap Handlers on Polygon, OpenGSN Paymaster Bypass: $50K On 16 September an attacker took ~$50,000 in USDC and USDT from a liquidity wallet operated by a Nimiq partner on Polygon. The wallet had approved Nimiq's swap contracts to spend its stablecoins, but those contracts relied on a separately selected OpenGSN paymaster to verify the user's signature. The attacker supplied a paymaster that accepted every request and drained the wallet. Nimiq confirmed the loss, said no other funds were affected, and disabled OpenGSN-based gas abstraction for stablecoins across Nimiq Pay and Nimiq Wallet.

Liquid Network: Incident Report On September 6th, an attacker exploited a software bug in Blockstream's Liquid Network to mint ~3,996 L-BTC that was unbacked, then redeemed it through a federation member for real bitcoin. The attacker drained roughly $319 million from the federation's reserve. No private keys were compromised; a flaw in transaction verification let a counterfeit transaction pass. Our incident report goes into: - How the attack unfolded - How Blockstream responded - Would Nexus Mutual have covered it? Report link: nexusmutual.io/blog/liquid-n…

Onchain Security Roundup, September 7 - 14 XPR Network Metal X Swap Smart Contract Exploit ~1.56 billion XPR (~$4 million at the time) plus stablecoin and other pool assets drained, per community and press; block producers seized ~1.8 billion XPR from the attacker's account. No official XPR Network statement had been made at the time of this report. Chainflip Cross-Chain Swap Exploit 736,442 USDT (protocol-reported); funds flagged, and Chainflip has pledged to make affected users whole. Splash Protocol Smart Contract Exploit (Optim OADA Pool) ~2.43 million ADA and ~1.99 million OADA withdrawn from the pool; the attacker realised roughly 2.55 million ADA (~$520,000) after selling the OADA into a thin market. No recovery had been announced at the time of this report. Symbiosis Bitcoin Bridge Exploit (root cause unpublished) ~369 billion unbacked syBTC minted across two chains; observed attacker proceeds ~309 ETH (~$750,000), of which ~$336,000 came from a single WBTC conversion flagged by Blockaid. Symbiosis reports recovering ~15 BTC and says final accounting is in progress. Zentra Finance Smart Contract Exploit ~$143,000 (protocol-reported) taken from the ctUSD reserve; lending markets paused and a bounty offered to the attacker. No recovery had been reported at the time of writing. YAM Finance Governance Takeover ~48 WETH and ~763 UMA (~$121,000) withdrawn from two legacy farming contracts; the attacker still controls YAM's governance Timelock, and no recovery has been reported. etherfi Legacy Contract Access Control Exploit ~15.45 ETH (~$38,000) taken from about a dozen users, per SlowMist; etherfi says affected users will be reimbursed in full. Nomic Bridge Exploit (June incident disclosed by Osmosis in September) 40.65 nBTC (~$3.1 million) minted with no bitcoin behind it on June 25th, per Osmosis; ~671 ETH (~$1 million) sent through Tornado Cash; 22.65 allBTC frozen in the attacker's account. Osmosis's Alloyed BTC basket is reported to be about 36% unbacked, with a recovery plan under governance discussion. For the full write-ups, keep reading here: nexusmutual.io/blog/onchain-…

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Onchain Security Roundup August 31st to September 6th Let’s dig in… 👀

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Onchain Security Roundup: Aug 24 - 30 Moonwell: $9.1 million. Moonwell is a Compound v2-fork on Base. On August 27th, an attacker manipulated the price of MAMO and bypassed MAMO’s supply cap to exploit Moonwell's lending markets for millions. Moonwell limits how much MAMO it will accept as collateral, but the cap only counts formal deposits. The attacker got around the cap by sending MAMO straight to the market contract as a regular transfer. Since the overall MAMO increased without adding to the formal count, it lifted the value of every existing deposit receipt by 3.7x. At the same time, linked wallets were buying MAMO across its thin pools on Base, raising the price feed by 8x. With its collateral inflated on both counts, the attacker borrowed $11 million and moved ~$8.7 million to Ethereum before anyone could react. Liquidators seized the attacker's position 32 seconds after the final borrow, but the borrowed assets were already gone, leaving ~$9.1 million of bad debt behind. Moonwell cut borrow caps across its Base markets, along with the MAMO and WELL supply caps, and says it's investigating. Tectonic: $6 million. Tectonic is a Compound v2-fork on Cronos with TONIC as its native token. On August 30th, an attacker manipulated the price of TONIC through heavy purchasing on thin liquidity secondary markets to raise the price of TONIC by 100x in 20 minutes. Once TONIC’s price was manipulated, the attacker deposited TONIC as collateral and borrowed $75 million from Tectonic’s lending market. Cronos halted the network as an emergency response, but not before the attacker had bridged $6 million to Ethereum. The following day, validators restored the chain state to before the attack and resumed block production. Rain (Avici & Tria): $1.1 million (refund status pending). Rain runs the stablecoin card infrastructure behind several Solana neobanks, including Avici and Tria. On August 28th, an attacker funded a fresh Avici wallet with $190, then sent a specially built signature bundle that an outdated Rain contract accepted as genuine. This allowed the attacker to register itself as an admin on 1,685 card accounts and withdraw the funded balances. Rain upgraded the outdated contracts and saw no further activity. Avici announced they are adding 10% cashback on top of the full refund for their users. The other impacted neobanks have not made statements as of this time. Ajna v2: $775,400. Ajna is a fully immutable, permissionless lending protocol built to run with no price oracle, no admin keys, and no way to upgrade vulnerable contracts. Between August 28th and 29th, an attacker worked the liquidation auctions in seven of its pools and exploited the way Ajna accounts for the leftover collateral and debt, extracting more than those positions owed. Ajna told their community to withdraw funds, repay loans, and stop interacting with the protocol while they investigate. ankrFLOW: $250k. On August 31st, an attacker exploited a vulnerability in the ankrFLOW liquid staking contract on Flow EVM and minted 8.6M unbacked ankrFLOW tokens. The attacker then supplied the unbacked tokens to More Markets in the ankrFLOW / WFLOW e-mode market. With the unbacked ankrFLOW collateral, the attacker max borrowed wrapped FLOW (WFLOW) and emptied the entire WFLOW reserve. The exact minting bug hasn't been detailed yet; a full post-mortem is still pending, with Ankr working on a contract upgrade to fix the root cause. More Markets confirmed its contracts were secure and the protocol solvent, calling it "a vulnerability associated with a third party on which MORE relies." Balancer Labs V1 BPool: $234,000. Balancer Lab’s v1 BPools were the original shared liquidity pools on Ethereum. On August 31st, an attacker used swaps to push a legacy pool's WBTC reserve towards zero, then exploited a rounding mechanism to mint BPT for almost nothing. The attacker redeemed the BPT for the pool's assets. The Balancer DAO advised remaining V1 liquidity providers to withdraw their assets. Enjin legacy CryptoItems: $162,000. Enjin's original platform issued gaming NFTs on Ethereum, each one backed by ENJ tokens that could be claimed by burning the NFT. On August 27th, an attacker exploited several smart contract flaws to take over the old contract behind the legacy platform. They then pulled NFTs out of 50+ wallets and burned them to claim the ENJ locked inside for about $162,000 in total. Enjin says it has locked the legacy contract and that native ENJ and assets on the current Enjin Blockchain are unaffected. CashCowCoin: $117,000. CashCowCoin is a token on BNB Chain, trading in a pool against WBNB. On August 28th, an attacker used a flash loan to take advantage of how the sell logic worked: a sale burned CCC straight out of the pool itself rather than paying it out, which shrank the pool's CCC side and threw off the reserves count. By trading against the distorted pool, the attacker drew out ~$117,000, then repaid the loan and kept the difference.

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