Your Next.js app might have an unauthenticated RCE right now.
Here's what applies to whom:
next/image on Linux: RCE, patch now
App Router plus use cache (Next 16): RCE, no workaround
App Router plus Server Actions: DoS
Pages Router: only the image bug
Patch to 15.5.28 or 16.4.1
One of the largest web3 games by daily active users, @pixels_online has a live economy spanning $PIXEL, land NFTs, a player marketplace, and much more.
They were already doing scheduled pentests and running a public bug bounty when we started working together.
The problem: they were shipping faster than point-in-time security could keep up.
So we started working continuously, across auth, game systems, on-chain rewards, and open-source releases.
Read the full story:
borghq.io/blog/from-pentests…
We’ve worked alongside @BananaGun on security for more than two years.
Across that time, they’ve processed $16B+ in trading volume and 25M+ lifetime trades, while the product, infrastructure and attack surface have continued to evolve.
Our work evolved with it.
Here’s what two years of continuous security alongside Banana Gun has looked like:
borghq.io/blog/banana-gun-co…
Borg retweeted
687 findings in 7 days.
Every Critical and High was actively tested and triaged—not scanner noise.
Continuous security should mean continuous proof.
Across Borg’s current findings, we’ve now uncovered:
🔴 44 Critical
🟠 305 High
🟡 1,140 Medium
⚪ 1,388 Low
But volume alone isn’t the goal.
The real value is proving which vulnerabilities are actually exploitable, cutting through false-positive noise, and helping engineering teams focus on what genuinely puts the business at risk.
Borg retweeted
PDF-based security reports are where findings go to die.
They slow down engineering, bury context, and turn remediation into archaeology.
Odin brings findings, tickets, integrations, and retesting into one workflow.
Another one!
We're slowly onboarding, let us know if you'd like to try it out!
🏆Another win for Mjolnir: our autonomous agentic pentesting agent just earned $2,000 bounty from Yearn.fi!
The bug: reflected XSS through the /api/vault/meta endpoint on the Yearn.fi frontend.
Because wallets are often already connected on the webapp, the impact could have been severe; including potential loss of funds.
Frontend security in crypto is not optional.
Thanks to @yearnfi for a smooth dialogue and quick mitigation! Issue has been fixed, ref: github.com/yearn/yearn.fi/co…
Very important reminder for everyone in the space.
Let us help you prevent this from happening to your company - borgsecurity.io
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