David Bitner retweeted
this is brutal
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David Bitner retweeted
U.S. homebuyer demand is now weaker than during the 2008 housing crash.
NAR's pending home sales index hit 71.2 in August, below any reading from 2008 to 2011.
Contract signings are down roughly 45% from the 2020 peak and about 30% below pre-pandemic levels.
Mortgage rates are the problem: signings peaked in 2021 when rates were near 3%.
David Bitner retweeted
This article works backwards. The current valuations of AI companies imply they will make staggering amounts of money. What about the world would have to be true for this to happen? It’s not as simply as they keep getting better — that need not make money! Link below:
David Bitner retweeted
"America is deploying as much as the rest of the world combined"
If there is one clean energy tech where this could become true within years, it's geothermal. The U.S. has now 1.66GW of geothermal (61% next-generation projects) with signed PPAs between 2021 and EOY2025.
For comparison, the entire world commissioned 320MW of new geothermal in 2024, and just 200MW in 2025.
Progress in clean geothermal power could begin scaling rapidly as more projects start proving themselves commercially, led by the US. Geothermal could become an American gift to the global energy transition... (1/2)
David Bitner retweeted
🦔The 10 year Treasury yield hit 5.35% today, its highest level since April 2002. The 30 year briefly went past 5.7%. This is the rate that sets the price of mortgages, car loans and a lot of corporate debt, and it has climbed close to a full percentage point since the start of July.
My Take
Most people blame inflation for this, and they're half right. The bond market's own inflation forecast has barely moved. You can back it out by comparing regular Treasuries to the inflation-protected kind (TIPS), and it has sat around 2.35% for weeks. So investors don't expect prices to run away over the next decade. They expect Warsh to keep hiking until prices calm down, and they want more money to hold US debt while he does it. Nearly all of the climb shows up in the inflation-adjusted yield, which hit 2.83% in late September. The national debt passed $40 trillion in August and Washington has to sell a mountain of new bonds every year, so that extra charge makes sense to me. (AI adds to it too. Every company that borrows billions for a data center competes with Uncle Sam for the same lenders.)
Bessent tried to talk yields down and buy back bonds in August and September. Yields went up anyway. So I think 5% on the 10 year becomes the floor for a while, and mortgages stay above 7% well into next year. If you plan to buy a house in 2027, budget for that. Savers do fine out of this, at least. And stocks keep setting records like none of this exists, which I don't think survives a 10 year that stays here past the new year.
Hedgie🤗
David Bitner retweeted
This is the best thing I’ve read on the Cornell situation.
We focus completely on consent, and that makes sense as a legal standard. But morally, it’s only part of the equation. If a man technically meets whatever standards we set for consent and then treats a woman like garbage afterwards, that’s terrible behavior and should be condemned.
It’ll be hard to convince a jury that any of the Cornell 7 committed rape. But these were men who sought to humiliate women for pleasure and as a group bonding experience.
This is how women can later feel regret over sexual experiences, and they use the language of “rape” because it is the only thing that we acknowledge as strong enough to capture their emotional state. I haven’t always appreciated this enough when looking at questionable allegations.
Consent should be the legal standard. But men need to behave better, and it is good to shun those who treat women poorly.
David Bitner retweeted
This @VisualCap graphic ranks top 40 cities by GDP per person among those featured in 2026 Global Cities Index published by @OxfordEconomics; figures shown in U.S. dollars and calculated using each city’s 2025 GDP and population
David Bitner retweeted
This is exactly right. Something we talk about all the time on the podcast is proxy issues in politics: political debates that appear to be about one thing, but are proxies for a deeper anger. Data centers are such a proxy: as Jon says, it’s anger at being force fed the future.
David Bitner retweeted
When Jacob Coxon was asked what he meant by 'plans for next year,' he said:
'This was talking directly to people running research. Not Dario Amodei but people who have been at the company for a long time and have a lot of context about the company's trajectory. They've been pretty consistent that 2027 is when things get crazy. The main thing that came up informally in conversation was that people didn't expect government regulation to happen in time and, in particular, did not expect any sort of international cooperation to be possible. Which maybe shouldn't have been surprising to me, but it was surprising.'
• '2027 is when things get crazy' – I agree, and I predicted in January that, looking back, 2026 will be seen as the last normal year. If you think we have already passed the weirdness threshold, we haven't. This is still normal relative to what will start happening between 2027 and 2030.
• 'people didn't expect government regulation to happen in time' – I agree, it won't. It's clear to me that (barring a catastrophic near miss) nothing regulatory will change in this regard until 2029 at the earliest. And for multiple reasons, I don't think it's even clear it will happen then. Regardless, 2029 is too late for it to matter. In my opinion, we will have real RSI by next summer. The loop will be closed, and progress toward ASI will proceed much more rapidly from that point onward.
• 'did not expect any sort of international cooperation to be possible' – I agree, it won't. For Pacing the Frontier to work, the Pacers needed all the national labs on board, a supportive administration, and an agreement with China. They don't have any of those things, and they're not getting any of them. What they have now instead is an openly hostile, adversarial administration that will likely work against anything they propose all the way through 2029. And without a supportive administration, an agreement with China is impossible.
I accepted all of this as true a long time ago. As a result, I've felt like Zarathustra watching people talk about the success of Pacing for the last few weeks. Pacers, I say all of this without rancor; you got a preference cascade from the Coxon event. As a result, you have a public that, for the first time, understands what x-risk is. You could - potentially - turn this into momentum for the next election, and then start to change policy, but for that to matter you would need the most important thing of all: time. And you don't have it. You don't have two years to make it to the general. In my opinion, you probably don't even have one. The labs can't even predict what capabilities look like three months from now anymore. A lot of things turned out to be easier than expected. We're closer than people think, and we're moving faster than people believe. You ran out of time. There is no stopping this train before things really start to kick off.
David Bitner retweeted
"there has been basically no increase in car sales in China in over a decade" is one of those sentences that sounds like it can't possibly be true but turns out to in fact be true
David Bitner retweeted
If you're thinking about the first post-chatgpt recession, you really should read Jaimovich and Siu! nber.org/system/files/workin…
Short version: jobs that get automated tend to largely (almost 90%) get automated *during* recession.
David Bitner retweeted
So much for that AI-driven productivity boom, says Apollo’s Torsten Slok.
Or as he puts it “the AI boom is clearly visible in investment data and in equity valuations, but it is not yet visible in the productivity statistics, which means the productivity payoff from AI remains a forecast rather than an observation.”
This somewhat echoes Robert Solow’s famous quip “you can see the computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics “.
My personal theory as to why this is the case is that the information economy’s ability to increase productivity is offset (if not surpassed) by its ability to manufacture influencers, hackers and scammers. So it’s a wash.
I know this is going to date me, but we said the same thing in 1999.
NEW w/ @bencasselman: The Fed has a conundrum on its hands as it tries to tame elevated inflation. One of the primary drivers of growth — A.I. — appears nearly immune to the higher borrowing costs the central bank has begun to impose on the economy.
That means the Fed might need to tighten the screws on the economy more than otherwise would be the case to sufficiently slow down activity to return inflation to the 2% target.
The brunt of that adjustment will fall predominantly on industries more sensitive to higher rates, such as housing and the automotive sector, and in turn the people employed by the companies in those fields.
David Bitner retweeted
🦔PNC Bank's credit card data shows about 2% of US households pay for an AI subscription. Roughly 3 million out of 131 million. Most spend $20 a month and cancel within seven months. For comparison, 25% pay for streaming. 5% pay for sports betting.
My Take
Tech companies spend on AI like it's already essential. PNC's data says it's nowhere close. The five biggest plan to drop $725 billion on infrastructure this year. OpenAI lost $21 billion on $13 billion in revenue. All that money and 98 out of 100 households won't pay $20 a month for any of it.
Look at the seven-month cancellation number. People aren't ignoring AI. They try it, use it for a while, and quit. Netflix took off because you could cancel cable and immediately save money. AI doesn't have that moment yet for regular people. It's useful in a vague way but nobody can point to what it replaced.
Millions use the free versions. People like AI fine, they just won't pay for it. I think that 2% climbs to maybe five or six percent over the next couple years as the products improve, and Wall Street will call it a win. But $725 billion in spending was priced for something a lot closer to 30% and Silicon Valley has built for a future that regular people haven't bought into yet.
Hedgie🤗
David Bitner retweeted
When I was in 7th grade I read the book “how to lie with statistics”. It was one of the most influential books I’ve ever read.
One take away lesson: it is very easy to present data in a way that seems rigorous and smart, to drive a narrative, but fails to tell the whole story.* This is why my strategy has been to focus on meta analyses, lit reviews, analysis of multiple data sources, multiple cuts, etc. It’s also important to update when new, good evidence comes in.
In this specific case, three things can be simultaneously true: 1) some jobs are facing headwinds, 2) those headwinds may or may not be AI related (ie interest rate adjustments, correction to over hiring), 3) the overall entry level job market is still flat, because other entry level jobs are growing.
* The title of the book is meant to be provocative, neither myself nor the author mean to imply that people are trying to actively lie with statistics, more that data analysis is not inherently objective or comprehensive.
So the AI risk folks unconditional estimate is ~400 million deaths from AI by 2050 (or greater)…
AI experts largely agree about which policies would most reduce catastrophic AI risk.
The Longitudinal Expert AI Panel (LEAP) brings together forecasts from a representative group of over 250 experts that policymakers look to when considering the future of AI: computer scientists, industry figures, top economists, policy experts, and AI risk experts.
We asked panelists to forecast (1) how a menu of policies would affect AI risk; (2) which policies they each support; and (3) which policies they think will be implemented by 2030.
Key findings:
• Despite disagreeing on the level of AI risk, respondents broadly agree on policy
• Respondents believe government policy can substantially reduce catastrophic AI risk
• The most supported policy of those we asked about was the creation of an international body, including the US and China as members, with pre-release authorization power over frontier models
• Some US-only policies are forecast to reduce catastrophic AI risk, but not as much as bilateral policies involving the US and China
• Experts strongly oppose federal preemption and think it would increase AI risk
• The policies experts expect to reduce risk the most are those they think are least likely to actually be implemented
🧵 More, with key insights below:
David Bitner retweeted
QTS, NextEra, Siemens Energy and Quanta are teaming up to counter Texas’ data center backlash through the Lone Star Infrastructure Coalition, Bloomberg reports.
They’ll pitch jobs and investment directly to residents and local officials as Texas halts permits pending grid and water audits.
Community support increasingly determines whether AI infrastructure gets built. "Data center opponents blocked 120 projects valued at almost $200 billion nationwide during the first half of this year, according to Data Center Watch"
David Bitner retweeted
Differences in fertility rates compound over time. A total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.8 might not look too different from 1.4, but it has drastically different implications.
Let me illustrate the argument. I take two countries with 10 million inhabitants in 2026, each with the same age structure and life expectancy as the U.S. and no migration. The only difference is that country A has a TFR of 1.8 and country B has a TFR of 1.4. Then, I simulate both populations forward for 100 years. I run a full simulation, including age-specific fertility and mortality, the sex ratio at birth, etc., but I skip the details to save space.
In 2126, country A, with a TFR of 1.8, has a population of 6.8 million, down 32%, and still falling by 0.5% per year. Country B, with a TFR of 1.4, has a population of 3.9 million, still falling by 1.3% per year. Country B’s decline is much sharper, 61%, and more will come in the following decades: country A has 71,000 births a year, while country B has only 27,000.
But the real difference is the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the population aged 20-64: 45 per 100 in country A vs. 60 per 100 in country B. Country A faces a challenging problem for social security and old-age health provision. Country B has a terrible problem.
That is why I find the argument “pro-natalist policies cannot get us back to the replacement rate” so weak. Even pro-natalist policies with modest effects, which increase the TFR from 1.4 to 1.8, make a very large difference in just 100 years.
This is, by the way, a common fallacy when we assess policies: the fact that policies do not succeed 100% does not mean we should not adopt them. We have flight regulations that have causally lowered death rates in commercial aviation, but we still have plane accidents. The point is to assess whether the policy passes a reasonable cost-benefit analysis. And I believe, after having read all the literature, that well-designed pro-natalist policies that lower the opportunity cost of having children (such as better access to large houses in medium-density locations and generous parental leave) do pass the test.
I plan to write much more about this over the next few weeks, as I am preparing a literature review on the issue.
David Bitner retweeted
It is fascinating how the publication of a politically correct national IQ measure (HLOs) has given economists the courage to use national IQs to explain global differences in economic development.
Richard Lynn has been vindicated, strongly.
Better cross-country data and measurement have raised the contribution of inputs—mostly human capital—in accounting for international differences in GDP per worker, from @LagakosDavid and @todd_schoellman nber.org/papers/w35826