It's worth stepping back; BitGo introduced its Quantum-Risk Controls for institutional Bitcoin custody on July 9, a month and a half before its CEO appeared on TV to state that Bitcoin was not in danger. Their own product page names the exact problem: coins whose public key has already been revealed on-chain are the exposed ones, and the "safest key is one whose public key has never been revealed." The discussion about timing and the one concerning risk management are entirely separate issues. Q-Day might happen in 2030, 2035, or later. Nobody knows. But, in the meantime, public keys are already sitting exposed on a public ledger, harvestable by anyone. To use an analogy, they’re basically sitting ducks: visible, identifiable targets waiting for a hunter to acquire a weapon capable of reaching them. It is well known that the ducks have to migrate to a safer area before this occurs, but no one knows when it will happen. And the problem with Bitcoin is that the coordination around the migration, and the migration itself, are processes that realistically take years. Replacement cryptography has to be agreed on network-wide, implemented, audited, integrated into wallets and infrastructure, and then actually adopted by users. And all of that is because the cryptography is baked into the consensus layer—a mistake CKB was designed from the beginning to avoid. On CKB, cryptographic verification is implemented via programmable Lock Scripts, so new signature schemes can be added by anyone at will. Just like smart contracts on Ethereum, for example. That means multiple schemes can coexist, users can migrate voluntarily, and the network does not have to place one irreversible bet on whichever post-quantum algorithm looks best today. SPHINCS+ is already live on CKB mainnet. So while other networks still have to decide which cryptography to migrate to, how to coordinate that migration, and how long it will take, CKB has already begun moving the ducks.