Emily Thornberry, "It's measurable that there were attempts by Russia to interfere in the Brexit referendum" Victoria Derbyshire, "Is it? Where's the evidence?" Emily Thornberry gives one example of many then adds, "The trouble is, how do you measure whether that has an affect or not.. It's difficult to prove ten years later" "And we have to remember its in the context of a huge amount of lies" "Its rich coming from some people - Nigel Farage - saying that Andy Burnham is lying, when there were 350,000,000 lies being told on the side of a bus; or Boris Johnson saying people's wives would have bigger breasts if we left the EU" "There were a lot of lies told and it's very difficult to know on what basis people made decisions" "It's difficult to know if Russians were making up additional lies, or simply amplifying the lies already there" Victoria Derbyshire, "You think they definitely did?" Emily Thornberry, "The Russians definitely tried to interfere" "And the truth is, that over the last ten years, the Russians have got a lot better at it" "How do we now protect our democracy, to ensure the Russians don't interfere in the future and are effective" "I think that the majority of people in Britain know that leaving the EU was a mistake" My view: The past, the present and the future all raise the same question: how do we protect democracy when people can’t tell who is speaking online? In 2016, there were attempts by Russian-linked accounts and media to influence the political debate. That is not, by itself, proof that Russia changed the referendum result. But the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2020 report found the government had neither sought nor seen evidence of successful interference. Ten years later, proving how many people saw particular posts—or whether those posts changed anyone’s vote—is extremely difficult. That difficulty is exactly why the government should have investigated properly when the evidence was fresh. We cannot use the absence of a proper investigation as proof that there was no effect. Today, fake accounts and bots can post, like and comment at scale, making a coordinated campaign look like a groundswell of ordinary public opinion. The UK has the Online Safety Act, and Ofcom is responsible for enforcing its duties. But that does not mean every political account is verified, or that every interaction is independently checked. We still need to know how platforms identify coordinated fake activity, how much reach it gets, and whether foreign-linked networks are influencing what people see. No one is suggesting civil servants should manually inspect every account or every like. The job is to require platforms to keep reliable records, detect coordinated bot networks, disclose what they find, and allow independent scrutiny—with Ofcom able to demand evidence and enforce the rules. We also need clear, regular reporting on foreign interference, so the public and Parliament can see what is being detected and what action is being taken. After two years in government, Lisa Nandy and her colleagues have failed to deliver the level of scrutiny and protection people were promised. Saying we need a safer online space is not enough. The government must make platforms show who is shaping the conversation, and make sure an independent regulator can hold them to account.