Tens of millions of illegal aliens invaded our country for four long years under Biden. That ended on day one of the Trump Administration. President Trump completely and totally delivered on his promise to secure our borders and keep Americans safe.

EXERCISE: On Sunday, October 18, 2026, we will have a routine training exercise on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol. Please do not be alarmed if you see emergency vehicles, low flying helicopters, and hear the simulated sound of gunfire.

After reading a chapter of Duped, the upcoming book from @ColonelReynolds and @willgofurther, my mind keeps coming back to one question: If Congress and federal agencies are willing to ban Chinese parts, Chinese-linked routers, Chinese telecom equipment, and Chinese-made drones because they may pose a national security risk, why aren’t we applying that same logic to voting machines? That is the double standard. Washington does not wait for proof that every drone has been used for spying before it acts. It does not wait for proof that every router has been turned into a weapon before it raises alarms. The standard is not “prove the disaster already happened.” The standard is risk. In recent years, the federal government has moved against foreign-made drones, Chinese telecom equipment, covered communications equipment, and even foreign-made consumer routers because these devices may collect data, receive updates, communicate externally, contain hidden firmware, or sit inside sensitive networks. That logic makes sense. But if a router is too risky because it sits inside a communications pathway, what about the systems that record, scan, tabulate, transmit, and report votes? If a drone is too risky because it can collect data, receive commands, and depend on foreign software or components, what about election systems that rely on hidden software, firmware, removable media, commercial hardware, vendor support, and election-management computers the public cannot independently inspect? Election infrastructure was designated critical infrastructure by DHS in 2017. So why are citizens treated as paranoid when they ask the same national-security questions about voting machines that the government already asks about routers, drones, telecom equipment, cameras, software, and supply chains? This is not a claim that every machine is compromised. It is not a claim that every vendor is malicious. It is a much simpler point: Self-government should not depend on complex technology the public is not allowed to understand, inspect, or independently verify. If America will not blindly trust foreign-linked drones near sensitive facilities, it should not blindly trust hidden software and foreign-made hardware at the center of its elections. If America will not blindly trust certain routers inside critical networks, it should not blindly trust proprietary machines to count votes. The safest election system reduces unnecessary complexity, preserves physical evidence, limits vendor dependence, and allows citizens to verify the count without trusting the machine. That starts with hand-marked paper ballots. Strict chain of custody. Public reconciliation. Transparent hand-counts. Results the people can see. @realDonaldTrump