Rapid Support Militia Commander Defects with 300 Officers and Fighters and 30 Military Vehicles, Apologizes to Sudanese People as Defections Mount and Militia Suffers Defeats in Kordofan Sudanese Echo has learned that Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Azraq Al-Fanjari, commander of the Special Missions Group within the UAE-backed Rapid Support Militia (Janjaweed), has defected alongside approximately 300 officers and fighters and 30 military vehicles. The development adds to a growing series of defections from the militia in recent months, coinciding with significant battlefield defeats in North Kordofan and the loss of several strategically important positions. In a recorded statement addressed to the Sudanese people, Al-Fanjari confirmed that he was relinquishing all his military duties and responsibilities within the militia, declaring his commitment to protecting Sudanese lives and pursuing peace. He said his decision followed sincere self-reflection and careful consideration of the country's suffering, describing the conflict as a "senseless war" that had devastated communities, displaced millions of innocent civilians, and claimed lives that should have been devoted to rebuilding Sudan. Al-Fanjari also issued a direct apology to the Sudanese people. "I offer my sincere apologies to every Sudanese family that has suffered harm, displacement, or loss during this war," he said. He publicly repudiated violations and abuses committed against unarmed civilians, including attacks on their lives, property, and honour, describing his decision as motivated entirely by moral and patriotic convictions. His statement is particularly significant because it comes from a field commander within a militia whose forces have been responsible for widespread atrocities against civilians, including killings, forced displacement, looting, and sexual violence. Although Al-Fanjari did not identify specific incidents or name those responsible, his apology and acknowledgment of abuses mark a notable departure from the position of the organization he previously served. Addressing his former comrades, Al-Fanjari urged fighters still serving in the Rapid Support Militia to reconsider their involvement in the conflict and allow truth and reason to prevail. "This war has no just cause and no future," he declared. "We must all return to the embrace of our homeland and stand united behind our Armed Forces. I offer you this advice in all sincerity," he added, calling on fighters to stop shedding the blood of their fellow Sudanese and emphasizing that the country has room for everyone. Al-Fanjari's departure follows several significant defections involving senior commanders, armed groups, and military vehicles throughout 2026. Among the most prominent was Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, widely known as Al-Nour Al-Gubba, who left the militia in April and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces. His departure followed reported disagreements with the militia's leadership, including allegations that he had been marginalized and humiliated despite his military rank and battlefield contributions. He was subsequently received by General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Sudan's army chief and chairman of the Sovereignty Council. Another prominent commander, Brigadier General Ali Rizgallah, known as Al-Savna, also broke with the militia after publicly criticizing its leadership. Al-Savna, who had participated in major operations across Khartoum, Kordofan, and Darfur, complained that Abdel Rahim Dagalo, the militia's deputy commander, controlled key decisions concerning weapons, supplies, medical treatment, and salaries. His departure attracted considerable attention because of his military position and connections to tribal fighting groups, although reports differed on whether he had formally joined the Sudanese Armed Forces. In August, a force led by Brigadier General Musa Khamsin reportedly defected with 318 fighters and approximately 50 armed vehicles, reaching army-controlled territory in Northern State. Other reported defections during the same period involved 270 personnel, including 21 field commanders, and another 45 fighters from the Bara front. That month also saw the reported defection of approximately 200 fighters led by Abu Bakr Dahloub, who had headed the Special Missions Intelligence Division in North Kordofan, before joining the Sudanese army. On September 25, field commander Al-Tayeb Al-Ahيدab announced his defection alongside approximately 50 fighters, joining the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied units as the army regained control of Sudri in North Kordofan. He attributed his decision to the suffering and abuses he had witnessed within the militia, particularly in Kordofan and Darfur. These departures follow the high-profile defection of Abu Agla Keikal, commander of the Sudan Shield Forces, in October 2024, which represented one of the most significant losses of commanders and affiliated fighters suffered by the militia at that stage of the war. Beyond battlefield losses, internal tribal divisions and unequal treatment of commanders and fighters have emerged as important factors behind the growing number of defections. Former commanders have described widespread resentment over the concentration of military authority, resources, and senior positions within the Dagalo family and its closest associates. The militia's leadership structure is heavily influenced by the Dagalo family and tribal patronage networks, particularly members of the Mahariya, a branch of the Rizeigat tribe to which the family belongs. Fighters and commanders from other communities, including the Misseriya and Mahamid, have reportedly complained about unequal access to supplies, medical treatment, salaries, and decision-making authority. These tensions became particularly visible during the disputes involving Al-Nour Al-Gubba and Al-Savna, both associated with the Mahamid, following the militia's assault on Mustariha, the stronghold of tribal leader Musa Hilal. The confrontation exposed deep divisions even among groups belonging to the wider Rizeigat community. Reports have also described mounting resentment among Misseriya fighters in Kordofan over the heavy casualties suffered by their communities and their limited influence over military decisions despite their substantial participation in the fighting. These internal divisions expose a striking contradiction in the militia's political messaging. Its leaders claim to represent an inclusive national project built on equality and the rejection of tribal discrimination, yet former commanders describe an organization in which power and resources are concentrated within a narrow family and tribal circle. The militia's inability to ensure equal treatment among its own fighters raises serious questions about its claims to offer an inclusive political future for Sudan. The defections have also coincided with a series of military setbacks in North Kordofan, where the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied units have recaptured important positions and inflicted substantial losses on the militia. In July, the Joint Forces reported destroying more than 62 militia vehicles and capturing another 54 during operations targeting positions and supply routes connecting central and western Sudan. In September, the army regained control of Sudri on September 25 and Um Sharu the following day. On October 2, the Sudanese Armed Forces reported recapturing Al-Mazrub, a strategically important militia stronghold in North Kordofan, following intense fighting that reportedly caused significant losses in personnel and equipment. Al-Mazrub's importance lies in its position along transport and supply routes linking North and West Kordofan. Losing the area further complicates the militia's ability to move troops, maintain supply lines, and reinforce its positions. These battlefield defeats are increasing pressure on commanders and fighters already frustrated by internal disputes over leadership, resources, and tribal loyalties. The prospect of continued fighting under increasingly difficult conditions may encourage further defections, particularly among groups that feel marginalized by the militia's leadership. The Rapid Support Militia has benefited from extensive UAE support, including weapons supplies, financing, and logistical networks, which have helped sustain its military operations despite substantial losses. However, continued external assistance cannot necessarily resolve internal divisions or restore confidence among commanders and fighters who increasingly question the leadership's decisions and priorities. Al-Fanjari's defection, accompanied by approximately 300 officers and fighters and 30 military vehicles, adds another significant episode to this pattern. His recorded statement also delivers a direct message to those who remain within the militia, coming from a commander who served in its military formations before publicly calling on his former comrades to leave and stand with Sudan's national army. As military operations continue across Kordofan and more armed groups abandon the Rapid Support Militia, questions are mounting over its leadership's ability to contain internal divisions and maintain the loyalty of its forces. The scale of these defections, the military equipment accompanying departing units, and the possibility of further commanders following their example could have important consequences for the militia's ability to sustain its operations in the months ahead. #Sudan #RSFisTerroristOrganization #UAEKillsSudanesePeople #UAESponsorsTerrorism