Anthony Britneff 🇨🇦

The Economist published an article titled “Donald Trump is in a hurry for peace in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin is not” about the negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and the U.S. in Abu Dhabi. The publication describes a situation in which the Trump administration is rushing to achieve a diplomatic outcome, while Russia continues the war and uses the negotiations to expand its demands. “FewFew believe a window for serious diplomacy has opened,” notes The Economist. At the same time, Trump’s latest statements about a “big, beautiful agreement” have caused concern in Kyiv and European capitals. In my opinion, the main problem lies in the U.S. administration’s very belief that it is possible to reach an agreement with Russia to end the war through mutual concessions. Russia is waging war not because of the absence of an acceptable diplomatic agreement, but because it seeks to destroy the independent Ukrainian state. No agreement that leaves Russia the option to continue its aggression solves this problem. The publication attributes the new sense of urgency in the negotiation process to Trump’s defeat in the midterm elections. A Democratic majority in both houses of Congress, which will take office in January 2027, poses additional risks for its negotiators — Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. According to sources cited by The Economist, they “may soon face investigations over alleged conflicts of interest.” These are potential investigations, not established violations. But the very fact that the negotiation timeline is tied to the U.S. administration’s domestic political problems is telling. Ukraine needs a military victory that will guarantee the preservation of its independence and prevent further Russian aggression. Trump needs a quick diplomatic result that he can showcase before his political situation becomes even more complicated. These are entirely different objectives. And Ukrainians should not have to pay with their own territories, security, and future simply because the U.S. president wants to announce yet another successful deal. Regarding the Ukrainian delegation’s position, the authors write: “Ukrainian negotiators are privately sceptical of a breakthrough, but have been instructed to approach the talks with an open mind, if only to avoid annoying Mr Trump.” In other words, according to the publication’s account, the Ukrainian side must take into account not only Russian demands and its own security needs, but also the personal reaction of the U.S. president. I find it utterly unacceptable that a country defending itself against aggression must constantly demonstrate a willingness to make concessions simply to avoid upsetting its partner. Especially when the aggressor shows no willingness whatsoever to abandon its goals. Russia kills Ukrainians every day, destroys our cities, and continues its occupation. At the same time, it is Ukraine that is expected to be constructive, willing to compromise, and accommodating. This approach only convinces the Kremlin that continuing the war allows it to receive new proposals from the U.S. administration. The Economist reports that Russia is showing “unusual flexibility,” particularly regarding the possibility of ceasing hostilities along the current front line. But it immediately explains the circumstances under which this flexibility emerged: “But this flexibility appeared only after American negotiators offered to broaden the talks to include a wider discussion about European security.” Thus, this is not about the Kremlin abandoning its goals, but about broadening the scope of the negotiations. Instead of discussing an end to the Russian invasion, Moscow gains the opportunity to make demands regarding the security of the entire continent. As critics quoted by the publication note, this allows Russia to make new, unworkable demands and “allowing it to continue the war while pretending to talk about peace.” To me, it is absolutely clear that this is the goal of Russian diplomacy. The Kremlin is using the negotiations not to end the aggression, but to secure political concessions it cannot achieve by military means. And the U.S. administration is handing it that opportunity on a silver platter. Ukrainian and European officials insist on a different sequence: first a ceasefire, then talks on Europe’s future security architecture. According to the article, American negotiators disagree with these terms. The Economist explicitly notes that their position is similar to the one Putin advocated on the eve of the full-scale invasion: the war in Ukraine is supposedly impossible to end without revising European security arrangements. In fact, Russia is attempting to return to the demands it made in December 2021, when it called for restrictions on NATO expansion and a review of Europe’s security architecture. And now, at the initiative of the United States, these demands are once again being discussed. But Russia has no right whatsoever to determine which international organizations Ukraine may join, what kind of armed forces it should have, or which states may ensure our security. This is a matter of Ukrainian sovereignty, not a subject for negotiations with an aggressor state. A source at The Economist close to the White House suggests that a reformatted NATO–Russia Council could serve as the basis for new agreements. A U.S. official also assures that the new framework will respect national sovereignty, and that NATO will remain the central element of Europe’s collective defense. At the same time, Russia continues to demand Ukrainian neutrality, a reduction in our military, and a refusal to station allied troops. It is unclear how the U.S. administration intends to reconcile these demands with its declared respect for sovereignty. In reality, this is an attempt to restore Russia’s right to influence the security decisions of other European states. It is precisely for this reason that Moscow has sought for decades to maintain control over the countries of the former Soviet Union. And I see no reason why we should agree to discuss these demands after four years of full-scale war, hundreds of thousands of deaths, and the destruction of Ukrainian cities. Separately, the publication examines outcomes that, according to its sources, are actually achievable: prisoner exchanges and localized ceasefires in specific sectors of the front. The evacuation of residents from Oleshky is cited as an example — an agreement to which, according to the article, Melania Trump was a party. “The Russians appear to want to support Melania’s efforts. It’s helpful for their relationship with Mr Trump,” says a Ukrainian official. Of course, the release of our prisoners of war and the rescue of civilians are essential. Separate humanitarian mechanisms may exist for this purpose. But such agreements should not be equated with political negotiations involving concessions to the aggressor. Russia’s willingness to agree to a separate humanitarian operation does not mean it is ready to end the war. This is especially true when the publication’s sources directly link such steps to a desire to improve personal relations with the U.S. president. Among the incentives proposed to Russia, The Economist cites a return to European energy markets. Ukraine and its European partners, according to the publication, oppose this. “Not a chance of us agreeing to that while the war is still raging,” the article quotes a Ukrainian official as saying. As for Russian gas, this proposal contradicts the EU’s already established legislative course: on January 26, 2026, the Council of the European Union finally approved a regulation on a phased ban on imports of Russian pipeline and liquefied gas. In other words, according to the article, U.S. negotiators are offering as a bargaining chip a decision that concerns not the American market but the European one. And this comes after Europe has spent years trying to break free from its energy dependence on Russia. The return of Russian energy resources would mean the restoration of one of the main sources of funding for the Russian state and its military machine. I absolutely do not understand why a country that started the largest war in Europe since World War II should receive economic rewards for its willingness to discuss the possibility of ending its own aggression. Another proposal appears to be an attempt to tailor Ukraine’s administrative map to the needs of Russian propaganda. According to negotiators, a change to the borders of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions is being considered, which would allow Russia to claim full control over them without having to hand over Ukrainian cities that remain under Kyiv’s control. The Economist calls this a “cartographic trick.” In other words, instead of demanding that Russia withdraw from the occupied Ukrainian territories, the proposal is to alter Ukraine’s administrative boundaries so that Putin can declare his goals achieved. To me, this is absolutely unacceptable. Ukrainian territory is not a bargaining chip, and its administrative boundaries must not be altered to satisfy the political needs of a Russian dictator. There can be no territorial concessions to Russia. It does not matter whether we are talking about legal recognition of the occupation, the de facto consolidation of the front line, or cartographic manipulations. All of these options allow Russia to retain the gains from its aggression and create the conditions for the next war. The most important, and at the same time the least defined, issue remains that of security guarantees. According to The Economist, U.S. negotiators speculate that Putin might agree to U.S. commitments modeled after Article 4 or Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. But these are not equivalent options. Article 4 provides for consultations in the event of a threat to a state’s territorial integrity, political independence, or security. Article 5 establishes an obligation to assist an ally that has suffered an armed attack, although each member state determines its own specific actions, and the use of military force is not automatic. Therefore, the phrase “modeled on NATO” does not, in and of itself, explain anything. It is essential to understand exactly who, with what forces, and according to what procedure should act in the event of a new Russian attack. But even this does not solve the main problem. Ukraine has already received international security assurances that failed to prevent Russian aggression. And now we are being asked to believe in political promises once again, while simultaneously discussing the reduction of our own army and the de facto relinquishment of parts of our territory. No guarantees can serve as a basis for concessions to a state that is waging war to destroy us. At the same time, as the publication notes, Russia “shows no indication it would accept a multinational reassurance force inside Ukraine” and has not renounced its demands for neutrality and the reduction of the Ukrainian army. It is precisely these demands that must be weighed against reports of its “flexibility.” The Kremlin wants Ukraine to be left without real allies, with limited armed forces, and without the ability to independently determine its security policy. In other words, Russia is demanding the creation of conditions under which a subsequent invasion would be significantly easier for it. And this is happening during negotiations that the U.S. administration calls “peace talks.” I see no point in discussing terms that directly contradict the very existence of an independent Ukrainian state. Russia cannot achieve through diplomatic means what it failed to achieve on the battlefield. The financial aspect of the negotiations reveals the same contradiction. According to the article, Ukraine considers large-scale military and financial support necessary for at least ten years if demobilization and Russia’s return to the global economy are to be considered. The money is needed for reconstruction, support for veterans and their families, and maintaining a combat-ready army of at least 800,000 servicemen. “The Americans believe that is too expensive for its supporters, and argue their security guarantees should suffice,” writes The Economist. In other words, Ukraine is effectively being offered a trade-off: real military capability in exchange for political promises, the fulfillment of which will depend on Washington’s future decisions. But Ukraine cannot afford such dependence. We must maintain and develop our own army, military production, and the ability to independently neutralize Russian military capabilities. Our security should not depend on who wins the next U.S. election or what agreements the next administration strikes with Moscow. This is particularly evident in light of reports on air defense. The Economist claims that Ukraine has nearly exhausted its stockpile of Patriot missiles, and the agreement with the U.S. on additional supplies has not yet resulted in new deliveries. At the same time, the publication estimates Russia’s stockpile at approximately 700 ballistic missiles, with production running at another 110 per month. These are estimates cited in the article, not independently verified inventory counts. But the problem described is quite concrete: Ukraine is being asked to rely on future U.S. guarantees, while, according to the same publication, already agreed-upon deliveries of critically important defensive equipment are not taking place. Russia, meanwhile, continues to ramp up missile production and destroy our infrastructure. I don’t understand on what basis we should assume that new guarantees will be more reliable than previous ones, especially when even current agreements on arms deliveries are not being fully implemented. Ukrainian sources interviewed by The Economist do not believe that Putin is ready to sign a comprehensive peace agreement before the end of Russia’s winter campaign. “Maybe it is their Plan B, while they execute their Plan A” says a high-ranking official. The publication describes the strikes on bridges, water supplies, and power grids as a campaign aimed at rendering Ukrainian cities — first and foremost Kyiv — uninhabitable. In effect, Russia is attempting to destroy the conditions necessary for the civilian population to live normally, while simultaneously proposing to discuss the terms for ending the war. This is deliberate terror against millions of people. And I don’t understand what kind of compromises with such a state could even be on the table. Any political negotiations with a terrorist state, aimed at finding mutual concessions, only give it the opportunity to use violence as a tool to gain new advantages. The most important thing that, in my opinion, some of our partners still refuse to understand is the nature of the war itself. For Ukraine, it is an existential struggle. We are not fighting for better terms in a peace agreement, not for a compromise on a few territories, and not for the chance to secure yet another set of international guarantees. We are fighting for the right of our state and our people to exist. Russia makes no secret of its desire to destroy Ukrainian statehood, strip us of our independence, and bring us back under its control. Therefore, no territorial, military, or political concessions can be acceptable. They will not eliminate the cause of the war but will only allow Russia to retain some of its gains, replenish its military resources, and prepare for the next attack. The article concludes with the words of a Ukrainian official: “Our American friends want a breakthrough. But seeing what the Russians are doing with our infrastructure, it’s hard to believe one is coming.” In my opinion, the problem isn’t even whether a diplomatic breakthrough is possible right now. The problem is that the very possibility of reaching a compromise agreement with Russia continues to be viewed as a realistic path to ending the war. But an agreement with a state that seeks our destruction does not guarantee peace. It merely creates an opportunity for new aggression on terms more favorable to Russia. I am absolutely convinced that the only way out of this war is Ukraine’s complete military victory. Not a freeze on hostilities, not territorial compromises, not a reduction of our army in exchange for security promises, and not Russia’s return to international markets in exchange for agreeing to temporarily stop killing Ukrainians. We must inflict such a defeat on the Russian army that it deprives the Kremlin of the ability to continue its aggression, liberate the occupied territories, and restore control over the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. Only then can we speak of a just and lasting peace. This is an existential war in which Russia is attempting to destroy Ukraine as an independent state. Therefore, we have no right to agree to concessions that threaten our very existence. It is impossible to persuade a terrorist state to cease its aggression by constantly offering it new rewards. It must be deprived of the ability to wage this war. And our efforts must be focused on exactly that — not on seeking yet another deal with Putin.