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Alula Frezghi retweeted
Mr. Fasika, the former economic adviser of the Derg, made it clear: the Derg never understood the full capabilities of Eritreans or what they were prepared to do. Because of that miscalculation, the Derg ultimately lost the war on 1991.
ሎሚ'ውን ብድሆ!
“Threats/Propaganda are half the battle”—but threats mixed with lies and disinformation cannot replace real strength. The Derg learned this the hard way in #Eritrea, despite its massive army, airpower, and the much-publicized Operation Red Star in 1982. Eritrean people and the #EPLF turned intimidation into a challenge and defeated aggression through resilience, unity, and sacrifice.
Today, #Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party repeats the same playbook: threats, propaganda, AI-generated illusions of victory, and claims of military strength. History teaches one lesson: bragging is not victory, and intimidation is not power.
As our fathers and grandfathers did, let us face the challenge, strengthen our preparedness, and stand firm in defending Eritrea’s sovereignty. @ERMedia91 @Adulisreviho @EritrawiPodcast @RedSeaBeacon @Ghidewon @EmbassyEritrea @GhideonMusa @tesfanews @NakfaPress @NationalEr_Int @horn_outlook @tewerwari_1
#EritreaPrevails #RedSea
Alula Frezghi retweeted
በኣቢ ኣህመድ የሚመራ የኦሆዴድ ብልጽግና፡ ኣዲስ ኣበባ የናንተ ኣይደለችም ያለው ኦሄደድ ፡ ኣሰብ የኢትዮጵያ ናት ብሎ ኑ ከኔ ጎን ተሰለፉ ሲል የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ሞኝ፡ጅል፡ቂል ነው ወይ? ከዚህ በላይ ንቀት ኣለ ወይ! እዚ ላይ ነው እኮ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ መልስ መስጠት ያለበት። በጦርነት፡ በትምህርት፡ ብእውቀትም ምንም ዓይነት ልምድ የሌለው ሰው፡ እንደዚህ ስጫወትብን ፡ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ በራሱ ነው ማፈር ያለበት። ለዚህች እንድ ሚልዮይን ህዝብ የሌላት፡ ከዘላኖች ወደ ከተማነት በ1962 በፔትሮዶላይ የበቀለች ኣገር ቅጭ ኣገዛዝ ኣሳልፎ የሰጠን ሰው ፡ ዛሬ የምንበረከክ ኢትዮጵያውያን ፡ ኣብይ ኣህመድ በጮሀው ኣጀንዳ የምንንቀሳቀስ ከሆንን፡ ጥፋተኛው ኣብይ ኣህመድ ኣይደለም፡ እኛ ነን።
Alula Frezghi retweeted
Eritrea's development cannot be measured without acknowledging the wars, sanctions, and external pressures it endured after independence. Unlike others that received tens of billions in aid, debt relief, and repeated bailouts, Eritrea pursued a self-reliant path while safeguarding its sovereignty and national unity.
The reality is simple: Eritrea's strategic Red Sea location, natural resources, skilled human capital, and social cohesion remain powerful assets for future growth. Sustainable regional prosperity will come not through threats, territorial ambitions, or coercive rhetoric, but through mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and sovereign equality.
#Eritrea #RedSeaRegion #Sovereignty #NationalUnity #PeaceAndStability #SelfReliance #HornOfAfrica #RespectSovereignty
Alula Frezghi retweeted
Getachew Reda’s latest remarks to CGTN are consistent with a long-established pattern: the convenient recycling of falsehoods and political narratives tailored to whatever faction or agenda he happens to serve at the moment. Over the past few years, his political positions have shifted dramatically, often contradicting his own previous statements and alliances. The same individual who once directed some of the harshest criticism at the TPLF leadership now stands aligned with the very figures he publicly denounced. Against that backdrop, his latest accusations against Eritrea carry little credibility and appear more as political expediency than principled analysis. Such rhetoric is not new; it is simply another chapter in a long record of opportunistic posturing, selective memory, and inflammatory commentary designed to advance short-term political objectives rather than truth or reconciliation.
#Eritrea #HornOfAfrica #RedSeaRegion #TruthMatters #PoliticalAccountability #EastAfrica #Geopolitics #EritreanPerspective #FactsOverPropaganda #RegionalStability
Alula Frezghi retweeted
For a leader presiding over a nation sustained by tens of billions in foreign aid, debt write-offs, IMF bailouts, and perpetual humanitarian interventions to lecture Eritrea on development is the height of irony. Eritrea has endured wars, sanctions, and relentless external pressure, yet remains sovereign, stable, and independent.
The real story is not Eritrea's resilience under adversity. It is why a country showered with international assistance still struggles with mass poverty while obsessing over access to another nation's coastline. Eritrea's future rests on its strategic Red Sea position, resources, and people. Sovereignty is not negotiable, and no amount of propaganda can change geography, history, or international law.
#Eritrea #Sovereignty #RedSea #HornOfAfrica #SelfReliance #NationalUnity #NoToAggression #PeaceAndStability
Mocking Eritrea's economy will not conceal Ethiopia's own contradictions. After decades of massive aid inflows, debt forgiveness, and repeated financial bailouts, Ethiopia's leadership still seeks external distractions while millions remain trapped in poverty.
Eritrea owes its existence not to donors, but to sacrifice, resilience, and self-reliance. Those threatening "access to the sea" should first secure peace, stability, and prosperity within their own borders. Eritrea's sovereignty was won at immense cost and will not be compromised by threats, pressure, or revisionist ambitions.
#Eritrea #RedSeaSecurity #SovereigntyMatters #HornOfAfrica #SelfReliance #PeaceNotAggression #NationalDignity
A government sustained by aid, debt relief, and IMF rescues has little credibility lecturing Eritrea about development. Eritrea faced war, sanctions, and isolation, yet preserved what matters most: sovereignty, stability, and national unity.
The obsession with Eritrea's coastline reveals more about Ethiopia's leadership failures than Eritrea's economic choices. Nations rise through productivity and good governance, not threats against neighbors. Eritrea's sovereignty is settled. The future belongs to peace, not expansionist fantasies.
#Eritrea #Sovereignty #RedSea #HornOfAfrica #PeaceAndStability #NationalUnity #NoToExpansionism
For a leader presiding over a nation sustained by tens of billions in foreign aid, debt write-offs, IMF bailouts, and perpetual humanitarian interventions to lecture Eritrea on development is the height of irony. Eritrea has endured wars, sanctions, and relentless external pressure, yet remains sovereign, stable, and independent.
The real story is not Eritrea's resilience under adversity. It is why a country showered with international assistance still struggles with mass poverty while obsessing over access to another nation's coastline. Eritrea's future rests on its strategic Red Sea position, resources, and people. Sovereignty is not negotiable, and no amount of propaganda can change geography, history, or international law.
#Eritrea #Sovereignty #RedSea #HornOfAfrica #SelfReliance #NationalUnity #NoToAggression #PeaceAndStability
Mocking Eritrea's economy will not conceal Ethiopia's own contradictions. After decades of massive aid inflows, debt forgiveness, and repeated financial bailouts, Ethiopia's leadership still seeks external distractions while millions remain trapped in poverty.
Eritrea owes its existence not to donors, but to sacrifice, resilience, and self-reliance. Those threatening "access to the sea" should first secure peace, stability, and prosperity within their own borders. Eritrea's sovereignty was won at immense cost and will not be compromised by threats, pressure, or revisionist ambitions.
#Eritrea #RedSeaSecurity #SovereigntyMatters #HornOfAfrica #SelfReliance #PeaceNotAggression #NationalDignity
A government sustained by aid, debt relief, and IMF rescues has little credibility lecturing Eritrea about development. Eritrea faced war, sanctions, and isolation, yet preserved what matters most: sovereignty, stability, and national unity.
The obsession with Eritrea's coastline reveals more about Ethiopia's leadership failures than Eritrea's economic choices. Nations rise through productivity and good governance, not threats against neighbors. Eritrea's sovereignty is settled. The future belongs to peace, not expansionist fantasies.
#Eritrea #Sovereignty #RedSea #HornOfAfrica #PeaceAndStability #NationalUnity #NoToExpansionism
Alula Frezghi retweeted
Reading from a teleprompter on Ethiopia's TV yesterday, the Potemkin Party's Prime Minister disparages Eritrea's economic development, and particularly its manufacturing sector, as "stagnant and in decline" since its independence in 1991.
The speech/interview was also laced with his three-year old threats of war of aggression and invasion unless Eritrea succumbs to his delusional projects of "sovereign access to the sea" and "Ethiopian naval presence" in Eritrea's coastal territory; packaged this time round in different pretexts, language, and format.
To revert to his disparaging discourse on Eritrea's economic performance and potential:
1. In the past 35 years, Ethiopia was the beneficiary of a whopping 80-90 billion US dollars of international multilateral and bilateral assistance;
2. Ethiopia went through two rounds of WB sponsored debt-cancellation rounds, as well as repetitive financial bailouts from the IMF and other donors. For almost ten years in -between, Ethiopia's dire humanitarian conditions were alleviated by the international community under a customized "social safety net" and other similar "intensive care" financial antidotes.
3. The current regime itself has received over 30 billion US dollars in international assistance in the last 8 years alone. In addition, its tattering economy is being resuscitated by another IMF bailout programme to the tune of 3.1 billion US dollars.
4. And yet, as the figures below illustrate, more than 68% Ethiopians are living under extreme poverty while close to 30 million people require urgent humanitarian relief assistance at this point in time.
5. In as far as the 300 manufacturing plants that the PP leader alludes to, these were old factories built during Italy's colonization of Eritrea from 1889 until 1941. The British Military Administration dismantled many of those factories - including the dock in Massawa - as "war booty" and sold them to other foreign countries. The occupationist Haile Selassie regime, in its turn, dismantled many of the remaining factories and transferred them to Ethiopia especially during the imposed "Federation" period.
6. After its hard-won independence in 1991, Eritrea registered rapid economic growth in the first seven years (WB reports). Imposed wars and unwarranted sanctions thereafter naturally affected the pace and magnitude of its economic trajectory.
7. These externalities have nothing to do with Eritrea's open investment and economic policies and visions.
8. And in any case, Eritrea has the abundant economic endowments (blue economy, extractive industry, educated and industrious human capital, and a civilized culture that celebrates religious and ethnic diversity within robust national unity) to excel and achieve its aspirations of rapid and sustainable growth in a conducive and enduring regional climate of peace and stability.
9. Finally, Ethiopia itself could do much better, extricate itself from debilitating dependency, and use its abundant resources for real development if its leaders abandon sectarian policies of division and polarization that incubate perennial cycles of internal turmoil as well as intertwined acts of regional destabilization in pursuit of delusional and expansionist projects.
🤖 Made with AI
Alula Frezghi retweeted
سقفة كبيرة وتحية لمنظومة الإعلام والتمثيل الإريتري:
✌️👏👏👏👏👏✌️🫡🫡🫡
من أول السيد الوزير غيبريمسكيل
للتمثيل الدبلوماسي الإريتري
للصحافة الإريترية
للإرتريين في الخارج
لحتى المغردين العاديين
كلهم عاملين ملحمة دفاع عن سيادة بلادهم ضد الأطماع البربرية الإثيوبية.
شكلوا جبهة قوية من حائط صد منيع، عماده:
🚨المعلومات🚨
مبهورة حقيقي بالسيفونية اللي بيعزفوها بشكل جماعي في منتهى الحسم والتنسيق والجمال.
على سبيل المثال لا الحصر، دا بوست نشرته إحدى المواقع الإريترية الدؤوبة "تسفا" بتقول الأتي:
القانون الدولي للمبتدئين:
الضم ليس سند ملكية
إريتريا ― على مدى أكثر من أربعة قرون من تاريخ إريتريا الاستعماري، لم تمارس #إثيوبيا السيطرة على ساحل #البحر_الأحمر إلا خلال فترة "الاتحاد الفيدرالي الإثيوبي" المدعوم من الأمم المتحدة بين إريتريا وإثيوبيا في الفترة بين 1952–1962 ثم "ضمها" واحتلالها مرة ثانية من 1962–1991، أي لمدة 39 سنة فقط.
وبالتالي، لا يمكن لإثيوبيا أن تدعي بشكل مشروع أنها "تستعيد" موانئ أو طرقا بحرية لم تمتلكها تاريخيا كإقليم سيادي.
السيطرة المؤقتة، والضم القسري، والاحتلال العسكري لا تُنشئ سند ملكية إقليمي قانوني.
لا تستطيع القوة المحتلة أن تصنع ملكية تاريخية عبر الغزو.
من كورس القانون الدولي للمبتدئين 101:
الاحتلال لا يساوي السيادة، والضم لا يخلق ملكية مشروعة.
شوف الرسالة العميقة المكتوبة ببساطة ومعمول لها ميديا مصاحبة تخدمها في إيصال المعلومة. راقب أد ايه هما عندهم شغف حتى وهما مهددين بالحرب والمحتل على حدودهم، ومع ذلك مجهزين لمعركتهم بكافة السبل ولو كانت بأقل الإمكانيات. على الناحية التانية الإعلام الإثيوبي مقصيها أكاذيب وصور مفبركة وفيديوهات قديمة وحاجة آخر فشل 😂
حقيقي بحييهم على نشاطهم الإعلامي ويا رب الجيران في الإقليم تتعدي منهم🙄😏🤲
#شيرين_هلال
#عين_على_افريقيا 🌴
Alula Frezghi retweeted
Eritrea’s Sovereignty Is Not Negotiable: The Finality of the Algiers Agreement and the Case for Anticipatory Self-Defence Under the UN Charter
October 19, 2026
By PI Demoz
@RedSeaBeacon
When threats become an existential danger, international law must not be reduced to a demand that the threatened state wait to be attacked.
Introduction
Eritrea’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence are not bargaining chips. Ethiopia’s strategic ambitions and desire for Red Sea access cannot override international law or reopen territorial questions already settled through binding international agreements.
The central issue is twofold: whether Ethiopia can lawfully challenge Eritrea’s sovereignty over Assab, and whether credible evidence of an imminent armed attack could justify anticipatory self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Eritrea’s communication circulated to UN Security Council members on 13 October 2026 laid out an escalating pattern of territorial claims, military declarations, and preparations threatening its sovereignty. Anyone who doubts Eritrea’s account need look no further than Ethiopian officials’ own public statements, plainly documented in parliamentary speeches, remarks at official celebrations, and broadcasts by Ethiopian state media. These declarations can then be examined against the established legal framework governing the Eritrea–Ethiopia boundary.
Assab: A Settled Question Under International Law
The sovereignty question concerning Assab is not an unresolved territorial dispute. It is governed by binding international legal instruments that establish the finality of the Eritrea–Ethiopia boundary.
First, the Algiers Agreement of 12 December 2000, signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia, established the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). Article 4(15) explicitly provides:
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Alula Frezghi retweeted
Exclusive | Sources Tell Sudanese Echo: Rapid Support Militia Officers and Fighters, Including Field Commander, Surrender Near Al-Kurmuk in Blue Nile State
Sources have told Sudanese Echo that several officers and fighters belonging to the UAE-backed Rapid Support Militia (Janjaweed), including a field commander, have surrendered near Al-Kurmuk in Sudan's southeastern Blue Nile State. The development comes amid mounting military pressure on the militia and a growing series of defections involving its commanders, fighters, and allied armed groups in recent months.
Further details about the number of personnel who surrendered, the identity of the field commander, and the military equipment in their possession were not immediately available. The reported surrender took place in an area that has witnessed repeated clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Militia, alongside its ally, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu.
The incident is particularly significant given Al-Kurmuk's strategic location near the Ethiopian border, where the area serves as an important military and logistical corridor in southeastern Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces regained control of the town on July 8, 2026, following clashes with the militia and its allied forces. However, the militia subsequently claimed to have recaptured the town on August 13, amid continuing military operations in the region.
The developments come against the backdrop of reported military activity across the Ethiopian border. In an investigation published on February 10, 2026, Reuters revealed the existence of a secret training camp in Ethiopia's Benishangul-Gumuz region for thousands of fighters destined for the Rapid Support Militia. Sources cited by Reuters said the United Arab Emirates had financed the camp and provided military trainers and logistical support. An Ethiopian security document indicated that approximately 4,300 fighters were stationed there in early January. Separately, Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab documented a substantial military buildup at an Ethiopian military base in Assosa in an August 28 report, linking the activity to support for the militia. The UAE denies involvement in Sudan's war.
The reported surrender near Al-Kurmuk follows a series of prominent defections from the Rapid Support Militia. Among the most recent was Lieutenant Colonel Mohamed Azraq Al-Fanjari, commander of the militia's Special Missions Group, who defected alongside approximately 300 officers and soldiers and 30 military vehicles. In a recorded statement, Al-Fanjari apologized to the Sudanese people for the suffering, displacement, and loss caused during the war. He repudiated abuses committed against civilians and urged his former comrades to abandon the militia and stand with the Sudanese Armed Forces, declaring that "this war has no just cause and no future."
Another significant development involved Major General Mohamedin Ismail Ahmed, Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration of the Sudan Liberation Forces Gathering, an armed movement allied with the Rapid Support Militia through the Tasis Alliance. Ahmed announced that he had joined the Sudanese Armed Forces alongside a group of officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. In a recorded statement, he accused the Dagalo family of committing war crimes, ethnic cleansing, rape, and looting, and of attempting to seize control of Sudan with foreign backing. He said he and his comrades had been deceived by the militia's promises of political change and justice. Ahmed also apologized to the Sudanese people and declared his readiness to fight alongside the national army from Kordofan all the way to Um Dafog.
Earlier defections included Major General Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, known as Al-Nour Al-Gubba, and Brigadier General Ali Rizgallah, known as Al-Savna, as well as armed groups led by Brigadier General Musa Khamsin, Abu Bakr Dahloub, and Al-Tayeb Al-Ahideb. Some of these departures followed disputes with the militia's leadership, allegations of marginalization, tribal discrimination, and mistreatment, particularly amid complaints about the Dagalo family's dominance over military decision-making, resources, and senior appointments.
These disputes have exposed growing divisions within the militia and its allied formations at a time when it faces military pressure on several fronts. In North Kordofan, the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied units regained control of Sudri and Um Sharu in September, followed by Al-Mazrub on October 2. The operations reportedly inflicted significant losses on the militia and weakened its positions along important supply routes connecting North and West Kordofan.
The surrender of Rapid Support Militia officers and fighters, including a field commander, near Al-Kurmuk adds another development to the military situation in Blue Nile State. However, the circumstances surrounding the surrender remain unclear, and it is important to distinguish this incident from the voluntary defections announced by other militia commanders in recent months.
As fighting continues across Blue Nile and Kordofan, and commanders and fighters increasingly abandon the militia and its allied formations, questions are mounting over the Dagalo leadership's ability to maintain the cohesion of its forces and military alliances amid battlefield setbacks and deepening internal divisions.
#Sudan
#RSFisTerroristOrganization
#UAEKillsSudanesePeople
#UAESponsorsTerrorism
Alula Frezghi retweeted
Three Scenarios Facing Colonel Abiy Ahmed’s Potemkin Party Regime and Its Tigrayan Enablers
October 18, 2026
By Simon K. Hagos
@RedSeaBeacon
The political and security landscape in the Horn of Africa is entering a critical phase. Ethiopia’s Bigwig Colonel Abiy Ahmed and his Potemkin Party regime face difficult choices as tensions with Eritrea and internal political instability continue to shape the region. For those Tigrayan political actors who have aligned themselves with or enabled Abiy’s political agenda, the coming period may prove equally consequential. Three possible scenarios illustrate the choices confronting this political alliance.
Scenario 1: Attempting to Cross the Border
The first scenario is a reckless attempt to cross an international border under the assumption that military pressure will deliver a quick victory. But this is not a contest in which political slogans, inflated military claims, or assumptions of superiority guarantee success. A force entering a conflict without fully understanding its adversary’s capabilities, determination, and defensive preparations risks finding itself trapped in a confrontation it cannot easily control. What begins as an attempt to impose its will could quickly become a costly strategic mistake.
The lesson is simple: the path chosen to initiate a confrontation may ultimately determine the price paid for it. Those who underestimate the consequences of crossing another country’s sovereign borders may discover that retreat is far more difficult than advancing.
Scenario 2: Prolonged Conflict and Strategic Exhaustion
The second scenario is a prolonged confrontation that gradually drains military resources, weakens political authority, and deepens internal instability. Rather than achieving a decisive victory, the party could become trapped in a drawn out struggle across difficult terrain, with mounting casualties, economic pressure, and growing uncertainty. Over time, the costs of sustaining the conflict could outweigh any anticipated political or military gains.
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redseabeacon.com/three-scena…
Three Scenarios Facing Colonel Abiy Ahmed’s Potemkin Party Regime and Its Tigrayan Enablers
October 18, 2026
By Simon K. Hagos
@RedSeaBeacon
The political and security landscape in the Horn of Africa is entering a critical phase. Ethiopia’s Bigwig Colonel Abiy Ahmed and his Potemkin Party regime face difficult choices as tensions with Eritrea and internal political instability continue to shape the region. For those Tigrayan political actors who have aligned themselves with or enabled Abiy’s political agenda, the coming period may prove equally consequential. Three possible scenarios illustrate the choices confronting this political alliance.
Scenario 1: Attempting to Cross the Border
The first scenario is a reckless attempt to cross an international border under the assumption that military pressure will deliver a quick victory. But this is not a contest in which political slogans, inflated military claims, or assumptions of superiority guarantee success. A force entering a conflict without fully understanding its adversary’s capabilities, determination, and defensive preparations risks finding itself trapped in a confrontation it cannot easily control. What begins as an attempt to impose its will could quickly become a costly strategic mistake.
The lesson is simple: the path chosen to initiate a confrontation may ultimately determine the price paid for it. Those who underestimate the consequences of crossing another country’s sovereign borders may discover that retreat is far more difficult than advancing.
Scenario 2: Prolonged Conflict and Strategic Exhaustion
The second scenario is a prolonged confrontation that gradually drains military resources, weakens political authority, and deepens internal instability. Rather than achieving a decisive victory, the party could become trapped in a drawn out struggle across difficult terrain, with mounting casualties, economic pressure, and growing uncertainty. Over time, the costs of sustaining the conflict could outweigh any anticipated political or military gains.
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@Yehdavid @EmbassyEritrea
@FT @AP @ReutersAfrica
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@shabait @AmbassadorEstif
@ytmn2 @alazarabrah1991
@biniamb @zerai_biniam
@addisstandard @BBCWorld
@nytimesworld @MesobJournal @NewYorker
@latimes @TheEconomist
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@Sudan_tweet
@tewerwari_1 @hadnetkeleta
@ERiTV_Official @BBCWorld
redseabeacon.com/three-scena…
Eritrea’s Sovereignty Is Not Negotiable: The Finality of the Algiers Agreement and the Case for Anticipatory Self-Defence Under the UN Charter
October 19, 2026
By PI Demoz
@RedSeaBeacon
When threats become an existential danger, international law must not be reduced to a demand that the threatened state wait to be attacked.
Introduction
Eritrea’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence are not bargaining chips. Ethiopia’s strategic ambitions and desire for Red Sea access cannot override international law or reopen territorial questions already settled through binding international agreements.
The central issue is twofold: whether Ethiopia can lawfully challenge Eritrea’s sovereignty over Assab, and whether credible evidence of an imminent armed attack could justify anticipatory self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Eritrea’s communication circulated to UN Security Council members on 13 October 2026 laid out an escalating pattern of territorial claims, military declarations, and preparations threatening its sovereignty. Anyone who doubts Eritrea’s account need look no further than Ethiopian officials’ own public statements, plainly documented in parliamentary speeches, remarks at official celebrations, and broadcasts by Ethiopian state media. These declarations can then be examined against the established legal framework governing the Eritrea–Ethiopia boundary.
Assab: A Settled Question Under International Law
The sovereignty question concerning Assab is not an unresolved territorial dispute. It is governed by binding international legal instruments that establish the finality of the Eritrea–Ethiopia boundary.
First, the Algiers Agreement of 12 December 2000, signed by Eritrea and Ethiopia, established the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). Article 4(15) explicitly provides:
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Alula Frezghi retweeted
The Untold Story Beneath Eritrea’s Waters: Assab
A Cinematic, Poetic, and Historical Revelation
By Abraham Gebremichael
“Everyone talks about Assab. But no one talks about what lies beneath it.”
Assab, that name stirs arguments in diplomatic rooms and hashtags in digital debates.
It’s painted as a port, a point of access, a piece of leverage.
But for Eritreans, Assab is not a bargaining chip.
It is the beginning.
And the end.
It is birth and return.
It is a witness and weapon.
It is where the chains came in and where freedom walked out.
Beneath the Surface: A Nation’s Forgotten Archive
Dive below Assab’s horizon, and you won’t just find coral
You’ll find a nation’s unspoken memory.
These reefs were here when the Rubattino Company landed in 1869.
They were here when the Italian flag rose.
And they were here, silent, glowing, when the final Ethiopian garrison fell in May 1991.
These corals are not decorations.
They are witnesses.
They watched the scramble for empire.
They felt the blast of colonial ships.
They swayed in the undercurrents of betrayal and endurance.
And still, they bloom.
The Ants Who Dive
In the language of our visual stories, the ants have become our eternal builders.
Now they dive
Lanterns in one hand. Coral seedlings in the other.
They do not carry bullets.
They carry protection.
They do not chase conquest.
They map sanctuaries.
They do not echo old wars.
They whisper future peace.
This is not a metaphor.
This is how Eritrea survives
by protecting what others overlook.
Assab Is Not Negotiable. It Is Origin.
Some will ask: Why Assab? Why now?
Because this is where colonization began.
Because this is where it ended.
Because without Assab, Eritrea is not whole.
Because with Assab, Eritrea speaks its full name.
As Dr. Gebre Gebremariam wrote:
“Assab is the cradle of Eritrean national identity. Without it, there is no sovereign Eritrea.”
Let the world remember what it forgets.
Let those who shout about Red Sea access read the treaties.
Let the coral testify.
Let the waters speak.
Let the people answer:
“We were born here. We will remain here.”
Final Words
Even the quietest waters carry the loudest truths.
Even the smallest hands plant the future.
Even the ants have learned to swim.
Beneath the surface, a nation listens to memory, to coral, to the quiet call of continuity.
From the depths of Assab’s coral gardens, a future rises — nurtured not by conquest, but by care.
This, too, is #Eritrea above and below, free and self-reliant.
🟥 Assab is Eritrea. Eritrea is Assab.
Glory to our martyrs. Strength to our
#ERITREA #Assab
Alula Frezghi retweeted
A false sense of grandeur rooted in a distorted reading of history—including pride in past occupations instead of remorse and reparations—has set Ethiopia’s Prosperity Party leadership on a dangerous course toward repeating those crimes, with even graver consequences.
The Red Line of Eritrean Sovereignty:
Ethiopia’s Red Sea Ambition and the Threat to Regional Peace
October 14, 2026
By Alula Frezghi
@RedSeaBeacon
The greatest danger in the Horn of Africa today is not a misunderstanding between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It is the growing attempt to make Ethiopia’s ambitions appear normal, reasonable, and even inevitable, while quietly placing Eritrea’s sovereignty on the negotiating table. That must be rejected clearly. Eritrea’s sovereignty over Assab, Massawa, the Dahlak Archipelago, and its entire Red Sea coastline is not an open question. It is not a historical dispute waiting for a new settlement. It is a legally settled matter, confirmed by history, international agreements, treaties, Eritrea’s internationally recognized independence, and the final, binding rulings that followed Ethiopia’s aggression.
The first point is simple: Ethiopia’s desire for sea access does not give it a right to Eritrean territory. Landlocked countries have economic needs. Ethiopia can seek trade routes, port services, transit arrangements, investment opportunities, and regional partnerships. Eritrea has never denied that reality. But access and ownership are not the same thing. Transit rights are not sovereignty. Commercial agreements are not territorial claims. No principle of international law allows a larger state to convert its economic needs into a claim over a neighbor’s land, ports, islands, or coastline.
This distinction matters because Ethiopia’s language has dire consequences. Senior Ethiopian officials, led by Abiy Ahmed, have repeatedly described sea access not merely as an economic objective, but as a question of national destiny, historical correction, and strategic necessity. That is a dangerous shift. Nations that seek normal trade do not speak as if another country’s coastline is part of their unfinished national story. Nations that respect sovereignty negotiate access. Nations that question sovereignty speak of destiny, grievance, and correction.
Second, internationally recognized legal and political processes have already confirmed Eritrea’s sovereignty. Eritrea’s independence was not an accident. It was not a gift. It was not provisional. It came after a long struggle, followed by a referendum recognized by Ethiopia, Africa, and the international community. After the 1998–2000 war triggered by Ethiopia’s invasion of Eritrean land, the Algiers Agreement established a legal process to determine the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission issued a final and binding decision. Ethiopia first accepted the framework, then refused to honor the outcome when the decision did not serve its political interests.
That refusal was not a small diplomatic disagreement. It violated Eritrea’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It prolonged tension, militarized the border, delayed peace, damaged Eritrea’s economy, and forced an entire generation to live under the burden of a “no war, no peace” reality, war by other means. Ethiopia’s record must therefore be judged not by speeches about cooperation, but by its repeated willingness to challenge Eritrea’s sovereign rights when those rights stand in the way of Ethiopian ambition.
This is where today’s Red Sea rhetoric becomes deeply troubling. Ethiopia’s claim is not emerging in a vacuum. It follows a long history of Ethiopian …ReadMore @RedSeaBeacon
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Two Tongues, One Tide: The Sea Hears Both
By Abraham Gebremichael
At the marble podium abroad, the language is law:
the high seas as shared heritage,
access softened by diplomacy,
cooperation dressed in light.
Back home, the microphone hardens.
The chorus rises: a landlocked nation no more.
Two great waters, they insist,
as if geography were a vote,
as if coastlines could be sung into surrender.
Two tongues, one appetite.
In English: access.
At home: our port.
Between the words, a current you can’t see on maps,
pulling truth out to deeper water.
We have heard this weather before:
corridors without consent,
plans drafted in the air above other people’s roofs.
But the tide has a memory older than microphones.
It keeps receipts no pen can rewrite.
They say reform. They mean revision.
They say cooperation. They mean claim.
They say shared heritage. They mean what belongs to you, and to me.
They bless the letter. They test the boundary.
They praise the Charter. They sharpen the eraser.
Eritrea’s shoreline is not a hallway.
It is a reef of names,
a ledger of sacrifice,
a sanctuary where sovereignty breathes.
It will not return what was never theirs.
That shoreline does not answer hashtags.
It answers history:
Nakfa’s trenches, cut by will.
Massawa’s fire, which unmasked pride.
Assab’s dawn, when the ground said enough.
Recognition was not granted. It was witnessed.
The world arrived late to a truth our martyrs had already sealed.
If you truly want peace, say it once.
Say it the same in every language.
Say it where it costs you applause.
Say: borders are not choirs,
seas are not corridors,
and neighbors are not doors you kick when you forget your keys.
And let the same law bind us all:
no army may take another’s coast by force, ours included.
We have no quarrel with light.
We quarrel with the shadow behind it.
Bring your ships of trade, not your flags of appetite.
Bring your charts of weather, not your scissors for maps.
Bring the humility to learn the shoreline’s grammar:
consent, memory, law, restraint.
Two tongues can charm a room.
One tide judges the day.
When the speech is over, and the crowd goes home,
the sea opens its quiet book
and reads what we did, not what we said.
Glory to our martyrs,
who taught us the difference.
Strength to our people,
who keep the difference.
Honor to the truth that never sinks.
The sea returns what we give it:
discipline, cooperation,
and the will to rise together.
#Eritrea
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Alula Frezghi retweeted
The Red Sea Gamble: Abiy Ahmed’s Expansionist Overreach
October 17, 2026
By Alula Frezghi
@RedSeaBeacon
The most dangerous conflicts rarely begin with the first bullet. They begin when a political idea makes aggression sound reasonable. Ethiopia’s recent Red Sea rhetoric does exactly that. What should be a practical discussion about trade access has been recast as a national grievance, a historical wound, and a question of destiny. That shift is dangerous because Eritrea’s independence, borders, and territorial integrity are not unresolved matters. International agreements, treaties, and legal processes have affirmed them. The issue, therefore, is not whether Ethiopia needs access to the sea. The issue is whether Ethiopia’s leadership is willing to pursue that access without violating a sovereign neighbor’s rights.
The first argument is legal. Eritrea’s territorial status is not open to revision. It rests on internationally recognized colonial treaties, Eritrea’s internationally accepted independence, the Algiers Agreement, and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s final and binding decision. These were not symbolic documents. They were the legal instruments designed to end war, confirm borders, and prevent future aggression. Ethiopia’s later refusal to fully honor the outcome prolonged instability and kept the region trapped in the destructive “no war, no peace” reality. That history matters because today’s Red Sea claims are not emerging in a vacuum. They follow a pattern in which Ethiopia accepts legal arrangements when they serve its interests and resists them when they limit its ambitions.
The second argument is political. Ethiopia’s economic need is real, but need does not create entitlement. A landlocked country has every right to pursue port services, transit corridors, infrastructure partnerships, and regional trade agreements. But access and ownership are not the same thing. A commercial problem cannot become a geopolitical claim. A development challenge cannot become a license to pressure another state. When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed describes sea access as a matter of survival, civilization, and destiny, the discussion moves beyond logistics. It begins to cultivate a public narrative in which another country’s coastline becomes the answer to Ethiopia’s internal frustration.
This is why Eritreans are puzzled. They are not reacting to trade proposals. They are reacting to the language of historical correction. Eritrea has lived through the consequences of Ethiopian leaders treating its identity, land, and future as negotiable. The federation was dismantled. Independence was resisted. The border ruling was delayed. For Eritreans, the suggestion that geography must somehow be “corrected” is not academic. It reminds us of a long political tradition that has struggled to accept Eritrea as an independent and equal sovereign state.
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The Red Sea Gamble: Abiy Ahmed’s Expansionist Overreach
October 17, 2026
By Alula Frezghi
@RedSeaBeacon
The most dangerous conflicts rarely begin with the first bullet. They begin when a political idea makes aggression sound reasonable. Ethiopia’s recent Red Sea rhetoric does exactly that. What should be a practical discussion about trade access has been recast as a national grievance, a historical wound, and a question of destiny. That shift is dangerous because Eritrea’s independence, borders, and territorial integrity are not unresolved matters. International agreements, treaties, and legal processes have affirmed them. The issue, therefore, is not whether Ethiopia needs access to the sea. The issue is whether Ethiopia’s leadership is willing to pursue that access without violating a sovereign neighbor’s rights.
The first argument is legal. Eritrea’s territorial status is not open to revision. It rests on internationally recognized colonial treaties, Eritrea’s internationally accepted independence, the Algiers Agreement, and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission’s final and binding decision. These were not symbolic documents. They were the legal instruments designed to end war, confirm borders, and prevent future aggression. Ethiopia’s later refusal to fully honor the outcome prolonged instability and kept the region trapped in the destructive “no war, no peace” reality. That history matters because today’s Red Sea claims are not emerging in a vacuum. They follow a pattern in which Ethiopia accepts legal arrangements when they serve its interests and resists them when they limit its ambitions.
The second argument is political. Ethiopia’s economic need is real, but need does not create entitlement. A landlocked country has every right to pursue port services, transit corridors, infrastructure partnerships, and regional trade agreements. But access and ownership are not the same thing. A commercial problem cannot become a geopolitical claim. A development challenge cannot become a license to pressure another state. When Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed describes sea access as a matter of survival, civilization, and destiny, the discussion moves beyond logistics. It begins to cultivate a public narrative in which another country’s coastline becomes the answer to Ethiopia’s internal frustration.
This is why Eritreans are puzzled. They are not reacting to trade proposals. They are reacting to the language of historical correction. Eritrea has lived through the consequences of Ethiopian leaders treating its identity, land, and future as negotiable. The federation was dismantled. Independence was resisted. The border ruling was delayed. For Eritreans, the suggestion that geography must somehow be “corrected” is not academic. It reminds us of a long political tradition that has struggled to accept Eritrea as an independent and equal sovereign state.
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