Deeply honored to have been awarded France's National Order of Merit by Ambassador @FrenchAmbUS Laurent Bili. I receive this not only as a personal distinction, but on behalf of the @gmfus where I've had the privilege of working for the past fifteen years, and on behalf of friends and colleagues across the Atlantic committed to strengthening the relationship between the U.S. and Europe. This honor is personal, because the transatlantic relationship isn't just the story of my professional life—it shaped my family, my identity, and my understanding of the world from an early age. I grew up in Rye, New York, while my father served as the Dutch Consul General. I attended the French American School in Larchmont with my sister Isabelle, where French and U.S. cultures coexisted; my brother William was born in NY. We grew up with a blend of French intellectual rigor, Dutch pragmatism and humor, and American entrepreneurial spirit. My grandfather ended his career as the Netherlands' NATO permanent representative; my uncle Jaap served as NATO Secretary General from 2004-2009. Theirs was a generation that built and defended the transatlantic alliance; mine, I would come to realize, would be the generation tasked with renegotiating it. That immersion carried me into my first role: special advisor for transatlantic relations to the French Foreign Ministry's Policy Planning, from 2009-2011, while completing my PhD at Sciences Po Paris. There, I hosted bipartisan congressional delegations through an exchange program GMF created early in the Iraq War—a deliberate effort to sustain the relationship despite divergence at the top. That conviction—that differences demand we listen harder and keep dialogue open—led me to join GMF in 2011, first as Paris office director, then SVP for Geostrategy, and today its first European president: a role I see as translator, of the U.S. to Europe and Europe to the U.S., without illusion, but always anchored in the reality of the world in which we operate. One lesson stays with me: this relationship cannot be taken for granted. It must be constantly renewed and recalibrated—through institutions, but above all through people. I'm often asked if the relationship is dead. My answer is no—it's being renegotiated, fast. The 80-year bargain on defense, trade, and tech is being rewritten in real time, under pressure from shifting alliances, a Europe forced to take greater responsibility for its own security and competitiveness, and the race for tech sovereignty. This is not the end. It's the most consequential renegotiation since the Marshall Plan. Writing what comes next is the exciting part of my job and GMF's mission. This honor strengthens my resolve to keep building bridges, protect the space for dialogue, and ensure the next generation inherits a relationship that is more balanced, agile, and fit for what's ahead. Grateful to Ambassador Bili, to France, and to the entire GMF community.

GMF was honored to host Germany's Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius in Fort Worth, Texas last night for an energetic discussion with Texas leaders on the strength of Texas-Germany ties—grounded in deep economic and cultural alignment and defense-industrial cooperation. State-and-local partnerships like this one are built over decades on manufacturing supply chains, defense-industrial ties, university and research links, and people-to-people exchange that endure beyond election cycles. That is precisely why GMF has spent over two decades building exactly this kind of ground game through our Across America Program and Cities Program, convening foreign policy, defense, trade, tech, and European leaders directly with governors, mayors, business, and civic leaders in key US states—leveraging a unique GMF network and alumni presence that few institutions can match. We are now scaling it up! More to come. About GMF's Across America Program: lnkd.in/ezUVUu2e About GMF's Cities Program: lnkd.in/eBGpUQV5 About GMF's Leadership Programs: lnkd.in/eQHRGDWR

I'm thrilled to officially welcome Dr. Sophia Besch to GMF as our new research director and managing director for transatlantic security, based in our Berlin office. Dr. Besch joins us from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with an exceptional record of policy-relevant research on European defense and a rare ability to bridge the policy, industry, and academic communities on both sides of the Atlantic. At a defining moment for both European security and GMF, her leadership will sharpen our research agenda and our analysis of transatlantic security and defense industry. Welcome to the team, Sophia - we are thrilled to have you!

I spoke with @hallbenjamin from the @FinancialTimes on how Europe would defend itself in a world where the United States assumes a smaller security role on the continent. The challenge now is for Europeans to turn growing defense commitments into the capabilities, industrial capacity, and coordination needed to take greater responsibility for their own security. How Europe would fight without America ft.com/content/ffd323d9-8a8c… via @ft

In my interview with @AdrienJaulmes for @Le_Figaro , I discuss a turning point for NATO: over the next six months, the goal is to ensure that the ongoing “burden shifting” in European defense—toward more Europe and less America—does not result in a forced strategic decoupling, but in a deliberate rebalancing within the Alliance. Uncertainty around U.S. commitments to Europe and NATO undermines the long-term visibility that defense industrial policies require. Yet it is also pushing Europeans and Canadians to build industrial bases, multi-year budgets, and EU/NATO frameworks that are less dependent on U.S. political cycles. A three-pronged European industrial approach is emerging: 1⃣European armament programs where possible, 2⃣with the United States where necessary, 3⃣and with other strategic partners where relevant—such as India, South Korea, or Japan. Poland’s large-scale purchase of South Korean tanks—making Seoul the second-largest arms supplier to European NATO countries over 2021–2025—illustrates this diversification, which will shape the future of Europe’s defense industrial base. Europeans are no longer betting on a more stable “post-Trump” phase. Instead, they see U.S. unpredictability as structural, driven by deep political polarization rather than any single administration. In my recent trips across Europe, I have observed a profound shift in traditionally Atlanticist countries—Nordic, Baltic, and Eastern European states—which are recalibrating their defense posture: maintaining deep strategic and industrial ties with the United States while investing more heavily in Europe’s own defense capabilities. This is not a rupture, but a rebalancing—one that aligns with Washington’s long-standing expectations. In that sense, the Trump administration is acting as an accelerator of Europe’s geopolitical and military maturation. 📢The transatlantic alliance still has a future, but it now hinges on Europe’s ability to assume primary responsibility for the defense of its continent, strengthen its industrial base, and clarify what it expects—and what it is prepared to guarantee itself—in terms of collective security. At a time when Washington seeks to “shift the burden,” external threats are intensifying, and public support is uncertain, NATO is not collapsing; it is transforming into an alliance where the European pillar must become credible—capable of acting and financing its own security—or risk gradually losing its purpose. Read the English version of the interview here: “The Trump Administration is acting as a catalyst for Europe’s geopolitical and military maturation” gmfus.org/news/alexandra-de-…

Dans mon interview avec @AdrienJaulmes pour @Le_Figaro , j'analyse un moment de bascule pour l'OTAN: l'objectif des six mois à venir est de faire en sorte que le mouvement de "transfert du fardeau" de la défense européenne vers plus d'Europe et moins d'Amérique ne se traduise pas par un découplage stratégique subi, mais par un rééquilibrage assumé au sein de l’Alliance. L'incertitude des engagements américains envers l'Europe et l'OTAN fragilise la visibilité à long terme dont les politiques industrielles de défense ont besoin, mais cette incertitude pousse aussi Européens et Canadiens à bâtir des bases industrielles, des budgets pluriannuels et des cadres UE/OTAN qui ne dépendent plus des cycles politiques américains. Ils dessinent désormais une triple approche : 1️⃣ des programmes d’armement européens quand c’est possible, 2️⃣ avec les États‑Unis quand il le faut, 3️⃣ et avec d’autres partenaires si nécessaire – comme l’Inde, la Corée du Sud ou le Japon. L’achat massif de chars sud‑coréens par la Pologne, qui fait de Séoul le deuxième fournisseur d’armes des pays européens de l’OTAN sur 2021‑2025, illustre ce mouvement de diversification qui va structurer l’avenir de la base industrielle européenne de défense. Les Européens ne parient plus sur un « après‑Trump » apaisé et ont intégré la volatilité américaine comme donnée structurelle, liée à l’hyper‑polarisation du système politique plus qu’à un seul président. Dans mes déplacements en Europe ces 18 derniers mois, j’observe une évolution profonde dans les pays traditionnellement atlantistes – nordiques, baltiques, Est –, qui articulent désormais autrement leur défense : maintien du partenariat stratégique et industriel avec les États‑Unis, mais investissement accru dans l’industrie de défense européenne. Ce n’est pas une rupture, c’est un rééquilibrage, et il converge avec ce que Washington demande à ses alliés. En cela, l’administration Trump joue le rôle d’accélérateur dans la maturation géopolitique et militaire de l’Europe. L’Alliance atlantique a encore un avenir, mais il dépend désormais de la capacité des Européens à assumer la responsabilité première de la défense du continent, à consolider leur base industrielle et à clarifier ce qu’ils attendent - et ce qu’ils sont prêts à garantir eux-mêmes - en matière de sécurité collective. Dans un contexte où Washington veut « transférer le fardeau », où les menaces extérieures se durcissent et où les opinions publiques doutent, l’Otan ne disparaît pas : elle se transforme en une alliance dont le pilier européen doit devenir crédible, capable d’agir et de financer sa sécurité, faute de quoi elle risque moins de « mourir » du jour au lendemain que de se vider progressivement de sa raison d’être. Lire l'interview ici 👉lefigaro.fr/international/al…

The transition from a US- to a Europe-led security order is no longer theoretical. It is underway. The Trump administration's announced reduction in American military capabilities in Europe and the undertaking of a broader force review marks the first step in a structural burden-shift that no successor is likely to reverse. Whether that shift opens a window of opportunity or of vulnerability depends on the speed and sustainability of Europe’s response, and on Washington’s view of a stronger European industrial base as an asset instead of a competitive threat. European NATO members and Canada raised defense spending by 20% in real terms in 2025, bringing their combined total to $574 billion. Yet the central paradox is stark: Europe is beginning to spend for wartime while still procuring and planning for peacetime. Closing that gap is the defining defense policy challenge of this decade, and it requires three urgent measures. 1️⃣ First, align procurement with threat reality and use Ukrainian expertise. The ReArm Europe plan is a start, but ambition must be matched by ruthless industrial pragmatism. Europe faces a real dilemma: rebuilding its defense-industrial base for long-term autonomy while urgently closing immediate capability gaps. These goals are not mutually exclusive, but they require balancing. Ukraine, now a co-architect of European security, is central to this, as European defense firms move from supplying Kyiv to co-developing combat-proven technology. 2️⃣ Second, include the private sector. Defense and security policy in Europe has long been the preserve of governments and militaries. That model is obsolete in an era when the most consequential capabilities—autonomous systems, AI-enabled intelligence, cybersecurity, and satellite communications—are being built in commercial labs. Policymakers must treat technology companies not as contractors but as strategic partners that must be in discussions to set industrial priorities. 3️⃣ Third, reframe the transatlantic bargain as strategic complementarity. Washington must encourage Europe to build its own industrial base, not treat it as a competitive threat. Strategic complementarity—not dependency—is the model that works for both sides. Complementarity is particularly apparent in defense tech. The U.S. leads in AI-enabled systems, space-based intelligence, and autonomous platforms; Europe's strengths lie in advanced manufacturing, sovereign cyber capabilities, laser technology, and a rapidly maturing dual-use deep tech ecosystem. 🚨 The NATO summit in Ankara should be the moment allies stop relitigating the terms of the alliance and formalize a new framework of strategic complementarity through agreed capability targets, a transatlantic defense innovation compact, and a shared framework for managing the transition without breaking the alliance. Read full piece here: gmfus.org/news/window-opport…

On the eve of the NATO Summit in Ankara, I discuss in my interview with @piosmo for @lemondefr how the transatlantic relationship is being renegotiated, with a Europe increasingly expected to take primary responsibility for the defense of its continent—with less America—and to translate rising defense spending into concrete industrial capabilities. One year ago, NATO Allies committed to moving toward 5 percent of GDP in defense spending by 2035. Washington is now calling for acceleration, in a context of strategic saturation: the United States is simultaneously engaged in Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific, putting its defense industrial base under strain. Production timelines are lengthening, as illustrated by delayed deliveries to Germany and the Baltic states. The message is clear: even in the absence of political disagreements, the United States is no longer able to guarantee the same level of defense capabilities support to Europe. On the European side, a shift has taken place, with the recognition that it would be illusory to bet on a reversal by a future U.S. administration. The Europeanization of NATO is now part of a long-term trajectory. The challenge is now industrial and capability-driven: can Europe take over, and at what pace? This will require a massive effort—up to €1 trillion over ten years—but above all a cultural shift: producing faster, differently, and drawing lessons from recent conflicts. European industry and policymakers must rethink defense procurement processes, accelerate production, and learn from the wars in Ukraine and Iran. Should the focus remain on heavy equipment, or shift toward more agile capabilities such as drones, artificial intelligence, and integrated systems? The issue is not so much spending more, but spending differently—and faster. This is the goal of the “European Defense Roadmap” initiative launched by the German Marshall Fund of the United States in May, aimed at structuring transatlantic dialogue and aligning U.S. and European timelines to avoid a capability gap. Over six months, we are bringing together governments, defense industries, and tech actors on both sides of the Atlantic, with meetings in London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Warsaw, Rome, as well as in the Baltic and Nordic countries. The goal is to map priority capabilities and define a shared “transition curve,” with a roadmap to be presented in Washington in early 2027, in the presence of senior European officials, the U.S. administration, NATO, Congress, and defense industry leaders. Read the English version of the interview here: gmfus.org/news/politicial-sc… and here: lemonde.fr/en/international/…

A la veille du sommet de l'OTAN à Ankara, j'analyse dans mon interview avec @piosmo pour @lemondefr , comment la relation transatlantique est en train d'être renégociée, avec une Europe sommée d'assumer davantage la défense de son continent, avec moins d’Etats-Unis et de traduire la hausse des dépenses de défense en capacités industrielles concrètes. Il y a un an, les Alliés de l’OTAN s’engageaient vers 5% de dépenses de défense d'ici 2035. Washington exige une accélération, dans un contexte de saturation stratégique: les Etats-Unis sont à la fois engagés en Europe, au Moyen-Orient et dans l’Indo-Pacifique, mettant la base industrielle de défense américaine sous tension. Les délais de production s’allongent. On l’observe dans les reports de livraison à l’Allemagne ou aux pays baltes. Le signal est clair : même en l’absence de désaccords politiques, les Etats-Unis ne sont plus en mesure de garantir le même niveau de soutien capacitaire à l’Europe. Côté européen, une bascule s'est opérée, avec l'acceptation qu'il serait illusoire de parier sur un revirement d’une future administration américaine. L’européanisation de l’OTAN s’inscrit désormais dans le temps long. L’enjeu est désormais industriel et capacitaire : l’Europe peut-elle prendre le relais et à quel rythme ? Cela implique un effort massif (jusqu’à 1 000 milliards d’euros sur dix ans), mais surtout une rupture culturelle : produire plus vite, autrement, et tirer les leçons des conflits récents. Nos industriels et responsables politiques doivent repenser les processus d’acquisition d’armement, accélérer les cadences de production et tirer les leçons des guerres en Ukraine et en Iran. Faut-il continuer à miser sur les équipements lourds ou investir davantage dans des capacités plus agiles (drones, intelligence artificielle, systèmes intégrés) ? L’enjeu n’est pas tant de dépenser plus que de dépenser autrement et plus vite. C’est l’objectif de l’initiative « European Defense Roadmap » lancée par le German Marshall Fund of the United States afin de structurer le dialogue transatlantique et réconcilier les calendriers américain et européen, pour éviter un vide capacitaire. Pendant six mois, nous réunissons gouvernements, industries de défense et acteurs de la tech des deux côtés de l’Atlantique, avec des étapes à Londres, Paris, Bruxelles, Berlin, Varsovie, Rome, dans les pays baltes et nordiques. L’objectif est de cartographier les capacités critiques à prioriser et de définir une « courbe de transition » commune, pour présenter cette feuille de route à Washington au début de 2027, en présence de hauts responsables européens, de l’administration américaine, de l'OTAN, du Congrès et des industries de la défense. Lire l'interview ici 👇 lemonde.fr/international/art…

Trans-Atlanticism Isn’t Dead—It’s Being Renegotiated - Reports of NATO’s demise have been greatly exaggerated. The Trump administration has indeed profoundly shaken the U.S.-European relationship. However, the evidence points not to the end of the trans-Atlantic alliance but to the emergence of a more demanding and ultimately more durable partnership that signals Europe’s long-delayed emergence as a geopolitically mature entity. This requires frank and sustained discussions—conversations that the U.S. and Europe have too long avoided. Instead, they have preferred to paper over diverging threat perceptions and interests with the comforting language of shared values rather than confronting directly where their interests converge, where they diverge, and what each side actually needs from the other. The NATO summit in Ankara will test whether European leaders can take the next necessary steps. Four things must happen. 1️⃣ First, Europe urgently needs to reform its defense procurement architecture. EU member states invested an estimated $447 billion in defense in 2025. But the machinery governing actual spending remains fragmented, slow, and captive to national champions. Joint procurement, binding interoperability standards, and radically accelerated acquisition timelines are force multipliers, not administrative refinements. 2️⃣ Second, Washington must stop treating European operational autonomy as a competitive threat. A stronger European defense industrial base is a strategic asset to NATO and aligns with U.S. needs to deploy overstretched capabilities across multiple theaters simultaneously. 3️⃣ Third, the Ankara summit should formally codify the new terms of trans-Atlantic responsibility-sharing: Washington and European allies must map the critical capabilities that should be prioritized and to define a common “transition curve.” Which segments of conventional defense can Europe take over as a priority by 2027? Which will only be realistic by 2030? GMF’s European Defense Roadmap initiative will help shape this effort over the next six months. 4️⃣ Fourth, the summit should launch a trans-Atlantic defense technology compact, for joint development, technology transfer, and coproduction in AI, autonomous systems, and cybercapabilities. This would turn the alliance’s industrial assets into a genuine force multiplier. GMF’s new Defense and Technology Task Force is designed precisely to help develop such a compact. Trans-Atlanticism is not ending. It is being renegotiated on rebalanced and more sustainable terms. Managing the sequencing is what will keep the trans-Atlantic relationship functional and forward-looking. The alliance that emerges will look different from the one built in 1949. It will also be better suited to the world that actually exists. In Foreign Policy, I write about what that renegotiated relationship looks like, and what the NATO Summit in Ankara must deliver to make it happen. Read paywall free until July 6 👇 foreignpolicy.com/2026/07/01…

I spoke with @lemondefr Piotr Smolar @piosmo on how the Iran war has accelerated a realignment already in motion—one that is forcing U.S. partners to rethink their alliances in more selective, pragmatic terms, without locking themselves into new dependencies. Here's what I shared: As the United States recalibrates its global priorities, it is increasingly seeking to outsource crisis management to regional partners and allies, asking Europeans to handle Ukraine and ensure their own defense and security. Gulf states are being asked to contain Iran and regional instability in the Middle East. Indo-Pacific allies—Japan, South Korea, the Philippines—are being pressed to contain China's ambitions. The challenge is that this geopolitical outsourcing is not being rolled out in a coherent or sequenced way. That leaves U.S. partners—in Europe, the Gulf, and the Indo-Pacific—needing to do three things simultaneously. First, continue engaging with Washington where interests converge, such as critical mineral supply chains or Middle East security, while setting their own conditions. Second, act with less or at times without Washington when they can't find common ground. That reality is already clear on climate, and it is becoming increasingly apparent on Ukraine. Third, and perhaps most consequentially, actively diversify their alliances—as Poland and South Korea have done with their bilateral defense partnership, built outside the U.S. framework.

Allied defense coordination is becoming more difficult at the moment it matters the most. The United States, Europe, and their partners worldwide face growing demands to move faster on capability development but are not moving in sync. That disconnect has real consequences. GMF is launching a Defense Tech Task Force to bring together senior leaders with experience in government, industry, and the military to examine how to accelerate collaboration. This work will be led by GMF’s @dankliman, with co-chairs Nathaniel Fick @ncfick and Gen. (ret.) Denis Mercier. Learn more about the initiative below 👇

I'm thrilled to welcome @SophiaBesch as GMF's new Research Director and Managing Director for Transatlantic Security, joining our Berlin office on September 15. Sophia joins us from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with previous roles at the Centre for European Reform, the Atlantic Council, Johns Hopkins SAIS, and the American-German Institute. She brings an exceptional record of policy-relevant research and a rare ability to bridge the policy, business, industry, and academic communities across the Atlantic. Her leadership will sharpen our research and strengthen GMF's role as the leading institution shaping the future of transatlantic relations, NATO, and European security. Welcome to GMF, Sophia!

The transatlantic relationship is being renegotiated in real time—and Germany is at the center of it. This week, I joined Bundestag Member @Peter_Beyer and the @GermanAmbUSA Jens Hanefeld in Washington D.C., along with American and European policymakers, parliamentarians, business and thought leaders, and GMF Marshall Memorial Fellows to dig into exactly what this moment demands of the Alliance. We covered the questions now defining the Atlantic Alliance's direction: Germany's defense ambitions, the future of transatlantic cooperation in Europe and the Middle East, and what shifting defense postures demand politically, strategically, and industrially. These are exactly the questions GMF's European Defense Roadmap is designed to work through. Next steps: carrying this conversation into GMF's upcoming roundtables in Berlin and across Europe, stress-testing assumptions and timelines with a broader set of European voices, and sharpening recommendations ahead of NATO's Ankara Summit. Grateful to Ambassador Hanefeld for hosting us, and to Peter for such a frank and substantive exchange.

A valuable opportunity to host U.S. Under Secretary of War @ElbridgeColby at the @gmfus this week, alongside a select group of senior European and NATO officials, for a candid conversation on the future of European defense and the Atlantic Alliance. Grateful to Under Secretary Colby and our European colleagues for the depth and strategic focus of the exchange—and to my colleague @ClaudMajor for leading GMF's European Defense Roadmap initiative, facilitating the discussion, and steering transatlantic partners toward concrete next steps. Following this Washington kick-off, GMF will convene a series of consultations and roundtables across its pan-European network—London, Brussels, Berlin, Paris, Rome, The Hague, Warsaw, Bucharest, and Ankara—to gather input from political and military decisionmakers, industry and tech leaders, financial institutions, and experts, test assumptions, and sharpen recommendations and timelines. The goal is to build the European Defense Roadmap in real time, ahead of and beyond NATO's Ankara Summit. This initiative will help governments on both sides of the Atlantic to prepare for a shifting strategic reality. The transition from a U.S.-led security order in Europe toward a European-led framework supported, but no longer directed, by the United States, has now become more urgent. For European allies, adapting to a reduced and more conditional U.S. security role will require fundamentally different planning, coordinated investments, and a shared framework for collective deterrence and defense. Decisionmakers will greatly benefit from a shared European vision for assuming primary security responsibility, an improved coordination between NATO and EU defense structures, clearer expectations for long-term U.S. contributions and a better understanding of Europe’s industrial landscape. In the months ahead, GMF will lead and shape the necessary trusted platforms, tailored analysis, and structured timeline that will define the parameters of a more cohesive, capable European security framework. More to come as we carry this work forward. For more on GMF's European Defense Roadmap: gmfus.org/news/german-marsha…