Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
Un artículo interesante para economistas que usen IA para sus trabajos de investigación. Un agente comete muchos menos errores al generar codigo para aplicaciones de econometría, pero un mayor porcentaje de ellos (la practica totalidad) son errores silenciosos que no se revelan por fallos de ejecución en el codigo, los más dificiles de detectar y, en mi experiencia, los que dan las sorpresas más desagradables.
cepr.org/voxeu/columns/letti…
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
Hoy escribo en @elmundoes sobre el crecimiento del empleo y la convergencia entre las CC.AA. en PIB per capita y productividad:
Crecimiento demográfico y PIB per cápita: Entre 2019 y 2025, las regiones con mayor dinamismo poblacional y de empleo registraron fuertes aumentos del PIB total, pero un avance limitado del PIB por habitante en comparación con zonas de población estancada.
Divergencia en productividad: Desde el año 2000, la dispersión de la productividad por ocupado entre comunidades ha aumentado (pasando del 7,9% al 9,5%), mientras que la convergencia en el PIB por habitante se mantiene estancada debido al efecto compensatorio de las tasas de empleo y la demografía.
El reto de aumentar la capacidad productiva: Aunque la creación de empleo y la atracción de población impulsan la actividad agregada, a corto plazo se observa una relación negativa con el crecimiento de la productividad por ocupado. Sostener la convergencia exige acompañar el empleo con mayor inversión, formación y valor añadido.
elmundo.es/economia/macroeco… via @BBVAResearch
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
Valuable update to the Global Macro Database (GMD), which integrates macro data from various sources into a consistent cross-country dataset; 46 variables for 200+ countries. New plugin for Claude Code and Codex enables AI agents to search for time series and plot the data.
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
The biggest, and stupidest, myth in European politics, particularly popular in France, is that Europe suffers the consequences of "austerity" and "neoliberalism". In the biggest 5 countries in Europe, more than half of the population makes its income from the state, less than half from the private sector. This is what makes the problem of reducing the welfare state so impossible: more than half of the voters are net recipients. No surprise that Italy's budget has not been balanced in 100 years, France's in 50 years (ooh la la, l'austérité!!):
-France: 30 million from the state versus 21m private sector workers. State spending is 57% of GDP, taxes more than half the economy. The budget hasn't been balanced in the lifetime of most French (since 1974).
- Germany: 35 million adults from the state, versus 34 million from the private sector. 10% of the population is registered as severely disabled. Public spending is over half of GDP. Germany has had a continuous budget deficit since 2019.
-Italy: 23 million from the state, versus 20.5 million private-sector workers. Public spending is 51% of GDP. Italy has had a budget deficit every year since 1925, for 100 years.
- Spain more people get their income from the state since 2024: 18.21 million from the public sector versus 17.9 million people working in the private sector. Since 2025, Spain also had more government employees than self-employed workers (autónomos) for the first time in history. State spending is at 45%, budget has not been balanced since 2007.
- UK: 54% of households now receive more in state benefits than they pay in taxes. State spending is 44.5% of GDP, taxes (40%) are at their highest since 1950, the budget hasn't been balanced since 2001, and 1 in 5 new cars is paid by the government through a bizarre state disability scheme (Motability).
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
.@HicksCBER You ask what should replace the NK model. Here are three propositions that are missing from NK monetary theory
A recognition that
1] Beliefs matter and independently influence outcomes
2] There is no tendency for markets to converge to a ‘natural unemployment rate’
3] Prices are not ‘sticky’ because the Calvo Fairy taps price setters on the shoulder and allows them to reset prices: they are slow to adjust because dynamic equilibria are indeterminate
Here is a simple empirical application of those principles
static1.squarespace.com/stat…
Here is a [technical] exposition of the research agenda implied by them
static1.squarespace.com/stat…
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
In migration-nations (countries that deliberately import worker that are more educated that locals) first and second generation migrant kids record higher PISA scores that the kids of locals. In Australia the trend is particularly strong. To me this is just one variation of educated parents push their kids to be educated. Source: buff.ly/49xhLvS
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
There are a handful of countries that—on their own—have more children per year than the entire EU.
These are India, China, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, and Ethiopia.
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
TIPS Are Screaming -- Buy Me! , by @Kotlikoff larrykotlikoff.substack.com/…
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
The Nobel Prize given to Mike Woodford and Bob Hall will re-trigger discussions about the so-called New Keynesian model. Some will hail it as an unambiguous success, building macro from micro foundations. Others will dismiss it as an empirically irrelevant construction, leading to complex models without much relation to reality.
As often is the case, truth is in between. I expressed my views, as a participant in the enterprise, but not an unconditional believer, in an NBER Macro piece last year. Given that the link has expired, I use this opportunity to repost it. shorturl.at/Xq7QG
Replying to @FrancoisGeerolf
My criticisms of these equations are well documented 😀. shorturl.at/cPKLV But this is what a useful model does and has to be judged by the work and the discussion it triggers. Why is there more inflation inertia than implied by 1? What about liquidity constraints and limited rationality in 2? Are expectations as forward looking as RE? Etc. And, given these deviations, what are the implications for policy? Is the initial model useless, profoundly misleading, or a useful starting point? What remains when you make the changes you think appropriate?
Trampa de pobreza
Los sindicatos reclaman que el SMI suba un 7% en 2027, hasta superar los 1.300 euros al mes.
Parece una subida importante del SMI, pero NO, el aumento que llega a la cuenta corriente del trabajador se queda en un 2%, muy por debajo de la inflación que padecemos, del 4,9%.
Se lo explico:
Un trabajador que cobra el SMI ahora paga un 6,5% de cotizaciones sociales, y se le retienen 590 euros, que luego se le devuelven al hacer la declaración del IRPF (DA 60 de la Ley del IRPF).
Si ese trabajador pasa a ganar un 7% más, pasa de 17.094 euros a 18.290,58 con un aumento de 1.196,58 euros brutos.
Eso le supone, en primer lugar, pagar 77,77 euros más en cotizaciones sociales.
Después, la retención le sube de 590 euros a 1037 euros (447 euros más de retención)
Por último, su deducción pasa de 590 a 366,24, con una reducción de 223,76 euros.
El resultado neto para el trabajador es que su empresario le paga 1196,58 euros (y otro 24% adicional en cuotas de Seguridad Social) y el trabajador recibe 1196,58-77,78-447-223,76=448,04 euros, que es el 37,44 de la subida, y sin incluir el aumento de la cuota de Seguridad Social. El marginal conjunto IRPF-cotización empleado es del 62,56%, que se desglosa en un 56% de IRPF y un 6,5% de cuota de Seguridad Social.
Esto es un disparate. Repito, el IRPF, especialmente de los que menos menos ganan, necesita una reforma.
Por supuesto, los sindicatos cuentan con que el IRPF se le rebaje a estos trabajadores, pero, un trabajador que ahora gane estos 1.1196 euros brutos por encima del SMI, que no llegan a 86 euros brutos en 14 pagas, sólo percibe, en términos reales, tras impuestos y cotizaciones, 32 euros.
Este IRPF desincentiva cualquier subida salarial para los trabajadores que menos ganan, y es un freno brutal al ascensor social, pero no hay la más mínima crítica sindical, de los mismos sindicatos que convocan una huelga general a la oposición.
eleconomista.es/economia/not… vía @elEconomistaes
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
⚠️En tres décadas se ha cronificado la pobreza en España: más de la mitad de los que caen en la pobreza en algún momento son pobres durante tres o más años, 10-15 p.p. más que en 1994.
Y lo que es peor: estar formados o trabajando protegen hoy bastante menos que hace 30 años.
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
Eight years after Denmark merged 239 councils into 66, places that lost their town hall had 26% fewer children and 35% lower house prices.
In 2027 Denmark folded 271 municipalities into 98, merging 239 of them into 66 larger ones. The basic idea (which makes every finance ministry happy), is that bigger councils spread fixed costs over more people, they cut duplicated jobs and deliver the same services via economies of scale. Earlier Danish research backed that up, finding administrative costs per head fell after the mergers.
But each new municipality kept only one town hall. Every other former council lost its administrative heart, and a bunch of economists wanted to know what happened to the places left behind.
They used Danish registry data covering every resident and every firm from 1996 to 2015, mapped onto 8,530 small neighbourhoods of at least 150 households each. They then compared the 2,187 neighbourhoods whose municipality lost its town hall with neighbourhoods in municipalities the reform left untouched. Because the untouched ones skew urban (Copenhagen, Aarhus, Odense), the authors built a weighted blend of them that tracked the losing areas closely before 2007, so the comparison is like for like.
The first domino is obvious. Neighbourhoods that lost their town hall shed about three full-time admin staff each, roughly a third of what they had, and the drop never reversed.
Then the losses spread to services nobody had voted to cut. School staffing fell by 17% on average across the nine years after the reform, and public-sector jobs overall by 21%. Private-sector jobs followed, down 16%, as the local economy lost the steady trade that a council and its staff bring.
People responded the way you'd expect. Each affected neighbourhood lost about three more working-age residents than it gained every year, around 0.7% of its population. The number of children fell 13%, which tells you young families were among the first to go. Those who stayed travelled 10% further to work, and their wages rose by just 1%, barely compensating for the extra time on the road. House prices fell 15% on average.
By 2015 the gap had widened. Against comparable untouched areas, public employment was down 38%, school staffing 36%, private jobs 24%, children 26% and house prices 35%.
The results hold when the comparison group changes. Comparing losing municipalities with neighbours that kept their town hall, or with the second-largest partner in the same merger, still shows clear damage, and so does using the number of council seats to predict which places lost out.
The geography is uneven tho. Neighbourhoods near Denmark's four biggest cities saw residents drift into those cities. Further out, people moved to whichever town had kept the town hall, and those winners added public-sector jobs. So a reform meant partly to slow urbanisation ended up feeding big cities in some places and building up regional hubs in others.
link to full article: doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbaf038
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
"En España el debate es limitado por el peso electoral de los pensionistas, la generosidad del sistema de reparto actual y la polarización, que dificulta consensos sobre una transición con costes a corto plazo."
En España el ajuste llegará necesariamente de forma catastrófica, en el sentido de la ecuación cúspide de René Thom (📉 ⬇️).
Una transición incremental al estilo de los paises que enumera Grok implica la pérdida de elecciones o la imposibilidad de alcanzar el poder, por lo que ningún partido ni la propondrá ni la implementará.
El sistema irá desequilibrándose cada vez más, hasta que llegue un punto, quizá inducido por una crisis externa similar a la del euro de 2010-12 o de nuevo tipo, en el que pasaremos del punto F al punto C de golpe, al estilo griego.
Es solo una cuestión de tiempo. Como decía mi antiguo profesor de física cuántica —en modo irónico, porque se refería a las fluctuaciones del vacío cuántico—; "de donde no hay no se puede sacar".
Replying to @antihacienda
Más países: Islandia, Finlandia, Israel, Canadá, Reino Unido y Nueva Zelanda combinan pensión pública con planes ocupacionales o individuales obligatorios/cuasiobligatorios y acumulan activos elevados respecto al PIB.
En España el debate es limitado por el peso electoral de los pensionistas, la generosidad del sistema de reparto actual y la polarización, que dificulta consensos sobre una transición con costes a corto plazo.
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
Excellent article in the Wall Street Journal on Britain's unsustainable welfare spending:
— 7 million people (over 10% of the UK population) now claim at least one or more sickness or disability benefit. This is up 60% in the past 6 years.
— The UK will spend over £100 billion pound this year on sickness and disability benefits. This is projected to increase to £130 billion a year by 2030.
— No other Western country has seen such a rise in disability claims. In the US, 10.6 million people claim some form of federal disability payment, despite the population being 5x larger.
— 1 in 7 new cars sold in the UK are under the Motability scheme; however, only 10% of cars are modified for a disability. In one dealership, 25 out of 26 cars they sold in August were all under the Motability scheme.
— Charities, consultants, YouTubers and TikTokers have all sprung up, telling people how to maximise benefit access. Some of these videos receive hundreds of thousands of views. Over 1,000 people a day are signing on for PIP.
— According to a Government survey from 2024, 25% of the UK's working age population could theoretically be classed as disabled under the current criteria and access these benefits.
— A minimum wage worker who works 40 hours per week would take home around £1,880 per month after tax; however, if you are classed as too sick to work and claim PIP, you can take home £2,000 tax free per month.
wsj.com/world/uk/united-king…
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
C'est HISTORIQUE: Bercy publie pour la 1ère fois le poids réel des pensions dans le budget de chaque ministère.
Attention, ça pique: 32% du budget de l’Éducation nationale et 30% du budget de l'Intérieur part en réalité dans... les retraites
Tous les ministères sont concernés⤵️
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
Para quien esté interesado en conocer la evolución de las distintas fuentes de renta (2010-2025). Fuente AEAT
Las pensiones no son precisamente las rentas peor tratadas
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
On the microeconomic foundations of macro stabilisation: The Hall-Woodford prize in historical perspective
beatricecherrier.wordpress.c…
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
Con profundo pesar traslado a mi comunidad de @X la triste noticia del fallecimiento de #EdwardPalmer, padre del sistema sueco de pensiones, un hombre profundamente humano y sabio. En nombre de mis compañeros de BBVA Mi Jubilación en España. DEP Ed Palmer.
bbvamijubilacion.es/blog/ed-…
Alfonso R Sanchez, CFA, PhD retweeted
Unpacking the real fiscal costs of immigration, by @jburnmurdoch
Low taxes on low earners mean the same immigrants cost the UK more than they would elsewhere.
The fiscal impact of immigration is shaped by the host country's tax and welfare policies and the background of the immigrants.
Because the UK levies low taxes on low earners while providing strong state support, migrants there must earn significantly higher salaries to become net fiscal contributors compared to those in countries like France or Germany.
As shifting demographic flows bring in lower-earning arrivals, host nations can improve economic assimilation (as Denmark has through targeted benefit policies) by adapting their fiscal frameworks to match changing migration patterns.
ft.com/content/124c1cf0-4885… @ft





































