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Ukraine war mapping, OSINT and geolocations, fortifications Donate: https://xitter.cf/t.co/EeR5Vg6S68 Ukraine control map: https://xitter.cf/t.co/aToLxkJlgP

Italy
Joined May 2023
Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)Photo by Playfra (@Playfra0)
Some personal thought about the Crimean bridge. While the news is undoubtedly good for Ukraine, it’s necessary to analyze its results from a more critical perspective. At the moment, a whole section of the road carriage collapsed in the water, blocking ship passage as well, and the railway side’s support column was also lightly damaged. This means that it will not be easy to repair it for Russia, and it will take them a good amount of time to do so. The main impact is a worsening of logistics to the occupied Kherson Oblast first of all, which is going to likely be the territory that will suffer the most, and then to the western part of occupied Zaporizhzhia Oblast and to Crimea itself. This will force the rerouting of a big volume of supply vehicles (military trucks, fuel trucks, …) to the Rostov-Melitopol road instead (Novorossiya Highway or Land Route), which will add itself to the already existing flow. With Ukrainian middle-strikes still being able to more or less effectively, but not tightly control that road, and with recent multiple Ukrainian strikes on bridges near Rostov, this enlarged flow of vehicles will find itself in an uncomfortable position, and Ukrainian middle-strikes will have many more targets and opportunities to strike and slow down Russian supplies. This said, though, it’s necessary to underline that this is not a logistical collapse for the Russians by any means. The land route remains still viable, even if risky, because of the aforementioned lack of tight Ukrainian UAV control combined to crude but decent Russian safety measures. This means that, on the front, there will likely be no big changes directly related to this problem, but different actions of small scale could be possible. It’s interesting here to connect the points and notice that Ukraine already announced a landing operation on the left bank of the Dnipro river some time ago, something that is getting more and more understandable every day that passes. In short, I think Russian logistical problems will again suffer a further worsening, but this will not be a game changer for Ukraine, even though it could be transformed in different tactical concrete results at the front. The Russians will also probably find it harder to resupply fire support units for massive usage in some areas.
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Under my last post and in my DMs, a lot of people wrote that their armies use self-propelled guns (SPGs), so in principle, thanks to their mobility, everything will be fine for them. They will avoid counter-battery fire and will find it easier to survive drones, and so on. Let’s set aside the maintenance of heavy tracked vehicles (especially their transmissions) in active service, and the fact that an SPG is much easier to destroy than a towed gun. Let’s look at this from the drone’s point of view. Literally. In the photos you can see two active shelters for Russian 2S19s, used by the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army, about 40 km from the front. You can clearly see the camouflage, the protection (including against drones) and, most importantly, the tracks left by a multi-ton vehicle. These are things that simply cannot be avoided and are extremely difficult (and after a while impossible) to get rid of. Both sides actively use long-range SPGs, and they do so specifically in a shoot-and-scoot manner. But hiding large vehicles is a very hard task, even far from the front. Both sides, in principle, know each other’s positions well. All that separates them from complete destruction is a lack of coordination, resources, other tasks and priorities, and so on. Even if you set up a «parking area» for your SPGs 70 km from the front (and as artillery develops, you may even be able to fire from there), that does not remove the problem of being found by fixed-wing ISR. I handled this very well, using SIGINT, satellite imagery, different types of reconnaissance UAVs and data from counter-battery radars. Finding and neutralising a self-propelled threat was never a problem for me. We all need to learn, draw the right conclusions and be ready for new challenges ahead.
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The main road span of the Crimean bridge has been destroyed by Ukrainian drones/cruise missiles. Currently laying in a twisted heap in the Kerch Strait, blocking the ship lane.
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Insane footage showing an FP-5 "Flamingo" cruise missile equipped with a camera striking the Crimean Bridge in Kerch.
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Dobropillia direction. No Ukrainian soldiers in Bilytske have been present for at least a couple of days by now: the battle for this tactically valuable town ends after approximately 9 months since the first Russian entered the now almost completely destroyed town.
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Fun fact: in the Velyka Novosilka direction, in a Russian rear position around 30 km from the contact line, Russian vegetable gardens were spotted. In all likelihood, this was done by them to be more independent from Russian supplies coming by car or truck, which are often delayed and unreliable due to continued Ukrainian middle strikes. About them specifically, they still do absolutely continue, and their intensity and frequency can only be lowered through Starshield disruptions, but not stopped, as they're not dependent on it only.
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My four years at war have deeply shaped my mindset and the way I see processes. Any processes. War opens your eyes and forces you to see things completely differently than before. It’s almost impossible to make that shift without going through it yourself. That’s why I have enormous respect for those who learn lessons from someone else’s war. One of those lessons is decentralization. I’m well aware that training videos don’t necessarily reflect the real tactics a military uses in combat. But does it make sense to train in a way you know you won’t actually fight? Or have many countries really drawn no conclusions at all? So far, these general points could apply to many areas (logistics, counter-drone systems, the infantry component, and so on), but this time I’d like to take a brief look at artillery. What you see here is a satellite image of the Lyman area from May 2022. It shows an artillery regiment, a tank battalion, two mechanized battalions and logistics support. This stretch of the front is deeply significant to me. I nearly died there twice in June 2022, and I fought there for a full year from 2025 to 2026, so I know the geography of the area very well. While defending Sviatohirsk in May–June 2022, I came up against this entire armada of Russian artillery. In short, it was hell: hours of relentless, non-stop Russian shelling that churned up our land along with its defenders. The Russian 90th Tank Division was advancing on the town, while the 5th Tank Brigade and the 36th Motor Rifle Brigade pushed along the flank. But as you can see in the image, the Russians set up their batteries almost in the open and fired from there. That’s how they were trained (and not only them). Today, in 2026, that is simply unimaginable. Even if the artillery had been positioned farther back, deployed like that every one of those guns would be destroyed. So here’s my point. When I see artillery units from some NATO countries during 2026 exercises still firing the way the Russians did in 2022, I have to ask: is it just an exercise (and then why train with outdated methods?), or is it a lack of analysis and a failure to draw conclusions? Do I have here any current serviceman from a NATO country who is serving in artillery: what have you learned?
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‼️As a result of work conducted by t.me/IA_klen and t.me/Ukraine_War_Tracker, 7 Telegram accounts were uncovered linked to spreading fake information and impersonating Ukrainian soldiers and representatives of the 3rd Army Corps. Those accounts are: @Hugo_3ab @yashchuknws @liza_magid (+380 50 034 6697) @ans4308 @ab3mediateam @Gggt_s @katygalad ✅ The only official contacts of the 3rd Army Corps are contained here: ab3.army/kontakty/. 📝 Tips to find similar accounts: 1. They use a robotic-like and unnatural writing style, to be associated with translator usage, and choose unusual words instead of other more natural ones. 2. They write from mail addresses that contain "ab3.media" or often associate themselves with "ab3.media", which is not related in any way to the Corps. The word "ab3" is also often used in their tags or names. 📝 How to deal with them once found: 1. I recommend simply deleting your chats with them and/or banning them. ➡️ In general, while talking to presumed soldiers, it's always best to ask for confirmation and to absolutely not write any sensitive personal or operational information until appropriate proof has been given and accurately cross-checked. Thanks for understanding; reposts will be appreciated.
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Playfra retweeted
Ukraine is opening five million annotated frames of battlefield footage, most of it shot by drones, to defense companies in allied countries at no charge. Any firm that trains a model on the archive licenses what it builds back to the Ukrainian military. The archive is called Avengers Labs. The Defense Ministry says most of it comes from unmanned systems. The companies never see the footage. They score models against it inside an isolated system, and a model that performs well gets loaded onto an aerial drone, a ground robot or a sea drone.
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Orikhiv direction. In this direction, indeed, the situation improved for Ukrainian forces. In Orikhiv, by now only small amounts of Russians are present, hiding somewhere in the dense cluster of buildings. The Russians conserve the possibility to infiltrate into Orikhiv from time to time with small groups, but at the moment they aren't able to do more than that. Meanwhile, the situation is slowly worsening east of Orikhiv, in the Mala Tokmachka-Huliaipilske sector, where the Russians continue to slowly creep forwards, albeit with proportionate losses.
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Regarding the dismounted infantry, it mixed up with already present Russian infiltrators in the first red circle, so it's hard to say who took the casualties of the two groups, but it's known that some were eliminated, and some are probably still alive. Regarding the 2 BMPs that dismounted those infantrymen, they were destroyed on the way back approximately in Volodymyrivka.
Some clarifications, having received further information from the field. Even though it's not particularly relevant as of today, it's still best to be complete for the record. -> I'll only write the corrections: if something's not written, it means that it was correct. (?) It also seems like one of the sources merged the description of this attack with another one that happened on November 11th near Rusyn Yar, but in general the attack was quite confusing to follow because of the extremely thick fog. Engaged resources: - 1 tank (not 2) - 2 BMPs (not 3) Developments: - 1 tank was sent forwards and had the task of being a decoy by attracting the bulk of the attention going dangerously north. - The 2 BMPs were actually able to dismount infantry approximately in the southern red circle. I'm clarifying their current status, but I'd bet more on the fact that the bulk was already eliminated yesterday morning and afternoon, just after the attack. I'm also unsure on the fate of the BMPs themselves. The rest, looks like, was correct.
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Playfra retweeted
I spoke to one of the brigade commanders who took part in Operation Vivaldi. He said he still values tanks and thinks we will see successful armored assaults in the future. One of his Leopard tanks sustained 45 FPV strikes and is still operational.
In other words, much of Russia's "war economy" is a jobs program. It's producing vehicles that are useless in modern warfare, putting them into storage, and valuing them at cost in its GDP numbers.
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Playfra retweeted
There are still Ukrainian infantry positions in the southeastern and eastern parts of the city. Determining “control” is difficult given the character of the fighting. Infantry on both sides are often told not to engage each other to avoid giving away their positions. Both sides would typically prefer for UAS to target the other side’s targets infantry. In some cases, Ukrainian and Russian infantry are occupying different parts of the same building with different entrances. There is no good way to map this.
this is very incorrect
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Some clarifications, having received further information from the field. Even though it's not particularly relevant as of today, it's still best to be complete for the record. -> I'll only write the corrections: if something's not written, it means that it was correct. (?) It also seems like one of the sources merged the description of this attack with another one that happened on November 11th near Rusyn Yar, but in general the attack was quite confusing to follow because of the extremely thick fog. Engaged resources: - 1 tank (not 2) - 2 BMPs (not 3) Developments: - 1 tank was sent forwards and had the task of being a decoy by attracting the bulk of the attention going dangerously north. - The 2 BMPs were actually able to dismount infantry approximately in the southern red circle. I'm clarifying their current status, but I'd bet more on the fact that the bulk was already eliminated yesterday morning and afternoon, just after the attack. I'm also unsure on the fate of the BMPs themselves. The rest, looks like, was correct.
Dobropillia direction, Shakhove sector. Yesterday at 8am local time, under the cover of fog, the Russians launched a combined attack. Objectives: - Dismount infantry in Hruzke (-) Dismount infantry as reinforcements in friendly positions some kilometers behind the contact line to continue infiltrations Engaged resources: - 3 tanks - 3 BMPs - 10+ lightly armored vehicles and motorcycles - Foot infantry Development: - The BMPs, lightly armored vehicles, and motorcycles reached the Volodymyrivka-Shakhove area, marked in orange, and dismounted infantry there, which is now likely continuing on foot toward the most advanced positions and will take part in continued infiltrations in this sector in the coming days. - 2 of the 3 tanks reached the red circle, likely along the highlighted route, and were destroyed there, just before the ditches of the New Donbas Line. I wasn't able to clarify where the 3rd tank was destroyed. Results: - No Ukrainian positions were lost - The Russians reinforced their forward accumulation points in the Volodymyrivka-Shakhove area - Some Russians from this attack could still be alive somewhere behind Ukrainian positions, but I have no information as to if and where. - As of yesterday evening (local time), counting all parts of this assault (the tanks, the dismounts in the orange circle, and the foot infantry engaged in this sector), the total reaches up to 30 wounded and killed Russians. 7 vehicles were destroyed: between them, very likely, are the 3 tanks and 3 BMPs. Furthermore, 3 quads were also destroyed. Notes and conclusions: - As I had somewhat predicted here (xitter.cf/Playfra0/status/211975…), the Russians restarted using armor to attempt advances on the front, especially in areas where they're struggling, and with appropriate foggy weather conditions, which severely limit reconnaissance and reaction times, were able to reach the contact line and even go further before being destroyed, something that would not and has not been possible in past times with good weather conditions. While this time they attacked in the area of responsibility of the 1st Corps "Azov," which is a properly organized, coordinated, and effective unit that was able to repel the attack, it is to be totally expected that the Russians will attempt such armored operations elsewhere as well, hoping to achieve bigger successes. Checking xitter.cf/moklasen/status/212157…, we can note how the Ukrainians struck a large Russian foot infantry group 14 km from the contact line with middle-strike drones "Darts," which proves that, despite bad weather conditions, Ukrainian air reconnaissance was still working and managed to spot the Russian attack already well inside their territory, which is a great sign that this node of the attack repulsion chain worked, at least partially, as intended. Part of the information was taken from t.me/officer_33/7103 and from xitter.cf/1unit_army/status/2121…. The rest is information from the field.
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Dobropillia direction, Shakhove sector. Yesterday at 8am local time, under the cover of fog, the Russians launched a combined attack. Objectives: - Dismount infantry in Hruzke (-) Dismount infantry as reinforcements in friendly positions some kilometers behind the contact line to continue infiltrations Engaged resources: - 3 tanks - 3 BMPs - 10+ lightly armored vehicles and motorcycles - Foot infantry Development: - The BMPs, lightly armored vehicles, and motorcycles reached the Volodymyrivka-Shakhove area, marked in orange, and dismounted infantry there, which is now likely continuing on foot toward the most advanced positions and will take part in continued infiltrations in this sector in the coming days. - 2 of the 3 tanks reached the red circle, likely along the highlighted route, and were destroyed there, just before the ditches of the New Donbas Line. I wasn't able to clarify where the 3rd tank was destroyed. Results: - No Ukrainian positions were lost - The Russians reinforced their forward accumulation points in the Volodymyrivka-Shakhove area - Some Russians from this attack could still be alive somewhere behind Ukrainian positions, but I have no information as to if and where. - As of yesterday evening (local time), counting all parts of this assault (the tanks, the dismounts in the orange circle, and the foot infantry engaged in this sector), the total reaches up to 30 wounded and killed Russians. 7 vehicles were destroyed: between them, very likely, are the 3 tanks and 3 BMPs. Furthermore, 3 quads were also destroyed. Notes and conclusions: - As I had somewhat predicted here (xitter.cf/Playfra0/status/211975…), the Russians restarted using armor to attempt advances on the front, especially in areas where they're struggling, and with appropriate foggy weather conditions, which severely limit reconnaissance and reaction times, were able to reach the contact line and even go further before being destroyed, something that would not and has not been possible in past times with good weather conditions. While this time they attacked in the area of responsibility of the 1st Corps "Azov," which is a properly organized, coordinated, and effective unit that was able to repel the attack, it is to be totally expected that the Russians will attempt such armored operations elsewhere as well, hoping to achieve bigger successes. Checking xitter.cf/moklasen/status/212157…, we can note how the Ukrainians struck a large Russian foot infantry group 14 km from the contact line with middle-strike drones "Darts," which proves that, despite bad weather conditions, Ukrainian air reconnaissance was still working and managed to spot the Russian attack already well inside their territory, which is a great sign that this node of the attack repulsion chain worked, at least partially, as intended. Part of the information was taken from t.me/officer_33/7103 and from xitter.cf/1unit_army/status/2121…. The rest is information from the field.
Replying to @Jonpy99
It's an interesting question. I think they will still continue for some time without changing their tactics on the ground. After all, Russia is notoriously not very good in situational awareness in tactical terms. After this, I think the only way for them to continue making any significant gains on the front is to stop infiltrating constantly in many directions at once but really focus a lot of resources in one singular area, possibly an area where two Ukrainian corps border, and if it coincides with a weak point, it's even better for them, and keep up the pressure for enough time until Ukraine's dam somewhat breaks, something like southwestern Kostyantynivka: a weak spot with no obvious mistakes from the Ukrainian side, but simply continued strong pressure from Russia eventually brought gains. Eventually I also agree with other commenters here that brought up the armor possibility; I think they will try a couple of "all-or-nothing" assaults in some directions they find suitable, maybe continue to try their Arena protection system, and probably making a bigger column than usual with some crazy armor on top of the vehicles. Anyways, just speculation and just talking about what I would do
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--> Corrections and clarifications here: xitter.cf/Playfra0/status/212165…
Some clarifications, having received further information from the field. Even though it's not particularly relevant as of today, it's still best to be complete for the record. -> I'll only write the corrections: if something's not written, it means that it was correct. (?) It also seems like one of the sources merged the description of this attack with another one that happened on November 11th near Rusyn Yar, but in general the attack was quite confusing to follow because of the extremely thick fog. Engaged resources: - 1 tank (not 2) - 2 BMPs (not 3) - Foot infantry - 10+ lightly armored vehicles and motorcycles Developments: - 1 tank was sent forwards and had the task of being a decoy by attracting the bulk of the attention going dangerously north. - The 2 BMPs were actually able to dismount infantry approximately in the southern red circle. I'm clarifying their current status, but I'd bet more on the fact that the bulk was already eliminated yesterday morning and afternoon, just after the attack. I'm also unsure on the fate of the BMPs themselves. The rest, looks like, was correct.
There's a new version of this post
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