Unrelenting entrepreneur Founder of @permit_io, @Rookoutlabs, @Reactful Permissions for the AI Era (https://xitter.cf/t.co/3jbOiNRcAl)

Joined September 2013
EN 18286 is the first harmonised standard under the EU AI Act, now in the Official Journal. It covers QMS for high-risk AI. For agent builders, the question it raises is whether you can prove what your agent was allowed to do and who approved it. permit.io/blog/en-18286-qms-…
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Most agents in prod borrow a shared API key or the user's session. Whatever that key reaches becomes the blast radius, and the audit log says the human did everything.
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For MCP, OAuth covers whether the client can connect. Whether this agent can call this tool on this resource right now is a separate check. A gateway PEP in front of MCP servers can do it without rewriting each server.
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NIST already defines what an audit record needs: what, when, where, source, outcome, who (SP 800-53, AU-3). AI agents need more on top of that.
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Teams often skip logging denies. An allow-only trail reads like telemetry. Add denies and it reads like a control.
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Congrats to the Oso team on joining Temporal. They pushed authorization forward for years. Oso Cloud teams get 25% extra on every Permit quota for 12 months, hands-on migration help on Enterprise, and this guide: permit.io/blog/migrate-from-…
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Tool traces show what an agent called. They do not prove authorization.
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Emit that at the tool-call PEP, not only at login. A gateway in front of MCP servers is a natural place for it.
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1/ Agents raise the authorization workload. Same security bar. One prompt can turn into dozens of tool calls, and each one needs its own check.
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5/ Realtime: if you revoke a human and the agent keeps working, that is the incident question. Audit: "the AI did it" will not hold up. Log principal, agent, tool, resource, decision, reason.
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