The Shahed-136 requires no runway, costs a fraction of conventional munitions, and has a 2,000km range. C4ADS spent months tracing how Iran built and exported the production capability behind it. More incoming next week.
Get the full report now 👇
c4ads.org/reports/airborne-a…
C4ADS retweeted
🇷🇺Russia Tightens Its Grip on the 🌴Sahel via the Skies: An Opaque Logistics Network
Between January 2025 and July 2026, pro-Russian forces conducted ✈️✈️ 75 flights to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, according to ADS-B tracking data analysed by @C4ADS. 🇧🇫 Burkina Faso accounts for the bulk of the traffic, followed by Mali, while activity in Niger remains marginal. These rotations — carried out primarily by Soviet-era Antonov An-124 and Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft — sustain Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group, now operating under direct Russian military command.
This aerial shuttle is more than logistical support. It forms the backbone of a grip that has consolidated since the region’s military coups. In exchange for security guarantees against groups such as JNIM and ISGS, 🇷🇺 Moscow has secured mining concessions, military bases and direct political influence, while remaining largely shielded from accountability. Civilians have paid the price through extrajudicial killings, violence and a continued deterioration of security, even as these forces have proven largely ineffective against armed groups.
Operators combine state entities — notably Flight Unit 224, the Special Flight Squadron and EMERCOM — with private companies, some already under sanctions (Aviacon Zitotrans, Rubystar, Sapsan). This hybrid model obscures attribution and preserves plausible deniability. State aircraft typically transit through Russian-controlled bases in Khmeimim (Syria) and Al-Khadim 🇱🇾(Libya), while private operators favour commercial hubs in Abu Dhabi, Algeria or Turkey. These stopovers act as potential chokepoints: disrupting access to them would significantly complicate resupply. Traffic spikes have coincided with high-level visits (including Ibrahim Traoré’s trip to Moscow in May 2025) and ground offensives. Burkina Faso functions as the main regional hub.
The transition from Wagner to Africa Corps has changed little on the ground: the same bases, routes and model of resource extraction and predation persist. The Central Sahel remains a strategic node for Russian influence in Africa, underpinned by a discreet, redundant and still difficult-to-disrupt air logistics network.
#AfricaCorps #Wagner #RussianInfluence #Mali #BurkinaFaso #Niger #RussiaAfrica
Satellite imagery indicates a North Korean bulker faked voyages to Malaysia while trading between North Korea and China. One phantom call made it into Malaysia’s Maritime Single Window.
Read the full investigation from C4ADS and @LloydsList 👇
lloydslist.com/LL1158727/Nor…
In early 2026, we worked with @AP to investigate the misuse of Western AI in Southeast Asian scam compounds. Now, that collaboration has led to a new documentary from @frontlinepbs emphasizing how these centers have industrialized fraud, and how AI is accelerating it.
Watch 👇
pbs.org/video/scammed-k62s3l…
We’re cited in TNFD’s 2026 Guidance on Environmental Crime as a key resource for environmental crime intelligence, supporting L2 (dependencies and impacts) and L3 (interface with nature) on the LEAP approach.
From @TNFD_ 👇
tnfd.global/publication/guid…
One sanctioned Russian airline, Aviacon Zitotrans, has flown 100+ apparent missions for the UAE since mid-2025 — often vanishing from tracking over the Gulf of Aden. C4ADS Senior Analyst Margaux Garcia says that behavior suggests deliberate transponder shutoffs, and that the UAE may not see sanctions as a true deterrent.
From @defense_news👇
defensenews.com/global/midea…
Russia's war on Ukraine is sustained by a global network that supplies weapons, parts, labor, and channels for sanctions evasion. C4ADS and our partners are working together to reveal the scope of this network and what stakeholders can do to disrupt it.
From @AtlanticCouncil 👇
atlanticcouncil.org/dispatch…
We had the chance to present and partner with the UK OSINT Community on the Global OSINT Conference — our team detailed how to turn PAI and open sources into real-world impact, sharing the life-cycle of investigations through C4ADS’ data-driven analysis.
Thank you to everyone who attended and our hosts, @OSINT_Community !
The DOJ just indicted a CA a business owner for smuggling $300M+ in GPU-equipped servers to China via Malaysia/Singapore transshipment — this case show similar evasion routes we detail in Covert Compute.
justice.gov/opa/pr/californi…
At C4ADS, our China portfolio continues to grow (now including our recently published Covert Compute report). But we’re not the only ones watching this space — here are three leaders in the movement to trace PRC influence around the world. 🧵 1/4
Read Covert Compute 👇
c4ads.org/reports/covert-com…
Russian satellite network Rassvet is racing toward giving its drones and missiles a jam-proof link for use in Ukraine. Its manufacturer, Bureau 1440, still isn’t on any Western sanctions list. C4ADS confirmed this gap for @EuromaidanPress and called fixing it the most effective tool available.
Read 👇
euromaidanpress.com/2026/09/…
C4ADS retweeted
PRC: "Monitoring the Frontier: Chinese Digital Surveillance Projects in Tibet, the Uyghur Region, Inner Mongolia, and Hong Kong" A report by Mishel Kondi @C4ADS
c4ads.org/wp-content/uploads…
NEW: China's surveillance supply chains run through distributors built to keep sanctioned manufacturers hidden — and existing sanctions and export controls have yet to catch up to how the equipment actually moves. 🧵 1/6
Read 👇
c4ads.org/reports/monitoring…
Our findings show exactly where these gaps sit, and give regulators the evidence to close them. 6/6
Read the full findings and our recommendations 👇
c4ads.org/reports/monitoring…











