As BTC-TCs, both @Strategy | @Strive rely on robust capital markets access to scale the Treasury Model. Through Digital Credit, they’ve opened additional capital-raising channels and, in my view, created a new asset class. The resulting preferred securities now trade as their own cohort | block in a secondary market, adjacent to $BTC and their “parent equities”, not separate from them. My research at True North examines $STRC through that lens: buybacks, market structure, and the transmission channels connecting the offering to the wider complex. This connection shows up in the data - the following results are from a broader analysis of all five preferred offerings: $STRK | $STRF | $STRD | $STRC | $SATA - using their price histories since inception and rolling attribution models built on matched trading sessions. The results below are from a 9-4-26 snapshot of that larger analysis: a 60-session window spanning 6-11-26 through 9-4-26, covering the selloff, the pre-buyback rebound, and the buyback execution period. Within that window, a model built on orthogonal (uncorrelated) factors explained 74.65% of daily price return variance in $STRC. The three largest allocations, expressed as shares of that explained variance, were: a] Other (Non-STRC) Preferreds: ~44.7% b] MSTR (ex-BTC): ~39.2% c] BTC: ~15.7% Read the full analysis here: tnorth.com/research/strc-buy…

$MSTR | $STRC | $BTC: The good that comes from an increase in the Digital Credit Securities Repurchase Program is that it'll allow Strategy to retire more dividend obligations | shares. That is a real benefit to the capital structure. As far as price? The market controls that.

So... Black Monday? Yea?

$STRC | $SATA: Digital Credit offerings are "Meta Derivatives". They are derivatives of their parent equity ($MSTR or $ASST) which itself is a derivative of $BTC: a derivative of a derivative. They aren't broken, this isn't a flaw, this is how the market will treat them.

Putting this out there now so that it's known: $MSTR common stock buybacks will not work to raise price, and will only serve to raise KPI's like $BTC Per Share. Which have nearly nothing to do with how the market is pricing the equity.

No... $MSTR wasn't down today because of MSCI it was down because Mag7 and damn near everything is down. Certain algo strategies trade it adjacent to $BTC and yes, some still trade it as tech | software.

OK @LaDoger really cooked with this one. The $MSTR meme-lord never rests.

Some thoughts on $MSTR | @MSCI_Inc Index Exclusion Last November, I challenged the framing of a potential $2.8B MSCI outflow as an “existential threat” to @Strategy. MSCI now seems to be adopting its “non-operating company” exclusion framework. The updated impact list identifies @Strategy for potential removal. The timeline to watch is as follows: 10-15-26: Results from Consultation on the Eligibility of Non-Operating Companies. 11-11-26: Final Constituent Changes 11-30-26: Implementation The risk has become real, but we need to differentiate the FUD and fear-mongering from actual potential impact on trading and capital markets access. $MSTR Trading Volume | EoW 10-09-26: $15.29B $MSTR Averages: $565.25B in Dollar Trading Volume YTD $2.91B Average Daily Dollar Volume $13.79B Average Weekly Dollar Volume $56.53B Average Monthly Dollar Volume Using the JP Morgan $2.8B “forced sell-off” estimate from last year as a scenario, that represents: 0.96 Average Trading Days of Volume 18.3% of the Last Week’s Volume 0.50% of YTD Volume I share these numbers to establish scale, not to predict zero price impact, but claims that highlight this as a massive risk to $MSTR are overstated. Any forced selling will be into trading flow, around re-blances, etc. This will not be a market dump event. $MSTR has the liquidity and turnover to absorb this selling with little issue IMO. This is a near term ripple to deal with, not an existential threat to $MSTR. Today's announcement for reference: msci.com/indexes/index-resou…

A few people have asked what the conclusions of my $STRC research paper actually rest on. Very simply: if the effects of trading volume dynamics and buybacks are so weak that quantitative models can't distinguish them from zero, they likely aren't having a strong impact on price activity. In the paper, I broke that down into 4 statements, 2 of which don't rely on regression results: “...( i ) The recovery in STRC began before repurchase executions ( ii ) The other Strategy Preferred Offerings (and SATA) also recovered before repurchases occurred | without share repurchases ( iii ) Trading Volume | Short Volume Flow are in the model, and their coefficients are not statistically distinguishable from zero over the observed window ( iv ) Share Buybacks as a proxy (when evenly allocated by session) are not statistically distinguishable from zero once BTC, MSTR, and the other preferred offerings are in the model. Given ( i - iv) above, while the results of this analysis do not claim that the effect of buybacks was zero, there is evidence that they were not the main explanation for the STRC price rebound over this observed window…”

Recent price action with $SATA has some investors confused. But there is no cause for worry, and the price action today should not come as a surprise. I shared analysis back in June that seems particularly relevant now, especially re: the Up | Down Betas and correlations with $BTC present with $SATA. The point I have consistently been making is that dividend frequency might smooth out volatility and help price stability around par, but it does not erase the broader $BTC | parent-equity transmission channels. My recent research on the @TNorth website showed the broader Digital Credit complex contributes materially to price return variance across all Preferred Offerings as well. I analyze $SATA (and all of Digital Credit) as meta-derivative instruments within BTC-backed capital structures. Updated data and research continues to support that framing; notably in behavioral differences between Digital Credit offerings on BTC-up and BTC-down days. For $SATA from inception through October 9, 2026: BTC Correlation {Pearson r}: 0.50 BTC R² {Return Variance Explained by BTC}: 24.7% BTC Beta {β}: 0.28 Up | Down BTC β: 0.20 | 0.44 Up | Down BTC Correlation {r}: 0.29 | 0.52 In my June post, I noted Up | Down Betas for $SATA of 0.35 | 0.45 -respectively. Now with additional history, we see that the estimated downside sensitivity remains materially larger than the upside sensitivity, and the correlation is also stronger on BTC-down days. That is the distinction that matters here: periods of compression around par can coexist with downside price action. Today, $SATA has traded back into the $96-97 range despite its daily dividend frequency, showing that daily payments have not prevented discounts to par; and discounts to par do not mean an offering is “broken”. There is also fresh capital-structure context to consider: @Strive announced a new proposed 15% $SATS offering on 10-13. This offering introduces another preferred instrument within the $ASST capital structure, creating differentiation, and the possibility of relative value repricing around issuance. Based on the relationships observed across @Strategy preferred offerings, I would expect shared pricing dynamics to emerge between @Strive’s preferred offerings within the larger Digital Credit complex. This is why I continue to assess these offerings within the broader capital structure and market transmission channels. Dividend terms, competing instruments, liquidity and the market’s assessment of $BTC and the parent equity all matter. Daily dividends might reduce volatility but they do not guarantee par, and they do not remove the economic exposures embedded in the instrument. $BTC remains the foundation of these capital structures: the payment schedule changes how income is distributed; but does not engineer away the underlying market exposure.

$STRC | Buybacks vs Trading Activity (Part 3) 12 weeks later, through the week ending 10-9, Strategy has spent ~$1.65B on $STRC buybacks, retiring dividend obligations on 16.97M shares. They now have $354.8M remaining under their Digital Credit Securities Repurchase Program. Over the ongoing buyback window, that spend is equivalent to [~20.13%] of dollar trading volume and over this latest week Strategy spent $192.4M, its largest weekly purchase in this window, equivalent to [29.57%] of dollar trading volume versus [18.58%] the week before. Buyback spending increased [9.13%], while dollar trading volume declined [31.42%]. In simple terms, what this means is that Strategy was a bigger bid in a thinner market. It's clear that Strategy has provided support for $STRC at various price levels, however, providing support for the price, being what is setting price, and being the cause of what drove the price recovery are very different things. Using 7-17 (before the first reported purchases) as a steady benchmark, through the 10-9 close, $BTC has gained [28.30%] and $MSTR [62.72%], with $STRC gaining [16.84%], rising from ~$85.29 to ~$99.66. Over that same window, $STRK gained [23.44%], $STRD [21.41%], and $STRF [7.39%], without any buybacks. This latest week adds context given that $STRC gained [0.25%] while both $BTC | $MSTR fell [2.42%] and  [3.54%] respectively. We can infer that this is consistent with buybacks providing support, but this still doesn’t establish that buybacks drove the broader rebound. It is important for investors to understand what is and isn’t within Strategy’s control. Other variables I continue to look into when assessing buybacks are short volume share, alongside daily short volume flow. Daily short flow measures the number of shares reported as short sales each day; short volume share measures those shares as a percentage of total reported volume in the same FINRA off-exchange dataset.  If we compare 9-28 through 10-2 with 10-5 through 10-9, average daily short flow declined from ~239K to ~200K shares, down [16.55%]. But over that same period, the weekly short volume share increased from [31.13%] to [37.80%] showing fewer short marked shares traded, but they represented a larger share of a thinner market while Strategy was also a larger share of that thinning market. My Read: I think the retail community is still giving buybacks too much credit for a recovery that extended across $BTC, $MSTR, Strategy’s broader capital structure, and with the recovery in $SATA; Digital Credit as an asset class. The latest numbers now expand the question I have posed in previous weeks from will $STRC sustain healthy trading near par when Strategy’s intervention steps back to how much support is being supplied to keep $STRC at these levels as trading activity contracts? When Strategy’s purchases are equivalent to almost [30%] of weekly dollar turnover, near-par trading is not, by itself, proof of healthy independent (organic) demand.

$BTC: The Corn wants to poop...

$TSWCF | @smarterwebuk is doing OK Between the MORE IPO and the ATM facility @asjwebley and team have £14.6M to deploy.

Digital Credit Snapshot since inception: Each Offering $STRK | $STRF | $STRD | $STRC | $SATA would have protected your capital vs $BTC, and paid you a dividend, with lower volatility. The financialization of $BTC will bring in hundreds of Billions in capital over time.

Another fantastic conversation with @OneChairPod We discuss $MSTR and $STRC buybacks with this important question as the backdrop: Can @Strategy out-engineer the market?