The US Army undoubtedly shows, and will keep showing, the best results in terms of its adaptability during exercises, and I’m sure in real combat as well. But such figures (like the loud claims about NATO brigades being “crushed by drones”) somewhat distort reality and, as a result, lead to false conclusions. Questions that should be asked: - How many Ukrainian (or any other) UAV crews were deployed per 1 km of frontage (and, accordingly, across the frontage of the whole “offensive” of the notional enemy); - How many integrated sensors, of the kind fielded on the Ukrainian side in the current war, were deployed; - What density of drone detection assets and EW suppression assets was deployed against the advancing American brigade; - What percentage of the deployed UAV crews on the frontage, broken down into SRD, fixed-wing ISR, FO, FR FPV, heavy drones, RUGVs, etc., took part in the exercises; - Did the defending side manage to establish constant surveillance of the notional enemy with SRD and fixed-wing ISR; - Was mining carried out with assets such as FPVs, heavy drones and fixed-wing “bombers”; - Was a decentralized SIGINT & ELINT network deployed; - Was a radar field built with STR; - Were UAV crews capable of striking at depths of 25–75 km present at the exercise; I could name quite a few more such “?” questions. Fighting a notional enemy that has 7–12 FPV/SRD/fixed-wing ISR crews deployed across a 10–15 km frontage is not the same as breaking through an echeloned defense made up of a large number of sensors, a unified situational awareness system, and detection and strike assets with corresponding strike zones and depths.