P1 Security is a leading provider for its offensive security services, software and trainings on mobile networks unique protocols (2G to 5G)

Paris, France
Joined October 2011
Live today, 15:00 CEST: Inside a telecom security assessment. Martin Kacer on how mobile networks are actually tested, SS7 to 5G, and what each kind of test misses. Free, with Q&A and replay. watch.getcontrast.io/registe… #TelecomSecurity
2
172
Home-routed roaming carries a partner's SIP traffic straight back into the home IMS core. New whitepaper: the SIP interconnect threat model, and where a signalling-aware SIP IDS fits alongside the SBC. p1sec.com/white-paper/sip-in… #VoLTE #TelecomSecurity
133
QCSuper has a sequel: DiagNG, a new GUI-based open source tool for Linux that produces PCAP/GSMTAP captures from Qualcomm Snapdragon basebands for Wireshark, NR/5G included. Launch post: p1sec.com/blog/presenting-di… Code: github.com/P1sec/DiagNG
1
1
126
A $1000 fibre switch and physical access to one cell site is enough to man-in-the-middle unencrypted backhaul. The user plane is often unprotected: sniff it, inject into it. From our Cloud RAN webinar. Full session: watch.getcontrast.io/watch/p… #CloudRAN #TelecomSecurity
104
India Mobile Congress 2026, 7 to 10 October, Yashobhoomi, New Delhi. P1 Security will be there. Want to talk signalling, interconnect or 5G core security? Book a slot with our team: p1sec.com/contact @exploreIMC #IMC2026 #TelecomSecurity
125
The AMF trusts the device (N1), the gNB (N2) and the 5G core (SBI) differently. Our AMF Under Pressure replay walks the attack paths. watch.getcontrast.io/registe…
203
Most O-RAN interface protections are mandatory to support and optional to enable. The gap between supported and switched on is a fixable deployment question. New whitepaper on open fronthaul, E2, O1, the RIC and xApps: p1sec.com/white-paper/o-ran-… #ORAN #TelecomSecurity
1
70
A pentest describes your network on the day it was tested. Networks do not stay still: new elements, new interconnects, new 3GPP features, patch and config drift. Re-testing an estate audited years ago keeps finding new exposure. p1sec.com/ugtmns
69
HLR, HSS, UDM: the subscriber database holds identities, authentication material and service profiles. Interconnect filtering decides who may ask, not how the element answers a malformed question. p1sec.com/white-paper/hackin…
1
237
No single public place tells you how mobile networks actually break. So we indexed ours: 191 articles, 14 chapters, SS7 and Diameter through to 5G SBA, O-RAN and IMS. No gate, no form, no download. p1sec.com/ugtmns
258
Tomorrow, live with Titan.ium: Offense vs Defense in Telecom Security. What a mobile network hands over to a stranger, and the signalling firewall rule that stops it. Built live on screen. 15 Sept, 16:00 CEST. titaniumplatform.com/webinar… #TelecomSecurity #SS7
1
231
A CVE feed says a vulnerability exists. It does not say what it does inside a mobile network. The P1 VKB holds 2,200+ telecom vulnerabilities from SS7 to 5G, with impact and remediation context. p1sec.com/product/vulnerabil…
241
11 September 2026: the Cyber Resilience Act's reporting clock starts. Actively exploited vulnerabilities in products with digital elements, early warning within 24 hours. Telecom equipment included. p1sec.com/services/supply-ch…
55
SS7 was built in the 1980s for a closed club. That club now has 1,000+ interconnected nodes, and MAP/CAP/SCCP still carry no sender authentication. Joint webinar with Titan.ium, 15 Sept, 16:00 CEST (15:00 London, 10:00 NY). titaniumplatform.com/webinar…
1
261
The most damaging findings in 5G core pentests are rarely exotic: default credentials, reused root SSH keys, SSRF that turns the SCP into an internal scanner. New whitepaper on the five classes we find most. p1sec.com/white-paper/top-5g… #5G #TelecomSecurity
3
691
P1 Security is at LEAP 2026 in Riyadh, 31 Aug to 3 Sept. Vikas Sharma is there taking meetings. If you run a mobile network in the region, regulate one, or depend on one, let's compare notes on what your signalling layer exposes. [email protected] #LEAP26
132
Live in under an hour: AMF Under Pressure. N1, N2, SBI. Three interfaces into the AMF, each trusting a different neighbour. El Mehdi Regragui on the attack paths across each, from P1 pentesting on the 5G core. Today 15:00 CET. Replay if you register. watch.getcontrast.io/registe…
1
200
Ask an operator where its attack surface is and the answer depends who is in the room: SS7, GTP, IMS, RAN. TelcoASM puts them in one matrix so you can see where exposure concentrates. Self-assessment, no scan. telcoasm.p1sec.com
232
Smishing defences read the message. But SMS fraud lives in signalling: spoofed origins over SS7, A2P grey routes bypassing the SMSC. Content filters can't see that. p1sec.com/blog/sms-based-att…
2
272