Ppl questioning @elonmusk because of physics is a joke lol. Pretty sure the rocket guy with major success in applied physics and engineering knows more than you.
Musk's new indoor strategy is beyond stupid.
Musk keeps iterating on how to enter the terrestrial mobile market. His latest idea is to combine satellite coverage outdoors with small cellular radios on Starlink rooftops to cover indoors.
The problem is physics.
D2D satellites face serious capacity limitations in dense cities, while smartphones have limited RF power to communicate over hundreds of kilometers. His proposed 7 MHz of low-band spectrum offers very little capacity for modern mobile broadband. And putting a radio on a rooftop doesn't solve the problem of penetrating walls, concrete floors, and other building materials.
I respect Musk's ambition, but this idea makes little engineering sense as a replacement for a proper mobile network.
Read the detailed analysis here:
sebastianbarros.substack.com…
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Shout out to the loser FINTWIT influencers who may or may not be liquidated after this week. Your arrogance is coming home to bite you in the ass. Reap what you sow.
30
Dj Whitegold retweeted
Well, the verdict is out:
AI was a fad this whole time and people will stop using it, just like the internet.
$NVDA
Does space count? @elonmusk
BREAKING: President Trump says he will impose a “tremendous tax” on any US company that attempts to build data centers outside of the US.
Trump says he will not allow data center construction outside the US because “China will take all of them.”
The Nasdaq 100 extends losses to -4% on the day after the statement.
35
How long before Jensen comes back to save the market? $NVDA Trump with a pre-pardon, deals get cut and we bottom
97
The flywheel in reverse. Sell bitcoin to buy $STRC then sell $mstr to buy $STRC because noone is buying organically. Propping up your shit preferred at the cost of your shareholders who believed in your buy $BTC strategy. Feel bad for them.
$STRC traded over $600M yesterday, the only one of 456 U.S.-listed income preferreds to do so this year. We intend to keep buying below $100. Repurchases facilitate liquidity and lower dividend obligations. We believe they strengthen the credit and benefit common shareholders.
94
Dj Whitegold retweeted
I'm hearing multiple things from industry executives:
1. Potential $NVDA employee exodus if Jensen doesn't come back soon.
Many senior management and engineers can easily retire after Nvidia stock appreciation over the years.
They don't need to continue working sitting on millions in equity. But they continued to work because Jensen was a visionary leader.
Under new interim CFO (former CFO), it gives an excuse for that lot of people to finally quit soon. A pay bump or hiring $ARM CEO isn't going to change that.
So you have generational talent leaving.
2. Loss of confidence in $NVDA future growth (Jensen was the moat).
What I'm hearing is that Jensen understands heavily top-down architectures, and it's this magical discretionary element that doesn't get covered in media.
When cuda, network, and $NVDA internal teams are arguing, Jensen made the final choices around heavily nuanced discretionary decision about where Nvidia + AI ecosystem ends up going:
Then everyone followed. The supply chain, capital, agreements, and faith.
You also can't suddenly replace the trust that local Taiwanese factories build with Jensen over the years if you bring in external CEOs, or even internal executives.
It was transformational bet after bet after bet after bet that Jensen made until Nvidia became a former $5T+ company.
3. $NVDA is not that technologically far ahead of others. It's not a 5 year lead, but months ahead to a year in different areas.
Jensen was accelerating all of that. Longer Jensen is gone, the longer Nvidia and its competitive ecosystem decays, beyond the current near-term roadmaps.
Nvidia's greatest moat was Jensen Huang making high-stake architectural decisions and accelerating capital, suppliers, + the industry to rally around his vision.
There's a massive loss of confidence in $NVDA with Jensen gone.
Replying to @aleabitoreddit
Hard to find an outside CEO who knows NVIDIA better than the man who started it.
Dj Whitegold retweeted
Every 500 Megawatt of inference compute makes them $100 billion per year.
The economic for them and for SpaceX is great. Athropic and SpaceX are working together as AI partners.
Anthropic will likely increase its leasing from SpaceX at about 2-4 gigawatts per year. This is my estimate based upon Elon Musk interview that Anthropic will increase to 10 gigawatts of leasing from SpaceX over an unspecified period.
At this point since the whole market is mega nuking I want $NVDA to go to 111 a share so there is an emergency termination of the board and re hire of Jensen. This whole year has been a psyop
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Dj Whitegold retweeted
I have ended the Jordan - LeBron debate with one 60-second video.
Now you know who the GOAT 🐐 is.
There’s no more discussion. Enjoy.
Dj Whitegold retweeted
LeBron is SHAMELESS
Airballed so bad he pretended he was hurt.
NO ONE touched him.
Dj Whitegold retweeted
I believe the @nvidia board is not acting in the best interest of shareholders nor in a manner consistent with their fiduciary duties.
What we know is that the board fired Jensen or forced his resignation for violating company policy and/or in response to the accusation of an affair with a spy.
They did so without careful consideration of the impact on the company, its customers, its shareholders or other stakeholders.
They rushed to judgment without the benefit of careful due diligence or even with a basic understanding of the facts.
How do we know this?
We know this by how quickly Jensen was fired and how little was known at the time of his firing.
It takes time to convene a board meeting. There was time, maybe, for one Zoom.
And this is a decision that should have been made by a board sitting in person and carefully deliberating the facts once they are known.
And they should have slept on the decision and met again the day after to discuss the facts, the risks and the other implications of their decision.
The timing and lack of information did not allow for careful board deliberation.
While boards can fire a CEO for an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate, it should not be an automatic decision. That is why we have boards comprised of humans and not agents.
A board should consider whether or not such a relationship was consensual or whether it was an abuse of power dynamics. And a board has to consider what the impact of the firing is on all stakeholders.
If I were in this board, I would not have rushed to judgment based on articles in the media. I would have made sure the board had all of the facts so it could make a careful and informed decision.
Boards of Delaware companies have a duty of care which means they must make informed, prudent and good faith decisions. This clearly did not happen here.
What law firm is advising this board?
Or is the board even taken good legal advice?
It doesn’t look like it.
And now the board is compounding its failures by insisting that there is no possibility for Jensen’s return as CEO.
Why is it in the best interest of the company to foreclose the possibility of Jensen’s return and to do so before all of the facts are known? This is yet another breach of their duty of care.
Furthermore, the board has launched an investigation whose scope is unknown. Investigations can be extremely damaging to a company and should be carefully targeted to address whatever facts need to be known rather than be overly broad in scope.
In short, this looks like a series of major governance failures by directors that panicked due to headlines in the media. They likely felt compelled to do something because they were afraid of looking bad in the media, not because it was the right thing for them company.
They couldn’t stand the heat.
The board’s conduct here is shocking for a company of this scale and importance to our country and the world at large, particularly at this moment in history.
Dj Whitegold retweeted
THE MICHAEL SAYLOR BROKEN PROMISE TRACKER 🧵
A running record of what Michael Saylor said versus what Strategy has actually done.
(Updated with data available as of mid-November 2026.)
1. STRC buyback discipline: Buy more at deeper discounts.
July 27th: “We intend to remain a regular, disciplined buyer of STRC below $100. More at deeper discounts, less as STRC nears $100.”
BROKEN: The largest buybacks occurred at prices approaching $99–$100. Analysis of filings shows approximately $1.4 billion spent between late September and mid-November, at weekly average prices of $99.06–$99.93. That represents more than half of the approximately $2.7 billion deployed under the preferred repurchase programme since July.
The November 9–15 period alone saw a record $228.1 million repurchase at an implied average price of approximately $99.93. Only $332.2 million remains under the $3 billion authorisation.
The numbers make the disconnect even clearer:
→ Average STRC issue price: $95.81
→ Average STRC buyback price: $97.93
→ Average STRC trading price to date: $89.92
2. MSCI index inclusion.
January 7th: Saylor stated that $MSTR would remain in MSCI indexes.
BROKEN: On November 11, MSCI officially confirmed Strategy’s removal from the MSCI USA Index and relevant global indexes, including MSCI World, under its new non-operating company eligibility rules. The changes take effect after the November 30 close.
3. STRC returning to par within approximately 70 days.
On the Q2 earnings call, Saylor suggested approximately 70 days was a reasonable timeframe for STRC to return to par, implying a target around September 8.
BROKEN: STRC remained below par for approximately 165 days, from mid-May until briefly reaching $100 around November 4th. Its recovery required billions in repurchases and a sustained 12% dividend rate. Briefly touching par is hardly evidence of sustainable, independent demand.
4. Never sell Bitcoin.
Saylor repeatedly promoted the idea that Strategy would never sell its Bitcoin.
BROKEN: Strategy introduced its Bitcoin Monetization Program as part of its June 29, 2026 Digital Credit Capital Framework, authorising up to $1.25 billion in Bitcoin sales to fund its USD Reserve, alongside additional authorised sales to meet dividend and interest obligations and fund repurchases.
Strategy subsequently disclosed actual Bitcoin sales of approximately 6,948 BTC for ~$432 million in 2026 to fund preferred dividends and related obligations.
The perpetual-hold promise was broken.
5. Increase Bitcoin per share and deliver positive Bitcoin yield. Never dilute at the expense of BPS.
The central promise of Strategy’s model is to continually increase Bitcoin per share (BPS) and deliver positive Bitcoin yield, without diluting shareholders in a way that reduces their underlying Bitcoin exposure.
BROKEN: Common share issuance has continued while Bitcoin per diluted share has declined. As of November 15, 2026, Strategy held 850,849 BTC against 457.244 million ADSO, equating to 186,082 sats per diluted share, down from 194,986 sats at year-end 2025.
Strategy’s own BTC Yield YTD stands at –4.6%.
Net Bitcoin purchases have failed to offset the dilution effect on a per-share basis. Further issuance of common shares to support cash reserves and preferred-stock obligations raises serious questions about the model’s central promise.
6. Never dilute below successive mNAV thresholds: First 2.5x basic, then 1.0x basic, then 1.22x EV.
BROKEN: Strategy’s original, more conservative issuance thresholds were progressively abandoned as its market premium compressed. Management subsequently referenced a roughly 1.22x enterprise-value mNAV threshold as a measure of accretive issuance.
That threshold was also breached as the premium compressed, yet common share issuance continued at lower premiums. Substantial proceeds were directed towards preferred-stock repurchases and cash reserves rather than Bitcoin accumulation.
The goalposts kept moving as the premium disappeared.
7. Maintain capital allocation discipline near 1x mNAV.
June 29: Strategy said it expected to “remain disciplined in its use of MSTR issuance, particularly when the stock trades at or near 1x mNAV.”
BROKEN: Common share issuance continued at compressed premiums, with substantial proceeds directed towards preferred-stock repurchases and cash reserves rather than Bitcoin accumulation. This is difficult to reconcile with the stated commitment to capital allocation discipline near 1x mNAV.
8. STRC as a stable, low-volatility instrument.
STRC was presented as a stable, money-market-like instrument, with an approximately 3% volatility target.
BROKEN: STRC fell as low as $71.25 in June 2026 and subsequently required substantial buyback support and a 12% dividend rate to recover towards par. Its realised volatility has materially exceeded the stated low-volatility objective.
9. Deploy the $42 billion capital plan methodically over three years.
BROKEN: The $42 billion figure announced in March 2026 represented new ATM capacity added on top of existing programmes: $21 billion in MSTR common stock and $21 billion in STRC preferred stock. It was framed as supporting continued, multi-year Bitcoin accumulation.
Strategy raised approximately $21.23 billion in total capital in 2026 through late October, but only $14.33 billion went towards Bitcoin purchases. Roughly $6.9 billion was directed towards USD reserves, preferred-stock repurchases (mainly STRC) and dividend coverage instead.
The Q3 figures are particularly revealing: Strategy raised approximately $5.41 billion through common stock issuance but spent only $588 million on Bitcoin.
The figures expose a significant shift in the pace and allocation of capital raised. What was presented as a multi-year Bitcoin accumulation plan has increasingly become a mechanism for funding reserves and managing preferred-stock obligations.
10. “There is no second-best crypto asset.”
Saylor repeatedly positioned Bitcoin as the only legitimate crypto asset and dismissed alternatives.
BROKEN: Strategy’s broader financial strategy has increasingly incorporated alternative digital-asset, DeFi and stablecoin yield opportunities. Its promotion of external protocols, including Apyx and Saturn, warrants scrutiny against its previous absolutist positioning on Bitcoin.
11. “Chasing yield is how you lose your Bitcoin.”
Saylor repeatedly warned against chasing yield and taking unnecessary risks with Bitcoin.
BROKEN: Strategy created and scaled STRC, a high-yield preferred security, introducing substantial recurring dividend obligations and additional financial complexity. Yield-driven preferred issuance, repurchases and associated capital management have become central to its structure, with Bitcoin sales also authorised to support those obligations.
The very financial engineering that Saylor warned against has become central to Strategy’s capital structure.
12. “Zero counterparty risk.”
Strategy has repeatedly presented its Bitcoin treasury model as a way to eliminate traditional financial and counterparty risks.
BROKEN: The expanding preferred-stock structure introduces significant financing, liquidity and dividend obligations. These create recurring cash requirements and reliance on continued capital-market access or Bitcoin monetisation, introducing structural risks that go well beyond simply holding Bitcoin.
13. Maintain accurate, lawful corporate accounting.
MicroStrategy’s accounting scandal in 2000 resulted in an SEC settlement and restatement of financial results.
HISTORICAL CREDIBILITY ISSUE: This is not a new accounting allegation, but an important part of Saylor’s corporate history that investors should not overlook when evaluating his financial reporting and credibility.
⸻
THE EVER-CHANGING mNAV GOALPOSTS
Is it a coincidence that every time $MSTR’s mNAV falls below 1x, a new valuation metric emerges that pushes the reported multiple back above 1x?
Look at the progression:
mNAV snapshot: November 17, 2026.
→ Basic mNAV: 0.76x
→ Diluted mNAV: 0.78x
→ EV mNAV: 1.04x
→ Net mNAV: 1.07x
Same company. Four different valuation metrics, with each successive measure presenting a higher multiple.
At what point does changing the denominator stop being financial innovation and start becoming narrative management via deceptive financial engineering?
Investors deserve consistency and transparency, not an ever-changing set of metrics that make the valuation look more favourable whenever the previous one becomes inconvenient.
⸻
That’s 13 points. And I’m sure I’ve missed a few.
Yet retail investors continue to swallow the narrative, the AI slop and the deceptive marketing tactics.
I’ll keep calling this out until the sector moves beyond this nonsense and the people who have damaged its reputation are replaced by the good actors building genuine Bitcoin and shareholder-aligned solutions.
Bitcoin’s integration into capital markets is inevitable.
The question is whether we build it on the same value-eroding financial engineering we came to Bitcoin to escape, or on models that actually align Bitcoin, companies and shareholders.
$MSTR $STRC
Dj Whitegold retweeted
Replying to @PlanetGreenest @billhanley10 @robbyparisi @Thomas_Fraser @JensenHuang @TeslaBoomerMama @elonmusk @DavidSacks
No : she will never be successful at running the company.
Conceiving, designing and drawing the most advanced chips is something that vey few people are able to do and require a formation which she does not have.
The board should review what happened to INTEL after they decided to fire their CEO for having "an affair":
1) They lost the complete dominance they had on 486 chips.
2) They got left in the dust by AMD
3) Their stock price went from 60 to 18.
Put an accountant at the head of Nvidia and the exact same will happen to them!



















