Looks like @krakenfx just shipped a CLI built for AI agents github.com/krakenfx/kraken-c… 134 commands. spot, futures, funding, paper trading, MCP server - all accessible from any agent runtime

great to see @dexscreener resolve the “unknown liquidity” issue for @TsunamiLaunch tokens on @CalamariDEX

#GM @wiredonink ☕🐱

I just sent a #GM to @WiredonInk! Have you GM’d today? 🫂🌅

Quotrons supercycle loading

you’ll hear it here, you’ll hear it there then all of a sudden you’ll see it everywhere it’s not about your JPEGs nor is it about your PFPs it’s about what we’ve yet to unlock

Fixed for you.

this is the direction i want to see v4 integrations move toward. credit to @0xbeans and @standard_rsv for taking venue-policy discovery through the standardization process with URC-5. i built around this problem with @Quotrons404 in early august, then worked directly with trading platforms to get the canonical execution path supported. on august 13th, i published the $QUOTRON integration guide: deployed contracts, a machine-readable manifest, complete ABIs, quoting instructions, approvals, and execution requirements. xitter.cf/cruelhandeth/status/20… Quotrons’ canonical v4 pool funds its Terminal reward engine and other protocol allocations. trading through a separate pool can bypass those mechanics, so i built three distinct enforcement controls: • address restrictions through setBlacklisted • runtime-codehash restrictions through banVenueCodehash • hook-authorized v4 settlement the third is the critical piece. v4 pools share a PoolManager. an ERC-20 transfer into or out of that contract does not, by itself, tell the token which pool produced the settlement. so, simply allowing PoolManager does not establish that the intended hook ran. Quotrons’ registered hook authorizes the QUOTRON settlement amount and direction in transient storage. the token checks and consumes that authorization when settlement occurs. inbound settlement additionally requires the canonical router, which supplies payer and recipient context to the hook. external venues are handled separately. address bans cover specific addresses; codehash bans can cover identical deployed clones. neither automatically covers every future pool or implementation. i documented those boundaries and the supported execution path, but getting trading platforms to consistently use it was another challenge (shout out @lute for being the first and only platform to directly integrate from my published work). i ran into this firsthand integrating Quotrons with @fomo in august. despite @0xProject already supporting the canonical path, i was seeing failed trades (and even worse, horribly priced fills) and routes through small v3 pools. the same token traded successfully through @opensea's 0x integration, which made the gap clear: upstream support did not automatically translate into compatible execution downstream. credit to @seyong for being responsive and helping coordinate the work, and to fomo's team for getting the route supported. i supplied the canonical contracts, execution docs, and a view quoter that returned output and payer-specific fees without requiring an existing balance or allowance. the integration got working through direct coordination. that experience, starting in august, is exactly why standardized venue discovery matters: a documented, functioning trading path still needed bespoke work to reach users. all of this shaped how i read 0x’s later “Uniswap v4 hooks were a mistake” article: xitter.cf/0xproject/status/20995… the malicious behavior they describe is a real concern. misleading quotes and unexpected settlement behavior demand stronger detection and execution checks. but i disagree with the headline’s conclusion. hooks let developers make trading behavior part of the product. the response should be clearer requirements, compatible execution, and verified user outcomes. 0x itself had supported Quotrons’ canonical path; the remaining friction extended across the integration stack. URC-5 addresses an important part of that friction by giving integrations a shared policy interface: • canonicalPools() exposes canonical v4 pool keys. • venueEnforcement() distinguishes preferred venues from enforced restrictions. • venueAllowed() exposes permissions by venue and direction. • externalVenues() exposes directional restrictions and allowlists outside v4. events keep cached policy current, and a standardized refusal error helps identify unsupported routes. directional permissions also let implementations block new deposits while preserving withdrawals. Quotrons’ existing address and codehash bans block both directions, so that is a useful distinction for future designs. discovery still complements execution support and security checks. a canonical declaration is not a security certification or a guarantee that an arbitrary router can execute the trade. there are enforcement limits too. when an intermediate token nets to zero entirely inside shared accounting, no ERC-20 transfer occurs for a transfer-level gate to inspect. the proposal explicitly acknowledges that. this is why @standard_rsv’s work matters. Quotrons had enforcement and integration docs, but supporting it still required direct coordination between myself, platforms, and routing providers. i’m grateful this is moving forward as i prepare to bring Quotrons to @inkonchain. the migration is an opportunity to carry these lessons into the next implementation and build toward better support at the liquidity and trading layer with explicit venue policy, clear execution requirements, and less guesswork for integrators. as routers and platforms adopt URC-5, that should mean less custom coordination and fewer failed routes for holders. after working through those problems firsthand, i’m excited and proud to see this moving toward a standardized venue policy for interacting with tokens and the economic models built around them. tfw "we must protect the quotrons" really ended up translating to protecting every projects economic model. gud tek if you ask me.

Quotrons enforcement primitives - token-level venue enforcement through address bans, runtime-codehash bans, and hook-authorized v4 settlement. @0xbeans / @standard_rsv creating the standardized venue-policy interface this is the way

“Few months ago, there were only few a projects to write about on @inkonchain, but now there is a lot more to catch up on.”