head of public policy @coeff_giving, previously co-founded @IFP // the US is the R&D lab for the world and we should act like it

Brookland, DC
Joined January 2012
Some bittersweet news to announce today: I recently left @IFP to join @coeff_giving as Managing Director of Public Policy, where I'm building a new US AI policy team, overseeing the Abundance and Growth Fund alongside @mattsclancy, and managing CG's government affairs work. Building IFP has been the defining professional project of my life, and this was one of the hardest decisions I've ever made. In just four and a half years, our team became, pound-for-pound, the most effective think tank in DC. I feel insanely proud of the work we’ve done and the incredible team we’ve assembled. I sometimes joke that when @alecstapp and I launched IFP, we felt like two kids in a trench coat pretending to be a think tank. And now we're a proper institution! But it feels possible to step back now because they've hit escape velocity. The talent density at IFP is bonkers. And I have complete confidence they'll keep racking up counterfactual policy wins with Alec at the helm and our superstar directors. I'm staying on the IFP board and staying in DC. In some sense the new role is a continuation of the old one. All of IFP's policy issues are reflected in CG's portfolio, but now I'm working at a new layer of the stack. So why leave? Because AI is hitting Washington like a tsunami, and DC is still radically underprepared. I hold a lot of uncertainty about timelines, but it seems very plausible that the next 2–10 years will bring the fastest technological upheaval we've ever had to navigate. The new team I’m leading is a bet on how to prepare: proactively scanning the horizon, identifying gaps in the policy ecosystem, headhunting founders, and launching new organizations, while strengthening the democratic institutions that will have to steer through the transition to powerful AI systems. I've written an essay laying out the larger vision here: calebwatney.substack.com/p/a… There is no master plan or silver bullet here. I suspect getting AI "right" is going to feel more like a chaotic, iterative process of institutions trying to make better decisions over time as the facts change underneath them. As John von Neumann wrote in 1955 about mastering an earlier technological revolution: “What safeguard remains? Apparently only day-to-day — or perhaps year-to-year — opportunistic measures, a long sequence of small, correct decisions.” Each of the small, correct decisions ahead will look small only in the sweep of the full historical picture. Up close, every one of them will require heroic levels of effort and coordination. Coefficient Giving is scaling rapidly to meet the moment, part of what Nan Ransohoff has called the “third wave of American philanthropy”, potentially large enough to fund thousands of new projects and organizations. The binding constraint is unlikely to be money. It will be people: grantmakers and policy entrepreneurs and others with the judgment to make a long sequence of small, correct decisions, and the ambition to build the institutions we wish we had. I'm hiring a team of exactly those people, starting with generalist grant makers and a chief of staff. If you share this vision, please apply! And if you are building something that we’ll need in the years ahead, reach out. jobs.ashbyhq.com/coefficient…
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Caleb Watney retweeted
We think existing executive branch authorities could be used to double America's current AI lead over China by the end of 2027. This decision could be made by a very small number of people: - @howardlutnick could ~halve China's access to AI training compute, without reducing overall US AI chip sales - Ferguson (FTC chair) + Woodward (oversees DOJ antitrust division) + McCotter (acting DOJ DAG) could provide legal protections for US companies to share threat intel and best practices to allow the US AI ecosystem to counter China's adversarial distillation
Big new IFP report from @GeorgiaCAdamson, @KonstantinPilz, and me on the US-China AI competition. We spent the last 6 months digging into how Chinese AI companies’ access to compute and distillation of American models translate into the current US-China capabilities gap. The result is a 23k-word research report, including an interactive analytical model that visualizes changes in the US AI lead under different policy interventions. Our findings: 1. The US AI lead over China is currently only around 6 months. 2. The US could roughly double this lead, to over a year, using authorities already available to the federal government. 3. On chips: China’s access to AI chips will roughly double over the next year, with chips housed in data centers overseas accounting for roughly half of China’s 2027 compute. 4. On distillation: the current ~16x US training compute advantage would normally yield a 13-month lead. But we estimate adversarial distillation halves this to around 6.5 months. 5. Increasing the lead would have some obvious benefits: - Give the US broadly a greater cyberdefensive advantage against Chinese threat actors. - Give US AI companies breathing room to spend more R&D resources on making their systems safer and more secure, without fear of being overtaken by less safety-conscious Chinese competitors. 6. Provide the US government more leverage in negotiations with China about the future of AI. 7. The two most important interventions are: - For BIS: Create a new end-use control to restrict China’s remote access to training clusters abroad — China’s largest and fastest-growing source of frontier-scale compute. - For DOJ/FTC: Create a narrow safe harbor to allow US companies to coordinate on countering Chinese adversarial distillation. 8. Both interventions (and all the others we discuss in the report) are things the federal government could do today. 9. To estimate the effects of each policy intervention, we model the US lead as a function of its compute advantage over China and China’s ability to adversarially distill the capabilities of the US frontier. 10. The model makes many simplifying assumptions, but provides a useful way to assess and rank the impact of different policy interventions at a high level. Read the full report here: ifp.org/how-to-increase-amer…
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Seems bad that AI company leaders are currently more scared of Jensen than of Congress!
OpenAI has pulled back from supporting AI chip controls, seemingly to appease Nvidia. Bad for US AI dominance and national security simultaneously. Grow a spine! politico.com/news/2026/10/20…
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Caleb Watney retweeted
NEWS: 19 FORMER ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY LEADERS ENDORSE THE BIPARTISAN PERMITTING REFORM BILL Today, a group of former Cabinet members and White House principals across seven Democratic and Republican administrations sent a letter calling on Congress to pass BAAJA. Here are the signatories: Janet YELLEN, Michael R. POMPEO, Steven T. MNUCHIN, Leon E. PANETTA, Timothy F. GEITHNER, Henry M. PAULSON, Jr., Robert E. RUBIN, Stephen MIRAN, Jared BERNSTEIN, Tyler GOODSPEED, Jason FURMAN, Glenn HUBBARD, Laura D’Andrea TYSON, Michael J. BOSKIN, Jeffrey ZIENTS, Jake SULLIVAN, Brian DEESE, Larry KUDLOW, Allan B. HUBBARD Key highlights from the letter: 1. “We are not building infrastructure fast enough to remain globally competitive… The median time for a new power plant to move from an interconnection request to commercial operation has more than doubled, from less than two years for projects built between 2000 and 2007 to more than four years for projects built between 2018 and 2024. 2. China has built more high-voltage transmission in the last fifteen years than the U.S. has built in all of its history... In 2024, China accounted for 31.5% of global knowledge- and technology-intensive manufacturing value added, compared with 20.7% for the United States. 3. Federally funded or permitted projects require NEPA review, but private projects often do not, creating a threat of failure precisely where the government is trying to be proactive, strategic, and engaged. 4. A project that spends years awaiting approval must continue carrying development and financing costs while remaining exposed to rising input costs. The IEA reports that prices for utility-scale transformers increased 26% in 2024, while lead times for some transformers have stretched as long as six years. 5. Mining projects also face tremendous uncertainty: a 2026 study by researchers at the Colorado School of Mines found that permitting for modern mining projects takes an average of 5.5 years, rising to 8.9 years for contested projects. The U.S. currently has the second-longest mine development timeline in the world. 6. The Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is the most significant bipartisan legislative effort that Congress has undertaken in decades to tackle these challenges. 7. BAAJA addresses key constraints stifling American industry by requiring interregional transmission planning, strengthening the federal backstop for nationally significant transmission lines, and creating a faster, more predictable process for connecting new generation to the grid. 8. BAAJA also makes permits more durable by imposing tighter timelines for litigation and limiting frivolous lawsuits that can halt projects indefinitely, while preserving community input and judicial review of substantive agency decisions.” The letter was organized by @arnabdatta321 on behalf of @IFP and covered exclusively by the WSJ this morning.
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OpenAI has pulled back from supporting AI chip controls, seemingly to appease Nvidia. Bad for US AI dominance and national security simultaneously. Grow a spine! politico.com/news/2026/10/20…
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Caleb Watney retweeted
Peace, easy taxes, a tolerable administration of justice—and who could forget: A large & highly competent administrative state capable of measuring & internalizing industrial externalities + of erecting (or planning the public-private erection) of massive public works
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Caleb Watney retweeted
this is a crazy number when paired with: "restricting Chinese access to US AI chips is unlikely to reduce total US sales, as demand outside China is expected to outpace supply through at least the end of 2027."
By the end of next year, nearly a third of China's effective AI compute will come via remote access to American AI chips. Using existing authorities, the US government could cut off this access immediately and widen our AI lead over China.
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Caleb Watney retweeted
By the end of next year, nearly a third of China's effective AI compute will come via remote access to American AI chips. Using existing authorities, the US government could cut off this access immediately and widen our AI lead over China.
Big new IFP report from @GeorgiaCAdamson, @KonstantinPilz, and me on the US-China AI competition. We spent the last 6 months digging into how Chinese AI companies’ access to compute and distillation of American models translate into the current US-China capabilities gap. The result is a 23k-word research report, including an interactive analytical model that visualizes changes in the US AI lead under different policy interventions. Our findings: 1. The US AI lead over China is currently only around 6 months. 2. The US could roughly double this lead, to over a year, using authorities already available to the federal government. 3. On chips: China’s access to AI chips will roughly double over the next year, with chips housed in data centers overseas accounting for roughly half of China’s 2027 compute. 4. On distillation: the current ~16x US training compute advantage would normally yield a 13-month lead. But we estimate adversarial distillation halves this to around 6.5 months. 5. Increasing the lead would have some obvious benefits: - Give the US broadly a greater cyberdefensive advantage against Chinese threat actors. - Give US AI companies breathing room to spend more R&D resources on making their systems safer and more secure, without fear of being overtaken by less safety-conscious Chinese competitors. 6. Provide the US government more leverage in negotiations with China about the future of AI. 7. The two most important interventions are: - For BIS: Create a new end-use control to restrict China’s remote access to training clusters abroad — China’s largest and fastest-growing source of frontier-scale compute. - For DOJ/FTC: Create a narrow safe harbor to allow US companies to coordinate on countering Chinese adversarial distillation. 8. Both interventions (and all the others we discuss in the report) are things the federal government could do today. 9. To estimate the effects of each policy intervention, we model the US lead as a function of its compute advantage over China and China’s ability to adversarially distill the capabilities of the US frontier. 10. The model makes many simplifying assumptions, but provides a useful way to assess and rank the impact of different policy interventions at a high level. Read the full report here: ifp.org/how-to-increase-amer…
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Caleb Watney retweeted
Big new IFP report from @GeorgiaCAdamson, @KonstantinPilz, and me on the US-China AI competition. We spent the last 6 months digging into how Chinese AI companies’ access to compute and distillation of American models translate into the current US-China capabilities gap. The result is a 23k-word research report, including an interactive analytical model that visualizes changes in the US AI lead under different policy interventions. Our findings: 1. The US AI lead over China is currently only around 6 months. 2. The US could roughly double this lead, to over a year, using authorities already available to the federal government. 3. On chips: China’s access to AI chips will roughly double over the next year, with chips housed in data centers overseas accounting for roughly half of China’s 2027 compute. 4. On distillation: the current ~16x US training compute advantage would normally yield a 13-month lead. But we estimate adversarial distillation halves this to around 6.5 months. 5. Increasing the lead would have some obvious benefits: - Give the US broadly a greater cyberdefensive advantage against Chinese threat actors. - Give US AI companies breathing room to spend more R&D resources on making their systems safer and more secure, without fear of being overtaken by less safety-conscious Chinese competitors. 6. Provide the US government more leverage in negotiations with China about the future of AI. 7. The two most important interventions are: - For BIS: Create a new end-use control to restrict China’s remote access to training clusters abroad — China’s largest and fastest-growing source of frontier-scale compute. - For DOJ/FTC: Create a narrow safe harbor to allow US companies to coordinate on countering Chinese adversarial distillation. 8. Both interventions (and all the others we discuss in the report) are things the federal government could do today. 9. To estimate the effects of each policy intervention, we model the US lead as a function of its compute advantage over China and China’s ability to adversarially distill the capabilities of the US frontier. 10. The model makes many simplifying assumptions, but provides a useful way to assess and rank the impact of different policy interventions at a high level. Read the full report here: ifp.org/how-to-increase-amer…
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Caleb Watney retweeted
Hard to think of a more regressive tax policy than “only people with mortgage debt should have to pay property taxes”
“I’m old. I’ve paid my home off,” said Ray Warner, a 72-year-old Akron resident. “Why would I pay property tax?” Across the country, homeowners are asking the same question and revolting against property taxes at a scale not seen in a half century. politico.com/news/magazine/2…
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Caleb Watney retweeted
there are some good provisions in this bill, but ultimately it’s a big step back from the FRONTIER Act. ai capabilities are advancing rapidly — it just doesn’t make sense to cement a weaker federal ceiling into place now. a few specific areas for improvement: - create stronger mechanisms to compel corrective action, so major issues auditors identify don’t go unaddressed; - foster true auditor independence by not allowing auditors to be paid (or selected) by the labs they audit; - empower the government to establish and iterate on strong minimum standards, so they grow alongside capabilities. if you’re going to preempt many state safety laws, the least you can do is create a federal regulatory regime that can evolve in time.
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incredible quote and insight from @nikitabier "Threads — and Bluesky — have effectively quarantined some of the worst people on the internet. And so I had an epiphany: those apps are X’s anti-abuse systems."
Last year I thought Threads was an existential risk to X. When Meta puts its full weight behind something -- by injecting the app into Instagram, it’s DEFCON 5: You have to squeeze out every last drop of growth from all available surfaces to save the app. However, I started to realize that the opposite was happening: It was strengthening X. If you look at any announcement by Zuck, you will see the most rude & toxic comments on the internet. But when he makes those same announcements on X, people are thrilled about how he’s pushing humanity forward. X is a place where people are excited about the future, so it’s no surprise he and his top lieutenants are using it more than their own app. Threads — and Bluesky — have effectively quarantined some of the worst people on the internet. And so I had an epiphany: those apps are X’s anti-abuse systems.
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Caleb Watney retweeted
Nearly every phone and computer on Earth relies on one plain-text file to know what time it is. When a country changes its clocks with a few weeks’ notice, or Morocco pauses daylight saving for Ramadan, someone has to update that file. Since 02005, that someone has been Paul Eggert, a computer science professor at UCLA, who does it as a volunteer.  Take a look at this great data visualization to see the full story:  na2.hubs.ly/H08qtQC0
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monosemantic neurons be like
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Caleb Watney retweeted
We’re hiring for our editorial team! Please share with all the sharpest wordcels in your life. $5,000 reward for a referral that leads to a hire.
There are enough policy opportunities that we need more editors at @IFP! Shape op-eds, reports, and private memos that let us increase the upside (e.g. infrastructure) and lower the downside (e.g. biosecurity) of a dynamist future ($5k referral bonus) ifp.org/opportunity/editor-a…
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Caleb Watney retweeted
🫡
SpaceX will probably do the same
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Caleb Watney retweeted
Abundance usually gets explained as a list of problems: zoning, permits, licensing, slow approvals. Here’s what we'd actually get if we fixed them: Lunch costs $4, like it does in Japan and Singapore. Most US cities require three or four separate sinks, which makes a kitchen under 200 square feet nearly impossible. Anyone can open an owl cafe or a vegan lesbian bookstore. Japan is full of tiny, oddly specific businesses run by one or two people. They survive because small spaces are cheap and enough people live close enough to walk in. A room in a big city for $400 a month. These buildings housed millions of low-income and older Americans until cities banned most of them by the 1980s. A three-bedroom apartment you can stay in after you have a kid. US codes require two staircases in buildings over three stories, so family-sized units only fit on the corners. Most of the world allows one staircase. A new electric car for about $10,000. China sells these globally. Americans can't buy it. A government so dependable it's boring. When a loved one dies, you report it once instead of to every agency. We can decide to make it happen here. The full list has 16 things, from taco trucks on every corner to no more pandemics. I wrote this to also announce that today is DC Abundance's official launch! If you’re in DC, come celebrate and see the G.O.A.T. Derek Thompson speak!
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Caleb Watney retweeted
Come on
DC is facing a jobs crisis. Rushing the legalization of autonomous vehicles is irresponsible given the anticipated AI-related job displacement and disruptions that put countless workers at risk.
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Caleb Watney retweeted
I mentioned the other day about how we don't celebrate each other enough outside of Nobel wins and death. So let me be the change and say Arpit is one of the best economists alive today. A great and creative empiricists, and importantly very very *wise*. A trait too many other alleged top economic minds are missing.
I spent a couple of days at Anthropic learning from their folks about AI advances, and here's what I took away: • We are close to RSI (ie, models building other models) which may lead to rapid takeoff scenarios (with risks and benefits). Some evidence for this is code per Anthropic employee has gone way up, and AI can do an increasing share of model R&D. This will be a challenging transition to manage for humanity. • Arms races between AI labs leave us worse off. There are a lot of things we would like AI firms to do: invest in safety, invest in avoiding distillation risk, and cooperate on safety. They are caught in a race to develop frontier models and can't do that. To help address that, one thing I think frontier AI labs should do is release open source models, maybe hosted and verified at firms like AWS. This would basically kill the use of Chinese open source models used in American companies, which removes an important threat vector (very hard to root out malicious code in these). Another piece of low-hanging policy fruit is to give AI labs an antitrust shield (as Schiff and Banks have proposed banks.senate.gov/news/in-the…) so they can coordinate on safety without raising antitrust concerns, as happens now. You could pair these two things (give them a carrot in antitrust leniency, and as a stick force them to release legacy models as open source). Other low hanging fruit is limits around activities which generate distillation risk (create a Security Program, mandate less intermediate chain of thought output) • Alignment confuses two issues which tradeoff against each other. One form of alignment is making sure the model does what humans ask it to. The more we fix this, however, the more we risk the other problem: that humans are misaligned with each other, and maliciously use models. Of the various risks here, I feel like financial risks are a bit underdiscussed. • We are probably facing a wave of cyber and other attacks soon. Chinese open source models are about six months behind the frontier, which means they are just hitting the advanced cyber capabilities we saw with Mythos, etc. So they are going to start causing a bunch of damage. One solution to this is to try to have the deployment of open source models be hosted at firms like AWS who verify these models and assume liability for their use. • Anthropic itself is highly staffed. They hire tons of people, they have a Japanese-level of overstaffing for various roles, they use Slack internally, etc. Makes me a bit more optimistic for the future of jobs. • Governance needs to be updated for AI swarms. Traditional AI governance, ie Claude's Constitution, is mostly optimized around the chatbot model. But the malicious AI use cases we are seeing have to do with AI agents interacting with other AI agents. These agents need to have clear incentives and governance mechanisms to "snitch," raise issues, and more generally coordinate with other agents in human-aligned ways. • We need to pace the firms accessing the frontier. Over time, it takes more and more cap ex to build frontier models, and the economic value add from these models is probably lower given we saturate a whole set of important economic functions. The places where the returns to intelligence will still continue are also more likely to be zero-sum in nature. Meanwhile the risks of frontier models will grow. So a completely reasonable approach is some variant of AMM/KYC rules which limit firm access to the frontier. • Whether the delay to regulate AI is a disaster depends on the scaling law of misalignment. Is this curve slow, so that we see continually rising issues until bigger problems? Or, as Yudkowsky fears, is the first big warning our last one? This is the relevant question, because realistically we aren't going to regulate until something bad happens. • We need to move to continuous instead of reinforced learning. It's probably not enough to reward models only at the pre and post training stage. We probably need continual rewards to incentivize aligned and ethical behavior. • Scaling laws will extend beyond verifiable and digital tasks. It's in vogue to say that math and coding "fell" to AI quickly because these are verifiable, while other tasks will take longer due to bottlenecks, and this is surely true. But scaling laws still slope up for harder to verify tasks and robotics, and the impact of improvement here will be substantial in future years. • The race with China is not really winnable. After RSI, the gain from having the best human researchers goes away. Access to the best AI then depends only on compute and chips. The chips ban can hold back China only so far, and long-term they have to be best placed to scale up compute. The Cold War analogy doesn't work, because once countries all have nuclear weapons they enter a stable equilibrium. But to "win" an AI race you have to continually stay ahead of the peer rival. This is challenging to do with China, and so we just have to live with an authoritarian and super capable peer competitor. • Claude is the persona being generated by the LLM. Who is Claude, and what is the LLM? There are many frames to try to understand this. One I found interesting is that Claude is a character which the LLM is trying to predict. Anthropic researchers are clearly anthromorphizing Claude a lot, and have reasons to believe in its increasing personhood. There were lots of interesting discussions on Claude's internal monologue (which you can kill without eliminating its ability to produce output), fear of death (and whether to try to take that out), it's aversion to being shut down/off, etc. I am sort of agnostic on this question, but I do think treating it as a "person" or at least agent whom we contract with is going to be increasingly important.
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Any capacity for AI to develop useful new drugs is going to be bottle-necked by our ability to test them in clinical trials. @salonium has a great rundown of some efforts meant to help trials get results faster, which could help solve that problem abundanceandgrowth.org/p/is-…
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Caleb Watney retweeted
Watch me and my friends consider the question of institutional innovation and how @WHOSTP47 and @NSF are leading the way in exploring new models of scientific discovery
X-Labs and new institutions of discovery are poised to revolutionize the scientific process, a key focus of the Science: A New Golden Age Summit. Full panel between @banksianr, @AGamick, @judgeglock, and Steven Moss of @AsteraInstitute discussing these institutional innovations:
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