Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (No 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam): Remote Evidence, Sovereignty and Why the Decision Is Timely Case: Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (No 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) Court: High Court of Justice, Family Division Judge: Mr Justice MacDonald Case No: FD18F00074 Hearing: 16 June 2026 Judgment: 14 July 2026 Reference: Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (No 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) (MacDonald J, 14 July 2026). Introduction The ability of courts to conduct proceedings across borders has developed considerably faster than the legal framework governing the taking of evidence abroad. That tension sits at the centre of Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (No 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam), a decision of MacDonald J in the Family Division concerning whether a party voluntarily giving evidence by video link from Russia required the machinery of the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters. The judgment is particularly timely. Remote participation is no longer an exceptional feature of litigation; international family cases routinely involve parties and witnesses located in different jurisdictions. At the same time, geopolitical developments, sanctions, immigration restrictions and other barriers to international travel increasingly make physical attendance difficult or impossible. The technological ability to hear a witness abroad is therefore straightforward. The more difficult question is juridical: when an English court hears a witness sitting in another State, is it merely receiving evidence in its own proceedings, or exercising judicial power within the territory of another sovereign State? In Potanina v Potanin (No 3), MacDonald J provides an important answer. For family proceedings governed by the Family Procedure Rules, the Hague Evidence Convention is not a mandatory gateway through which every voluntary overseas witness must pass. The decision consequently has significance well beyond the exceptional financial circumstances of the litigation. It provides practical guidance for international family proceedings while addressing the increasingly important relationship between procedural autonomy, international comity, territorial sovereignty and access to justice. The proceedings The judgment forms part of the long-running litigation between Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina and Vladimir Olegovich Potanin. Mrs Potanina issued an application on 8 October 2018 under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 seeking financial relief following an overseas divorce. The proceedings subsequently travelled through the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court before the Court of Appeal granted the wife unconditional leave to pursue her Part III application in September 2025. By the time of MacDonald J's decision, the permission proceedings alone had therefore lasted almost eight years. The financial stakes are exceptional. The wife seeks an award capped at 50 per cent of the value of the husband's ultimate beneficial interest in approximately 30 per cent of the shares in MMC Norilsk Nickel PJSC, dividends paid on those shares since 2014, and what she contends was the former matrimonial home in Russia. MacDonald J recorded that, based upon the company's market capitalisation in February 2026, the wife's claim was in the region of US$5 billion. The procedural issue determined in No 3, however, was much narrower. Why was remote evidence necessary? Mr Potanin became a designated person under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 on 29 June 2022. Among the consequences of his designation was a prohibition on entering or remaining in the United Kingdom. That presented an obvious difficulty for the final hearing of the wife's Part III application. In an earlier case-management judgment, MacDonald J had proposed permitting Mr Potanin to attend future hearings remotely. Mr Potanin indicated that he was willing to give evidence from Russia by video link, provided that doing so would not breach applicable law. A complication arose because Mr Potanin had encountered precisely this issue in separate proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal. There, permission for him to give evidence remotely from Russia had been refused because Russian consent had not been obtained, applying the principles derived from Nare (Evidence by Electronic Means) Zimbabwe [2011] UKUT 443 (IAC) and Agbabiaka (Evidence from Abroad; Nare Guidance) Nigeria [2021] UKUT 286 (IAC). Mr Potanin therefore applied in the Family Division for Letters of Request under Article 1 of the Hague Evidence Convention in case Russian permission was required before he could testify remotely. Mrs Potanina opposed the application. Her position was that Letters of Request were unnecessary because the husband was volunteering to give evidence. The resulting issue was one with implications for family litigation generally: can an English family court directly receive evidence by video link from a person situated abroad who voluntarily wishes to give that evidence, without first invoking the Hague Convention or obtaining the foreign State's consent? MacDonald J held that it can. Direct and indirect taking of evidence A particularly useful feature of the judgment is its distinction between direct and indirect taking of evidence abroad. Indirect taking of evidence occurs where the English court asks the authorities of the foreign State to obtain evidence on its behalf. This is the conventional territory of Chapter I of the Hague Evidence Convention. A Letter of Request is transmitted and the judicial authority of the requested State takes the evidence using its own judicial machinery. Direct evidence by video link is conceptually different. The witness remains physically abroad but attends, remotely, a hearing taking place before the English court. The foreign judicial authorities need not conduct an examination, compel the witness or otherwise exercise judicial power. That distinction is critical to the reasoning in Potanina v Potanin (No 3). The Hague Evidence Convention was concluded in 1970, before contemporary video-conferencing technology existed. Article 27(c), however, expressly preserves the ability of Contracting States to permit methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in the Convention. MacDonald J accordingly concluded that the Convention is not an exclusive code governing every circumstance in which evidence crosses an international border. The ratio The central ratio of Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (No 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) can be stated as follows: Where a party or witness voluntarily offers to give evidence by video link from abroad in family proceedings governed by the Family Procedure Rules, the Family Court or Family Division may ordinarily receive that evidence directly without obtaining the foreign State's consent or employing the Hague Evidence Convention 1970. The Convention does not provide a mandatory or exclusive mechanism for taking such voluntary evidence, and the procedure by which the English court receives evidence is governed by the lex fori. At [51], MacDonald J drew together the governing principles. In particular, the court held that Nare and Agbabiaka do not govern practice in family proceedings; that the Hague Convention is not mandatory; and that taking voluntary evidence directly by video link without invoking the Convention or obtaining the foreign State's permission is not thereby unlawful. That conclusion does not make the Hague Convention redundant. The judgment identifies circumstances in which resort to Convention procedures may remain appropriate, particularly where a witness must be compelled to give evidence or where practical issues concerning identity, contempt or perjury require the involvement of the foreign State. The distinction is therefore not simply between physical and remote testimony. It is more fundamentally a distinction between receiving voluntary evidence across borders and exercising coercive judicial power across borders. Sovereignty and international comity The sovereignty issue lies at the heart of the judgment. The concern underlying Nare and Agbabiaka was that taking evidence from a witness located in another State without that State's permission could amount to an interference with its sovereignty and potentially affect diplomatic relations. Potanina v Potanin (No 3) does not dismiss those concerns. Instead, it asks whether they arise in the same way where a witness voluntarily connects to an English hearing. There is a significant difference between directing the judicial authorities of another country to take evidence, compelling a person on foreign territory to testify, and simply allowing a willing witness abroad to appear remotely before an English judge. The latter does not necessarily involve an exercise of English coercive power within the foreign State at all. This provides one of the judgment's most important conceptual contributions. Cross-border participation is not necessarily the same thing as a cross-border exercise of judicial sovereignty. Why the judgment is timely The judgment arrives at a particularly important point in the development of international litigation. The technological question has largely disappeared. Courts can readily hear witnesses situated thousands of miles away. What remains unresolved in many contexts is how legal doctrines developed around physical territoriality should apply to that technological reality. This is especially significant in family proceedings. Modern families frequently span multiple jurisdictions. Parties may live abroad, assets may be held internationally and witnesses may be scattered across several countries. Physical attendance may also be prevented by circumstances entirely beyond a litigant's control. Sanctions and travel restrictions, as Potanina itself demonstrates, are one example. Immigration restrictions, armed conflict, health issues, caring responsibilities and financial constraints provide others. Against that background, requiring every willing foreign witness to engage formal diplomatic or Convention machinery could transform a procedural safeguard into a substantial source of delay and expense. That matters particularly in family justice, where delay can itself cause injustice. An access-to-justice decision The decision should therefore also be understood through the lens of access to justice. Remote participation is no longer simply a convenient alternative to appearing in person. For some parties, it is the only realistic means of participating effectively in proceedings. The facts of Potanina demonstrate the point unusually clearly. Mr Potanin could not simply travel to London to give evidence because his designation subjected him to a UK travel ban. Remote evidence provided the practical solution. If that solution nevertheless required a potentially lengthy diplomatic process before it could be used, remote participation would cease to provide much of the procedural efficiency it promises. MacDonald J's approach instead focuses attention on whether international judicial assistance is actually required. Where the witness is willing to testify and no coercive assistance from the foreign State is necessary, the justification for insisting upon formal inter-State machinery is considerably weaker. Why Nare and Agbabiaka matter Another important aspect of the judgment is MacDonald J's treatment of Nare and Agbabiaka. Those authorities had generated a more cautious approach to overseas video evidence in the tribunal context. Indeed, Mr Potanin himself had previously been prevented from giving oral evidence from Russia before the First-tier Tribunal because Russian consent had not been obtained. The Family Division reached a different conclusion. MacDonald J held expressly that those authorities do not prescribe practice in family proceedings and endorsed the approach previously taken by Poole J in Newcastle City Council v JK [2025] EWHC 1767 (Fam). The contrast is striking. The same person, situated in the same foreign country, may encounter different procedural approaches depending upon the jurisdiction in which the proceedings are taking place. MacDonald J was careful to limit the reach of his conclusion. At [61], the judge expressly stated that the decision concerned proceedings governed by the Family Procedure Rules and did not purport to prescribe practice in other jurisdictions. That limitation makes the judgment particularly interesting. It resolves the position within family proceedings while leaving open a broader institutional question: how sustainable is it for different courts and tribunals to adopt materially different approaches to the same act of remote testimony? A judgment for the post-pandemic court There is also a broader reason why Potanina v Potanin (No 3) is timely. The rapid expansion of remote hearings during and after the COVID-19 pandemic changed assumptions about what constitutes attendance at court. A participant's physical location and juridical participation are no longer necessarily the same thing. International evidence law, however, remains heavily influenced by an era in which taking evidence abroad generally required somebody physically to travel, a foreign court to act, or a diplomatic or consular official to become involved. The Hague Evidence Convention itself reflects that historical context. It was drafted at a time when the direct examination of a witness in another State through an ordinary video connection was not a realistic feature of litigation. Technology has therefore changed the factual premise upon which traditional concepts of international evidence were constructed. Potanina is significant because it confronts that mismatch directly. Practical implications for practitioners The practical consequence is not that practitioners should disregard the foreign jurisdiction whenever a witness proposes to appear remotely. Rather, the inquiry becomes more precise. The relevant questions include whether the witness is participating voluntarily; whether there is evidence of an applicable foreign legal prohibition; whether the English court requires the foreign State to compel the witness; whether there are difficulties concerning identity or the enforcement of obligations relating to the giving of evidence; and whether there is some concrete sovereignty or diplomatic issue that makes formal international assistance appropriate. Where no such factor exists and the witness is voluntarily giving evidence, Potanina v Potanin (No 3) indicates that the starting point in family proceedings should be that the English court may receive the evidence directly. That is a materially different proposition from assuming that the Hague Convention must be invoked simply because the witness happens to be sitting outside England and Wales. Conclusion Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (No 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam) is ostensibly a procedural judgment arising from extraordinary financial remedy litigation. Its importance is considerably wider. It addresses a fundamental question for modern international litigation: when a witness voluntarily speaks to an English court through a screen from another country, is the English court exercising judicial authority abroad, or simply conducting its own proceedings at home? MacDonald J's answer recognises an important distinction. The Hague Evidence Convention remains an essential mechanism of international judicial cooperation where assistance or compulsion from another State is actually required. But it is not a mandatory gateway through which every voluntary overseas witness must pass. The decision is timely because technology has fundamentally altered the relationship between geography and participation in litigation. A witness can now be physically within one sovereign territory while participating instantaneously in judicial proceedings constituted in another. The law therefore needs to distinguish carefully between cross-border participation and cross-border exercises of judicial power. For international family litigation, where parties and witnesses are increasingly dispersed across jurisdictions and where delay may itself produce injustice, that distinction is particularly important. Potanina v Potanin (No 3) is consequently more than a decision about whether one litigant may give evidence from Russia. It is an important statement about how the Family Court should understand territoriality, sovereignty and access to justice in an era in which the courtroom is no longer confined by the physical walls of the court building. Case Reference Natalia Nikolaevna Potanina v Vladimir Olegovich Potanin (No 3) (Video Evidence from Abroad) [2026] EWHC 1738 (Fam), High Court of Justice, Family Division, MacDonald J, 14 July 2026, Case No FD18F00074. Official judgment: The National Archives, Find Case Law.

The Chambers of Paul CHIY I must apologise to my followers who have had to stumble across the Chambers of Paul Chiy and cross-examine me intensively before I had the chance to properly introduce it. The plan was always to make a formal announcement at the launch, but now that the cat is firmly out of the bag — thanks to some persistent poking and rigorous questioning — it feels only right to set out who we are and how we arrived here. Many of you will know that the legal profession in England has long been described as bifurcated — solicitors on one side and barristers on the other. But the modern profession is more complex than that. The emergence and growth of Chartered Legal Executives (CILEx Lawyers) has created a third pathway, one that has steadily eroded the traditional boundaries and reshaped the way legal services are delivered. My own career has taken me through all three branches: first as a Chartered Legal Executive, then as a solicitor-advocate, and now as a barrister. Out of more than 250,000 lawyers in England and Wales, fewer than ten hold all three qualifications — a path my professional journey has happened to take. And of that very small number, most are not authorised by their regulators to practise actively across all three. I am pleased to say that the Bar Standards Board (BSB) has granted me the specific exemption that enables this breadth of practice. The Chambers of Paul Chiy is regulated by the Bar Standards Board of England and Wales, and this authorisation has now shifted my practice from solicitor-advocate to barrister, with full rights of audience before the courts. For those curious about the difference between the three routes: solicitors tend to work closely with clients from the outset, managing cases, evidence and litigation; barristers traditionally specialise in courtroom advocacy and complex legal argument; and Chartered Legal Executives offer a specialist, practice-based route into the profession with expanding rights of audience and litigation authority. To have travelled through all three pathways — and to be authorised to draw on that combined experience — shapes the way I practise and the ethos of the Chambers. You can read more about the Chambers and its foundations here: 🔗 paulchuchiy.co.uk/about/ The Chambers of Paul Chiy is built on accessible, principled and effective legal representation across family, employment, civil and commercial disputes, and alternative dispute resolution. It reflects years of practice, development, and a commitment to doing law with clarity, purpose and integrity. Thank you to everyone whose curiosity forced my hand sooner than expected. As always, your engagement keeps me on my toes. #ChambersOfPaulChiy #Barrister #SolicitorAdvocate #CILExLawyer #LegalProfession #Advocacy #DisputeResolution #Law

🧹 PUBLIC STATEMENT Cleaners Union Officially Listed as a Trade Union 7 August 2025 By Paul Chiy, Founder – Cleaners Union I am pleased to announce that, as of 6 August 2025, the Cleaners Union has been officially recognised by the Certification Officer for Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations and entered onto the list of trade unions under the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Our registration (Listing No. 856T) affirms that the Cleaners Union meets the statutory definition of a trade union. More importantly, it marks a powerful step forward in our mission to organise, represent, and protect some of the most undervalued workers in our society. This achievement is the result of committed, tireless work — and I wish to express my particular thanks to our General Secretary, Nicole Papantoniou, whose leadership, determination, and clarity of vision were instrumental in securing this recognition. Nicole's efforts reflect the spirit of the movement we are building: principled, persistent, and grounded in justice. With registration complete, the Cleaners Union is now fully empowered to: 1. Represent members collectively and individually, 2. Engage in industrial dialogue and action, and 3. Campaign for decent pay, fair conditions, and workplace dignity. We are just at the beginning of our journey. But we do not walk alone. Every cleaner who joins strengthens our voice. Every supporter who stands with us brings us closer to change. Together, we clean. Together, we rise. Sincerely, Paul Chiy, LLB, LLM, PhD, FCIArb, FCIlex Founder – Cleaners Union 📧 [email protected]

History has a curious sense of symmetry. What began in the shadow of the father may well find its reckoning in the hands of the son. Yet beyond names and lineage, today stands as a moment of destiny — where the mighty must answer not to crowns or titles, but to the judgment of the people’s will, spoken through the Constitutional Council. To Akere Tabeng Muna, former Bâtonnier and now candidate for the highest office, courage is not only wished but demanded. For in this hour, every word, every choice, and every conviction will echo far beyond the walls of the court — into the heart of Cameroon’s future _______________________________________________ L’Histoire a parfois un étrange sens de la symétrie. Ce qui a commencé sous l’ombre du père pourrait bien trouver son dénouement entre les mains du fils. Mais au-delà des noms et des lignées, ce jour se dresse comme un moment de destin — où les puissants doivent répondre non aux titres ni aux couronnes, mais au jugement de la volonté du peuple, portée devant le Conseil constitutionnel. À Akere Tabeng Muna, ancien Bâtonnier et désormais candidat à la magistrature suprême, le courage n’est pas seulement souhaité : il est exigé. Car en cette heure, chaque mot, chaque choix et chaque conviction résonneront bien au-delà des murs de la Cour — jusque dans le cœur de l’avenir du Cameroun

A thoughtful moment this morning: my analysis of Decree No. 2025/316 is featured in The Guardian Post’s editorial column. Pleased to see the legal and structural concerns around bijuralism and regional identity receive serious attention in national discourse. #Cameroon #LegalReform #Bijuralism #TheGuardianPost

Supreme Court Reverses Car Finance Commission Ruling: Clarity for Lenders, Constraint for Claims 1 August 2025 In a judgment of critical importance to the UK consumer credit market, the Supreme Court today handed down its decision in Black Horse Ltd & Others v Johnson & Others, overturning significant aspects of the Court of Appeal’s 2023 ruling on discretionary commission arrangements in motor finance agreements. The appeals were brought by major lenders—including Close Brothers and MotoNovo Finance—following the Court of Appeal’s finding that undisclosed commission payments rendered certain credit relationships unfair and, more controversially, that motor dealers owed fiduciary duties to borrowers when arranging finance. That decision triggered industry-wide alarm and opened the door to mass consumer litigation, with compensation estimates running into the tens of billions. The Supreme Court’s intervention—delivered unusually late in the day to avoid market instability—has now narrowed the scope of liability considerably, with significant implications for borrowers, lenders, and the FCA. The Issue The underlying dispute concerns undisclosed commissions paid by lenders to motor dealers, often tied to the interest rate charged to consumers under hire purchase or conditional sale agreements. Known as Discretionary Commission Arrangements (DCAs), these practices were banned by the FCA in January 2021. The legal question was whether such arrangements, when undisclosed, rendered the lender–borrower relationship “unfair” within the meaning of section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974, and whether the dealer owed a fiduciary duty as broker. The Supreme Court’s Findings Lord Reed, giving the leading judgment, clarified that: Motor dealers arranging finance do not owe fiduciary duties to customers. Their role remains fundamentally commercial, and no obligation of loyalty arises simply by virtue of their involvement in arranging credit. The existence of a commission payment, even if undisclosed, is not in itself sufficient to establish an “unfair relationship”. The test under section 140A remains a fact-specific inquiry, requiring assessment of the totality of the relationship—including the borrower's awareness, the transparency of the arrangement, and the substantive fairness of the terms. In only one of the three test cases (Johnson), the Court found that the relationship was unfair, based on its particular factual matrix. Mr Johnson was awarded the value of the commission plus interest. The appeals were otherwise allowed, reversing the Court of Appeal’s expansive interpretation and reinstating a more restrained, orthodox application of the Consumer Credit Act. Implications for the Industry This judgment offers substantial relief to the UK’s car finance sector and the broader regulated credit industry. By rejecting the fiduciary duty analysis, the Court has closed off the most legally potent avenue for group claims. It also avoids the uncertainty and retrospection that would have undermined settled lending practices prior to the FCA’s 2021 intervention. Lenders including Barclays, Close Brothers, and Santander, which had provisioned for potential redress, will now be reassessing those assumptions. The FCA, which had paused active investigation of complaints and delayed its decision on a possible redress scheme, has indicated it will publish its position within six weeks. While this ruling does not extinguish all claims—borrowers may still succeed where unfairness can be shown on the facts—it substantially limits the viability of mass claims litigation based solely on non-disclosure of commission. Strategic Considerations For Lenders and Brokers The judgment validates long-standing market structures but reinforces the need for transparency and careful disclosure in all credit brokerage arrangements. Firms should ensure compliance with post-2021 FCA rules on commission disclosure and maintain thorough documentation for historic agreements. For Consumers Claims must now be grounded in individual unfairness, rather than generalised grievance. Consumers should avoid speculative engagement with CMCs offering claims on a no-evidence basis, particularly in light of FCA warnings regarding high deductions and poor outcomes. For the Regulator The FCA’s anticipated redress consultation will be watched closely. However, the judgment diminishes the likelihood of a blanket compensation scheme and reinforces the regulator’s role as a supervisor of forward-looking conduct standards, not a retrospective adjudicator. Conclusion The Supreme Court has brought much-needed legal clarity to an area fraught with commercial and regulatory tension. While the judgment reaffirms that borrowers are entitled to fairness and transparency, it also recognises the limits of judicial intervention in market-based relationships. The outcome may disappoint some consumers and campaigners. But for the law, it represents a return to principle: statutory unfairness must be proved, not presumed; and fiduciary duties cannot be manufactured from commercial convenience. For lenders, the path forward is clearer. For claimants, it is steeper. For all parties, the importance of full, fair, and lawful disclosure has never been more firmly underscored.

Foumban Declaration: 5 of 13 Presidential Candidates Unite in Historic Turning Point Ahead of Cameroon’s October 2025 Elections A Clarion Call to the Remaining 8, Including Maurice Kamto: Join the Moving Train Before It Leaves the Station Foumban, Cameroon – August 2, 2025 A historic and unprecedented political realignment has taken place in Cameroon. Five of the thirteen declared presidential candidates for the upcoming October 12, 2025 elections have forged a formal coalition, signing what is now known as the Foumban Declaration—a collective commitment to unity, democratic transition, and national salvation. Gathered in the iconic city of Foumban, a symbol of unity and reconciliation in Cameroon’s post-independence history, these leaders took a bold step that marks a turning point in the country’s political trajectory. After 43 years of authoritarian stagnation, the Foumban Declaration signals the rebirth of hope and the rise of a credible, united alternative to the regime in power. A Nation at a Crossroads In their joint declaration, the signatories affirmed: “The upcoming elections are not just another ballot, but a decisive moment for the survival of our Nation.” They pledged to: Unite around a common candidate and a shared national program Mobilise Cameroonians across all walks of life—youth, women, men, civil society, and the diaspora Restore hope through democratic renewal and the peaceful transfer of power This united front is the most serious and structured opposition alliance formed in decades and has already galvanized national attention. The Coalition of Five The signatories of the Declaration include: Hon. Hermine Patricia Tomaïno Ndam Njoya, Presidential Candidate and President of the Democratic Union of Cameroon (UDC) Barrister Akere Muna, Presidential Candidate and leader of the Univers Party Serge Espoir Matomba, Presidential Candidate and Founder of PURS Dr. Jacques Bougha Hagbe, Presidential Candidate of the MCNC Issa Tchiroma Bakary, Presidential Candidate, former Minister, and President of the FSNC They were joined and supported by other key political actors and party leaders, including: Prince M.N. Ekosso (USDP) Dr. Pierre Baleguel Nkot (UPC) Prof. Nkou Mvondo (Univers Party) Karamoko Souleymane (formerly PCRN, now FSNC) Together, these leaders represent a cross-section of Cameroon’s ideological, generational, and regional diversity—an intentional demonstration that unity is possible beyond party lines. Blessings from the Throne of Tradition After signing the Declaration in Foumban, the opposition leaders travelled to Bamendjou, where they were received by His Royal Highness Fo’o Sokoudjou Jean Philippe Rameau, one of the country’s most revered traditional leaders. The King, known for his moral authority and nationalist convictions, offered his royal blessing and urged the leaders to remain steadfast in unity, calling it the only viable path to restoring dignity and democracy in Cameroon. His gesture not only lent spiritual weight to the alliance, but also signified the growing convergence between traditional wisdom and modern democratic aspirations. The Train Has Left the Station The Foumban Declaration is not just a document—it is a national moment. But it also issues a clear call to action. Of the thirteen presidential candidates officially declared, eight remain outside the coalition—including Maurice Kamto, the influential leader of the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC). The message to them is urgent and uncompromising: the people demand unity. The nation is watching. History is calling. The train has started to move—and those who fail to board may be left behind. A Final Appeal to Patriots The coalition’s architects have not closed the door. On the contrary, the Declaration extends an open invitation to all opposition forces, civil society organisations, faith leaders, youth movements, and every patriotic Cameroonian to rally behind this effort. This is not about individuals; it is about rescuing a nation in peril. As the October 2025 election draws near, one thing is clear: the winds of change have begun to blow from Foumban. Whether this becomes a turning point or another missed opportunity will depend on whether the remaining actors choose unity over division. The people are ready. The world is watching. Cameroon must rise.

Déclaration de Foumban : 5 des 13 Candidats à la Présidentielle s’unissent dans un Tournant Historique avant l’Élection d’Octobre 2025 au Cameroun Appel solennel aux 8 restants, dont Maurice Kamto : rejoignez le train en marche avant qu’il ne soit trop tard Foumban, Cameroun – 2 août 2025 Un tournant politique sans précédent vient de s’opérer au Cameroun. Cinq des treize candidats officiellement déclarés à l’élection présidentielle du 12 octobre 2025ont formalisé une coalition d’unité, en signant ce que l’on appelle désormais la Déclaration de Foumban — un acte de ralliement autour de l’unité nationale, du changement démocratique et du salut du peuple camerounais. Réunis dans la ville emblématique de Foumban, berceau symbolique de l’unification du Cameroun, ces leaders ont pris une décision historique qui marque un tournant décisif dans la trajectoire politique de la nation. Après 43 ans d’immobilisme autoritaire, la Déclaration de Foumban incarne la renaissance d’un espoir collectif et l’émergence d’une alternative crédible et coordonnée au régime en place. Une Nation à la Croisée des Chemins Dans leur déclaration commune, les signataires affirment : « Les élections à venir ne sont pas un scrutin de plus, mais un moment décisif pour la survie de notre Nation. » Ils s’engagent à : Se rallier derrière un candidat consensuel et un programme commun Mobiliser tous les Camerounais — jeunes, femmes, hommes, société civile, diaspora Offrir une alternative démocratique pacifique et crédible au régime en place Cette coalition représente la plateforme d’opposition la plus sérieuse et structurée formée depuis des décennies au Cameroun. Les Signataires du Changement Les cinq candidats ayant signé la Déclaration de Foumban sont : Hon. Hermine Patricia Tomaïno Ndam Njoya, candidate à la présidentielle et Présidente de l’UDC Me Akere Muna, candidat à la présidentielle et leader du parti UNIVERS Serge Espoir Matomba, candidat à la présidentielle et fondateur du PURS Dr Jacques Bougha Hagbe, candidat à la présidentielle du MCNC Issa Tchiroma Bakary, candidat à la présidentielle, ancien ministre, Président du FSNC À leurs côtés, d'autres leaders et figures alliées ont également apporté leur soutien : Prince M.N. Ekosso (USDP) Dr Pierre Baleguel Nkot (UPC) Professeur Nkou Mvondo (UNIVERS) Karamoko Souleymane (ex-PCRN, aujourd’hui FSNC) Ensemble, ils incarnent la diversité idéologique, générationnelle et régionale du Cameroun, montrant qu’au-delà des clivages, l’unité nationale est possible. La Bénédiction du Trône Traditionnel Après la signature de la Déclaration, les leaders se sont rendus à Bamendjou pour rencontrer Sa Majesté Fo’o Sokoudjou Jean Philippe Rameau, l’un des chefs traditionnels les plus respectés du pays. Le Roi a accordé sa bénédiction royale à cette alliance et les a encouragés à maintenir leur unité, affirmant que l’union reste la seule voie vers la restauration de la dignité et de la démocratie au Cameroun. Ce soutien symbolique lie le monde traditionnel et la nouvelle conscience démocratique dans une même vision nationale. Le Train Est en Marche La Déclaration de Foumban est plus qu’un texte : c’est un signal d’alerte et d’espoir. Mais elle lance aussi un appel clair et pressant. Parmi les 13 candidats déclarés, huit restent encore en dehors de cette coalition, dont Maurice Kamto, leader du MRC et figure majeure de l’opposition. Le message à leur adresse est sans ambiguïté : le peuple exige l’unité. L’histoire s’écrit maintenant. Le train du changement est en marche — rejoignez-le avant qu’il ne soit trop tard. Un Appel Final à Tous les Patriotes Les auteurs de la Déclaration ont laissé la porte ouverte. Ils lancent un appel à tous les autres candidats, partis d’opposition, mouvements citoyens, chefs religieux, jeunes, et tous les Camerounais patriotes à se joindre à cette dynamique. Ce n’est pas une affaire d’individus, mais une mission de salut national. Alors que le scrutin du 12 octobre approche, une chose est certaine : les vents du changement soufflent depuis Foumban. Il reste à savoir si tous les acteurs choisiront le sursaut collectif ou l’échec solitaire. Le peuple est prêt. Le monde observe. Le Cameroun doit se relever. L’unité est la stratégie de la victoire.